The FBI, Franklin Roosevelt, and the Anti -interventionist Movement, 1939 -1945 by Charles, Douglas Michael
The FBI, Franklin Roosevelt, and the Anti -interventionist Movement, 1939 -1945. 
Douglas Michael Charles 
Doctor of Philosophy 
The University of Edinburgh 
2002 
CONTENTS 
Abstract (page ii) 
Introduction (page 1) 
Chapter One The Bureau of Investigation and the Origins of FBI Political 







The Roosevelt Administration, Foreign Policy, and the 
Expansion of FBI Authority, 1933 -1939 (page 54) 
FBI Surveillance of Charles A. Lindbergh, 1939 -1944 
(page 82) 
FBI Surveillance of the America First Committee, 1940 -1945 
(page 117) 
FBI Surveillance of Congressional Anti- interventionists: 
Burton Wheeler, Hamilton Fish, and Gerald Nye (page 161) 
The FBI, the Victory Program Leak, and the Chicago Tribune, 
1941 -1942 (page 216) 
FBI Surveillance of Anti- interventionists Extending Beyond 
Pearl Harbor: The Brigham Family, Harry Elmer Barnes, and 
Laura Ingalls (page 257) 
Chapter Eight The FBI, British Intelligence, and the Anti- interventionists, 
1940 -1942 (page 304) 
Conclusion (page 339) 
Bibliography (page 347) 
Acknowledgements 
After years of seemingly endless education, research, and writing it is indeed 
a joy to thank those who made the experience worthwhile. I've benefited from 
superb advising throughout my academic career, beginning with Robert Szymczak 
and John Rossi (Pennsylvania State University), Athan Theoharis (Marquette 
University), and finally Rhodri Jeffreys -Jones and David Stafford (Edinburgh 
University). I owe them all a tremendous debt of gratitude for their thoughtful 
direction, encouragement, and assistance. My research could never have been 
completed without generous financial assistance from the British Overseas Research 
Student Award Scheme, Edinburgh University, American Friends of Edinburgh 
University, the Roosevelt Study Center (Holland), Princeton University, the Herbert 
Hoover Presidential Library, and the American Heritage Center of the University of 
Wyoming. I've also benefited from the selfless financial help and encouragement 
of my parents (Jeannette and Daniel), my grandparents who got me interested in 
history (Pauline & Lavern Blinn, Anne & Dan Charles), and my great aunts 
(Jeannette and Lily. My friends also proved especially supportive during research 
trips: Ken & Anne Stahl, Kelley Clements, James Mazgalis, Christian Grantham, 
Vince Oropesa, and Mike Wilson. I'd especially like to thank a few who made 
various points in my journey truly pleasurable: Dustin Thornhill, Douglas Mitchell, 
Michael Whitehead, Kelvin Gove, and my flatmates Faith Ward, Kris Conway, and 
Mark McCanney. 
ABSTRACT 
Between 1939 and 1945 the Federal Bureau of Investigation, headed by J. 
Edgar Hoover, monitored the political activities of President Franklin Roosevelt's 
anti- interventionist foreign policy critics. Hoover, whose position as FBI director 
was tenuous within the left -of- center Roosevelt administration, catered to the 
president's political and policy interests to preserve his position and to expand FBI 
authority. In his pragmatic effort to service administration political goals, Hoover 
employed illegal wiretaps, informers, collected derogatory information, conducted 
investigations that had the potential to discredit the anti -interventionists, forwarded 
political intelligence to administration officials, and coordinated some activity with 
British intelligence. This all occurred within a crisis atmosphere created with the 
onset of the Second World War, and it was this political dynamic that permitted 
Hoover to successfully cultivate his relationship with President Roosevelt. In the 
process, the administration's otherwise legitimate foreign policy opposition was 
regarded as subversive and some anti -interventionists' civil liberties were violated 
through intensive FBI scrutiny of their political dissention. Moreover, the FBI's 
surveillance marks the origins of the FBI's role in the later national security state. 
II 
Among those targets examined in this dissertation include Charles Lindbergh, the 
America First Committee, notable anti- interventionist senators and congressmen, the 
anti -interventionist press, and other prominent individuals who advocated American 
isolation from foreign war. 
III 
INTRODUCTION 
From 1939 to 1945, J. Edgar Hoover's Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
monitored the political activities of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's celebrated 
anti- interventionist foreign policy critics. Popular notions of the threat from a Nazi 
"Fifth Column" and sensationalized stories of German espionage led many 
Americans and government officials to suspect the motives of otherwise legitimate 
anti -interventionist foreign policy critics. Moreover, the bitter foreign policy debate 
provided the conservative Hoover with an opportunity to ingratiate himself with the 
politically left -of- center Roosevelt administration. By catering to the president's 
political and policy interests -in providing him detailed political intelligence on 
foreign policy critics -Hoover demonstrated his worth to the administration, 
retained his tenure as FBI director, and in the process secured increased authority 
and autonomy for his Bureau. FBI officials, in their efforts, utilized wiretaps, 
collected derogatory information, supplied public- opinion leaders with political 
intelligence, conducted investigations that had the potential to discredit Roosevelt's 
critics, and coordinated some activity with British intelligence. Among those 
targeted were Charles Lindbergh, the America First Committee, notable senators and 
congressmen, elements of the anti -interventionist press, and other leading figures in 
the anti -interventionist movement. Throughout, Roosevelt valued these reports and 
made no complaints about the impropriety or civil liberties violations of J. Edgar 
Hoover's actions. 
It was during this period when Hoover's FBI first used its resources in an 
expansive way to monitor, provide intelligence, and discredit an administration's 
political opposition. But while the FBI extensively monitored administration 
opposition, as it never had previously, the extent of the FBI's activity is 
characterized by its confined nature. Whereas the Cold War FBI used secret and 
illegal programs (the COINTELPROS) to contain its targets, the FBI during the 
1939 -42 period confined itself to the collection and dissemination of political 
intelligence and worked to silence administration critics by developing legal cases - 
utilizing the Smith Act, Foreign Agents Registration Act, conspiracy statutes, and 
(during wartime) the Espionage Actl -or by initiating grand jury proceedings that, 
while nominally secret, might have discredited opposition efforts by casting doubt 
on their legitimacy. This activity, while confined, suggests that the FBI's role in the 
later national security state -executed while America advocated an activist foreign 
policy -lies in the pre -war foreign policy debate (the so- called Great Debate) - 
where a hidden agenda lay behind interventionist policy and where patterns of FBI 
behavior mirror those of the Cold War and national security state period. 
Dating from 1940 the FBI established a relationship with British intelligence 
which, like the Bureau, had a vested interest in the political activities of the anti - 
interventionists. Whereas Hoover sought to develop legal cases against anti - 
interventionists, collect derogatory intelligence about them, and provide the White 
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House with political intelligence regarding their activity (all to satisfy White House 
political interests), British intelligence sought to hasten American entry into the war 
by disrupting and discrediting Roosevelt's foreign policy critics. The relationship 
between the FBI and British intelligence, which had existed on an ad hoc basis 
dating from the First World War, was made permanent from 1940 and continued to 
grow, extending into the Cold War years. The exact scope and nature of the two 
organizations' relationship cannot be ascertained fully owing to classification 
restrictions on relevant documents, but it is nevertheless clear that it was a close 
relationship. The closeness and origins of the relationship, moreover, further 
suggests that the FBI's role in the later national security state -where the FBI 
cooperated closely with Allied foreign intelligence agencies -had its origins during 
the Great Debate of 1940 -41. 
Hoover was limited to the above tactics during the Great Debate as he did not 
have the level of autonomy that he would during the Cold War, though he did have a 
greater level of autonomy than any time previous. Without an assurance that 
intrusive programs would never be discovered -something Hoover did not develop 
until the Cold War-he refused to employ such methods remembering the effects 
wrought on the Bureau of Investigation from discovery of other illegal tactics 
employed during the 1919 -1920 Red Scare. These concerns are reflected in 
Hoover's efforts to curtail any criticism that his Bureau was involved in illegal 
activity and his public denials that the FBI collected non -criminal information 
during the Great Debate, despite the fact that FBI agents had employed illegal 
surveillance tactics and actively sought non -criminal intelligence. 
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The FBI director during this period demonstrated that he was, above all, a 
pragmatic bureaucrat. Beginning with the Coolidge administration in 1924, Hoover 
made himself useful to each succeeding administration by providing information 
each would find valuable. He was successful inasmuch as he held onto his high 
position in government longer than any comparable figure in American history - 
Hoover was FBI director from 1924 until his death in 1972, nearly fifty years. This 
pragmatism is significant when one examines the Bureau in the context of the New 
Deal era. Generally regarded as a watershed in the development of the welfare state, 
the New Deal reflected the precept of "big government" staffed by left -of- center 
politicians seeking proactive leadership in Washington. While on the surface it 
seems the political views of New Dealers and J. Edgar Hoover were at odds, the FBI 
director thrived during the Roosevelt administration. He succeeded in cultivating a 
close relationship with Roosevelt by using his pragmatism to manipulate the 
relationship between the president and the FBI. Hoover became a valued source of 
information on Roosevelt's political enemies and useful in occasional attempts to 
undermine them. 
Hoover's pragmatism during this period, however, must be analyzed within 
the framework of the correlation between international crisis and growth of power. 
Hoover's ability to increase FBI authority has, for the most part, been associated 
with some concomitant international crisis. The charged atmosphere created by 
international crises resulted in fears of domestic unrest, whether during the First 
World War era, Red Scare, Great Depression, Second World War, or Cold War. In 
each period, the FBI increased its power and authority, for different reasons, to deal 
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with perceived domestic subversion. During the Great Debate of 1940 -41, foreign 
policy issues provided the impetus for extensive FBI monitoring of White House 
foreign policy critics who were popularly regarded as subversive.2 This all took 
place in the context of a charged international situation that permitted Hoover to 
cater to President Roosevelt's domestic political concerns about overcoming his 
anti -interventionist opposition. Throughout the period, Hoover garnered increased 
authority and autonomy for his FBI. From this basis, the Cold War FBI was able to 
develop into a more intrusive national security apparatus. 
Roosevelt's foreign policy critics during this period have popularly been 
dubbed "isolationists." The term "anti- interventionist," however, will be employed 
throughout this study. The word "isolationist" is too narrow a descriptor to be 
applied to Roosevelt's foreign policy critics who did not advocate isolation from 
foreign affairs but unilateralism in American foreign relations. Moreover, anti - 
interventionists themselves never used the word "isolationist," preferring instead 
"anti- interventionist" or "non- interventionist." It was Roosevelt's interventionist 
allies who propagated -successfully -the derogatory term "isolationist." 
While Franklin Roosevelt's anti -interventionist foreign policy opposition 
included elements from both ends of the political spectrum -from the mostly 
conservative America First Committee to the leftist American League for Peace and 
Democracy -this study focuses on his mostly conservative and prominent critics 
who were associated with America First. Some non -conservatives are included but 
only inasmuch as they opposed the centralization of power in the presidency and 
allied themselves with America First. Anti- interventionists from other points on the 
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political spectrum are excluded primarily for three reasons. First, those associated 
with the America First Committee were best organized and posed the most 
significant political threat to administration foreign policy. Second, after the Nazi 
invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, American leftists and Communists 
wholeheartedly joined the interventionist cause; thereafter America First remained 
the only serious threat to administration political interests.3 Third, Hoover was a 
fervent anti -Communist with conservative political and social credentials, and his 
willingness to monitor those of similar political ilk for the left-of- center Roosevelt 
administration reveals his bureaucratic astuteness. Ever the master bureaucrat, 
Hoover realized his position in the Roosevelt administration was tenuous and he 
sought to preserve and expand it by catering to the White House's political and 
policy interests vis -à -vis the anti -interventionists. 
As Hoover was of the political right4 -like many anti -interventionists, 
particularly those associated with the America First Committee -the question arises 
whether he considered himself an interventionist? There is no definitive evidence, 
however, demonstrating Hoover's interventionist credentials. While Hoover may 
have been an interventionist, evidence suggests he was more of a pragmatist who 
worked to effect Roosevelt's political interests. Further, he may have regarded anti - 
interventionists as "subversives" or "un- American" because of the popular 
associations many had made between anti -interventionists and radical /fascist 
elements. This follows a popular outlook dating from the 1930s, and extending into 
the early Cold War, that identified Stalinism and Nazism as essentially similar 
totalitarian regimes. Hoover may have held such views and, coupled with popular 
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perceptions of anti -interventionists as witting or unwitting Nazi dupes, he may have 
regarded some fellow conservatives as domestic threats.5 
The time period covered herein (excluding background material) ranges from 
1939 to 1945. While the debate over intervention began in 1935 with the Neutrality 
Act, by 1939 Fifth -Column fears had achieved popular support in the United States 
creating a political dynamic in which many interventionists regarded "isolationists" 
as Nazi sympathizers. With the start of war in September, moreover, FBI agents 
began systematically to monitor anti -interventionist political activity and FBI 
officials forwarded political -intelligence reports on them to the White House. The 
height of FBI surveillance of anti -interventionists came in 1941 with debate over 
Lend -Lease and lasted until the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. As this dissertation 
indicates, the Bureau's surveillance did not end with American entrance into war, as 
it continued in some instances for the war's duration. 
This study makes use of previously classified FBI files. Only in the last few 
years have the FBI files on Charles Lindbergh, the America First Committee, and 
other prominent anti -interventionists, for example, been available for research. As a 
result, previous discourses about the Bureau's political surveillance during this 
period have been tentative and incomplete. Furthermore, historians of anti - 
interventionism have either been only tangentially interested in FBI activity or have 
been unaware of intricate FBI programs and filing procedures. Historians of the 
FBI, while not unaware of other periods, have been disproportionately interested in 
the agency's Red Scare days (1919 -1920) or its Cold War activities. Much has been 
missed through these oversights, particularly the new information that reveals the 
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true extent of FBI surveillance activity from 1939 to1945. As a result, FBI political 
surveillance during this important period has never received the full treatment it 
deserves. 
The single most important source of information for this study lies in FBI 
files. All Bureau files created since 1924 have been retained by the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation and not deposited in the National Archives. For over seventy years, 
FBI files have remained the preserve of FBI officials who have opened their files to 
only a select number of "friendly" journalists.6 Only when amendments were made 
in 1974 to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) did researchers have access to 
these important documents. But with access comes restriction. Exemptions to the 
FOIA include classified material, privacy- rights related information, and anything 
revealing FBI sources and methods. With FBI officials' subjective use of the black 
magic -marker, researchers are presented with sometimes heavily censored 
documents. In addition, it is the responsibility of the requestor to pay processing 
costs (at ten cents per page for files that can be thousands of pages long), which can 
become very expensive. Moreover, FBI under -staffing and budgetary restrictions 
have created long delays in the processing of requests (in 1996 the Bureau averaged 
50 requests per day). It is not uncommon to wait years for an FOIA request to be 
finalized. Nevertheless, FBI records are a vital and important, if sometimes 
frustrating and tantalizing, source of information.? 
The nature of FBI files to 1945, too, must be considered. Dating from his 
appointment as Bureau director in 1924, Hoover kept a "confidential" file "in which 
are kept various and sundry items believed inadvisable to be included in the general 
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files of the Bureau."8 Concurrently, the FBI director continued and updated a 
system of "personal and confidential" letters wherein correspondence containing 
sensitive information, instead of being serialized in the Bureau's central records 
system, were directed to Hoover's personal attention. With this letter procedure and 
special office file, FBI agents continued to monitor political activity despite 
Attorney General Harlan Fiske Stone's 1924 order to the contrary.9 
Dating from 1940 Hoover created and revised procedures that ensured 
sensitive memoranda were not filed in the FBI's central records system but filed 
separately. FBI officials were to use blue paper, and later pink paper, when writing 
a memorandum that was not to be serialized; those that were to be filed in the 
official files of the FBI were typed on white paper. Further, at the bottom of the 
document was the notation (or some derivation of it) stating: "Informative 
Memorandum Not to be Sent to Files Section." With this procedure, FBI officials 
were able to conceal the authorization of illegal FBI activity or compilation of 
sensitive or embarrassing information. Moreover, as these files were not part of the 
FBI's official files, they could safely be destroyed at FBI officials' discretion.10 
Hoover maintained in his office two sets of "confidential" files. One was his 
Personal and Confidential file which Hoover's executive assistant, Helen Gandy, 
destroyed after his death in 1972. She claimed in Congressional testimony that the 
file contained no official policy documents, an assertion that was later proved 
inaccurate. The other "confidential" file was Hoover's Official and Confidential file 
which contained sensitive information on a variety of subjects and included some Do 
Not File memorandums. The Official and Confidential file was incorporated into 
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the FBI's central records system after Hoover's death. Another confidential file was 
maintained from October 1941 in the office of FBI Assistant Director Louis Nichols 
and a fourth in the office of FBI Associate Director Clyde Tolson." 
It is important not only to be aware of FBI separate filing procedures, but to 
understand FBI central- records -system filing classifications. FBI documents in the 
central records are referenced by three numbers (e.g. 65- 11449 -15). The first 
number indicates the type of case file -the number 65, for example, designates a 
case file involving "espionage." The second number identifies the subject of the 
file, whether an individual or organization. The third number is called the serial, 
which, simply, is the number placed on each document in the file. Therefore, the 
example noted above cites document 15 of the Charles Lindbergh file (11449) which 
the FBI labeled an espionage matter. Other anti -interventionists targeted by the FBI 
and analyzed herein include: 
The America First Committee -100, "Domestic Security." 
Senators Wheeler and Nye -62, "Administrative Inquiry." 
Representative Hamilton Fish -94, "Research Matters." 
Victory Program file -65, "Espionage." 
Ethel Brigham, Harry Elmer Barnes, and Laura Ingalls -100. 
Clegg and Hince mission -66, "Administrative Matters." 
But while the file numbers suggest a specific type of investigation, the information 
within the file does not necessarily reflect this. The Charles Lindbergh file while 
nominally an espionage matter in reality reflects an interest in his anti- interventionist 
political activity. The file number, therefore, can be misleading on one level, and on 
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another is an indication to the historian of an avenue taken by FBI officials in their 
efforts to investigate the political activities of an individual or organization under the 
rubric of, say, national security.12 
Beyond reliance on submitting an FOIA request to the FBI, one can find FBI 
documents in other repositories. For this dissertation, the Franklin D. Roosevelt 
Presidential Library is one such important depository. The Roosevelt Library holds 
the unredacted reports that FBI Director Hoover forwarded to some administration 
officials. These documents reveal only one side of the Hoover -Roosevelt 
relationship inasmuch as they reveal only what Hoover forwarded to the White 
House (what he thought Roosevelt might find of value) and not all information held 
by the FBI. Moreover, these unredacted copies are useful in determining the content 
of some FBI files released via the FOIA. A researcher can ascertain some 
information that the FBI has redacted by comparing FOIA released FBI records with 
unredacted copies of the same document in, for example, the Roosevelt Library. 
The FBI's copy sometimes is referenced leading the researcher to the sources of 
information used in an FBI document forwarded to the White House. To 
understand more fully FBI officials' motives and priorities, then, it is necessary to 
compare Roosevelt Library copies with FOIA- released FBI files. Only then can one 
begin to understand the true dynamic of the FBI -White House relationship. 
Other valuable sources of information include FOIA- obtained FBI records 
deposited in the Herbert Hoover Presidential Library. The Hoover Library holds the 
FBI files- sometimes not complete -of several key anti -interventionists, thereby 
not necessitating the submission of a duplicated FOIA request with the FBI. 
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Likewise, other repositories hold key FBI files including the American Heritage 
Center at the University of Wyoming (Harry Elmer Barnes file), Hoover Institution 
at Stanford University (Victory Program file), and the Roosevelt Study Center in 
Holland (America First Committee file). One can also view a limited number of 
popular FBI files maintained in the reading room at FBI headquarters in 
Washington, D. C. 13 An even more limited number are accessible at the FBI's 
Internet website (http: / /www.fbi.gov). 
Gaining access to records about the FBI's liaison with British intelligence 
present even greater problems for the researcher. The United Kingdom, unlike the 
United States, has no FOIA and virtually no primary material has been released 
regarding the British liaison with the FBI.14 American records regarding the 
operations of British intelligence are still classified and, by international agreement, 
will not be released without the express approval of the British government. 
Therefore, one must rely on scant or tangential primary sources and unverifiable and 
biased official histories and memoirs. Yet some American primary sources offer 
more than can be found in British archives. FBI records obtained via the FOIA and 
records culled from State Department files offer the only documentation about the 
FBI's intelligence mission to Great Britain during 1940 -41. The only reference to 
this on the British side can be found in official histories. Further, the personal 
papers of Adolf Berle and, again, State Department files offer a limited number of 
primary documents that very broadly address the general origin and function of 
British Security Coordination. But enough documentation exists to piece together an 
indicative, if incomplete, picture of FBI -British intelligence liaison in America. 
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Ibis dissertation makes historiographical contributions in three areas: the 
history of FBI political surveillance, the history of the anti - 
interventionistlinterventionist foreign policy debate, and the history of the rise of the 
American national security state. Most historians of the FBI have focused either on 
its abuses during the Red Scare of 1919 -19201' or its political intelligence activities 
during the Cold War era.16 Some FBI historians have examined the FBI's political 
surveillance of Roosevelt's anti -interventionist foreign policy critics, but only as a 
small part of larger studies. Athan Theoharis briefly mentioned the FBI's 
monitoring of anti -interventionists in his broad study Spying on Americans (1978), 
in his biography of FBI Director Hoover, The Boss: J. Edgar Hoover and the Great 
American Inquisition (1988), and in his collaborative reference work The FBI: A 
Comprehensive Reference Guide (1999).17 Likewise, both Richard Powers and Curt 
Gentry in their biographies mentioned but only in passing that the FBI had 
monitored Roosevelt's critics.1 s 
Some historians of anti -interventionism and Roosevelt's foreign policy also 
have only sketchily examined the FBI's surveillance of anti -interventionists. Their 
interests have concentrated on the politics of anti -interventionism, and while 
recognizing FBI political surveillance perhaps have neglected it through a lack of 
documentation. Wayne S. Cole has studied anti -interventionists more than anyone 
else and in his magnum opus, Roosevelt and the Isolationists (1983), he only briefly 
examined the FBI's surveillance.'9 In his book Storm on the Horizon (2000), Justus 
Doenecke, too, only briefly noted the FBI's efforts.26 Robert Dallek's broad survey 
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of Roosevelt's foreign policy, like Cole's and Doenecke's, offered only one passing 
reference to the FBI.21 
A few historians, nevertheless, have examined the FBI's political 
surveillance of the anti -interventionists more directly than these broad studies. 
Richard W. Steele in his article "Franklin D. Roosevelt and His Foreign Policy 
Critics" (1979) attempted fuller coverage of FBI investigations into the anti - 
interventionists, but was limited by the inaccessibility (at the time) of FBI records. 
Steele focused on President Roosevelt and argued that he intentionally directed 
Hoover, citing his 1934 and 1936 directives, to investigate his anti -interventionist 
opponents in an effort to destroy them. As Steele's argument was based on only a 
limited number of FBI documents, Roosevelt papers, and congressional reports he 
placed too much emphasis on Roosevelt's machinations as distinct from J. Edgar 
Hoover's own priorities. Steele did not widely examine FBI monitoring of anti - 
interventionists and because his documentation was limited, he focused more on the 
White House than the FBI.22 
Charles Croog has analyzed the FBI's political surveillance of anti - 
interventionists in his article "FBI Political Surveillance and the Isolationist - 
Interventionist Debate, 1939 -1941" (1992). Croog argued that Roosevelt and 
Hoover fully agreed upon the national security mission of the FBI and that the FBI's 
investigation of anti -interventionists was limited. In making this argument, Croog 
stated that FBI "resources were never significantly mobilized against Roosevelt's 
law -abiding opponents." Yet Croog's piece suffered from one major weakness. 
Like Steele, Croog employed only a limited base of evidence to support his 
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conclusions: his footnotes show that he used only a portion of the America First 
Committee FBI file, congressional hearings and reports. Croog thereby 
underestimated the true extent and nature of FBI political surveillance.23 
Kenneth O'Reilly examined the FBI's political surveillance of Roosevelt's 
foreign policy opponents in the context of the agency's New Deal expansion in his 
"A New Deal for the FBI: The Roosevelt Administration, Crime Control, and 
National Security" (1982). O'Reilly examined FBI institutional changes made 
during the New Deal in the areas of crime control and national security. While he 
used a slightly broader base of evidence than previous historians, when analyzing 
the FBI's monitoring of foreign policy critics he nevertheless concluded, contrary to 
Steele, that "the Roosevelt administration's purposes were essentially benevolent. "24 
Athan Theoharis examined an aspect of the FBI's surveillance of the anti - 
interventionist press in his article "The FBI, the Roosevelt Administration, and the 
`Subversive' Press" (1993). Making more extensive use of FBI files, Theoharis 
analyzed the FBI's monitoring of prominent members of the anti -interventionist 
press and the Roosevelt administration's desire to settle scores with them after the 
American entry into the Second World War. Theoharis concluded that a complete 
understanding of the episode could not be ascertained until further documentation is 
declassified.25 
My own articles on the FBI and the anti- interventionists, early results of my 
research, examined limited aspects of the FBI's political surveillance. In "FBI 
Political Surveillance and the Charles Lindbergh Investigation, 1939 -1944" (1997), I 
argued that the FBI's investigative effort against anti -interventionists, in particular 
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Charles Lindbergh, were greater than previous historians had argued. Then, in 
"Informing FDR: FBI Political Surveillance and the Isolationist- Interventionist 
Foreign Policy Debate, 1939 -1945" (2000), I furthered my argument by examining 
the FBI's monitoring of the America First Committee, Lindbergh, and five wiretap 
targets. I concluded that secret FBI political reports to the White House helped 
Roosevelt to advance his conception of the nation's national security interests.26 
And in "Franklin D. Roosevelt, J. Edgar Hoover, and FBI Political Surveillance" 
(1999), I argued for a lay audience that it was Hoover and not Roosevelt who 
initiated FBI monitoring of anti -interventionists, yet Roosevelt had made no 
complaints. These early conclusions were limited and served as a basis on which 
this present study was launched. Some aspects of my early work are expanded upon 
herein and more closely scrutinized.27 
Other studies deal with the FBI and political surveillance during this period 
in indirect ways. Roy Turnbaugh argued in "The FBI and Harry Elmer Barnes" 
(1980) that the Bureau targeted the anti- interventionist Barnes in an effort to enact 
vengeance for critical comments the noted historian had made about the FBI prior to 
the Great Debate. He did not analyze the FBI's monitoring of Barnes as part of a 
larger effort against anti- interventionists.28 Francis MacDonnell, in his book 
Insidious Foes: The Axis Fifth Column and the American Home Front (1995), 
analyzed the FBI's activity during this period but only insofar as it related to the 
perceived Fifth Column threat.29 Barton Bernstein surveyed very briefly 
Roosevelt's interest in FBI reports about his critics, but in the larger context of the 
abuse of executive authority dating from 1940.3° And John F. Berens noted 
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Roosevelt's empowerment of the FBI but overlooked its monitoring of anti - 
interventionists in his broad and concise survey article "The FBI and Civil Liberties 
from Franklin Roosevelt to Jimmy Carter -An Historical Overview" (1980).31 
This dissertation further makes a contribution to the historiography, in terms 
of the FBI at least, surrounding the origins of the American national security state. 
In his book Shattered Peace (1977), Daniel Yergin traced the origins of the national 
security state back to Woodrow Wilson and his conception of American 
internationalism. Dating from that period, Yergin argued, is American policy 
makers' conceptualization of security concerns in light of a perceived expansionist 
and ideological Soviet Russia.32 Frank J. Donner similarly identified the 
federalization of domestic intelligence in the First World War era and the period of 
the Russian Revolution. It was at this time, he argued, that the FBI involved itself in 
large -scale investigations of primarily left -wing dissenters yet he argued that the 
national security state is best demonstrated during the Cold War. And Athan 
Theoharis has examined the national security state in terms of McCarthyism, dating 
its origins with the Cold War which, he argued, along with President Truman's 
rhetoric and poor leadership permitted such abuses to be wrought. He furthered his 
argument in Spying on Americans (1978) where he argued that it was during the 
Cold War when the Congress deferred to the executive in matters of national 
security and tolerated secrecy as necessary to effect security policy.33 
This dissertation hopes to complement the work of FBI, anti -interventionist, 
and national security historians by examining the FBI's political surveillance of 
Roosevelt's anti -interventionist foreign policy critics from 1939 to 1945. FBI 
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political surveillance during this period was extensive, widespread, and sought to be 
responsive to Roosevelt's political interests. The extent of the Bureau's efforts 
reflected Cold War patterns of FBI behavior. FBI surveillance was also an 
important aspect to the bitter interventionist/anti -interventionist foreign policy 
debate that historians have overlooked or only partially analyzed. While we might 
not be able to determine definitively how the administration used the information 
Hoover provided, we nevertheless know the FBI's efforts were extensive and the 
administration made no complaints. FBI political surveillance during this period 
further reflects the origins of the FBI's contribution to the national security state 
inasmuch as for the first time the FBI extensively monitored an administration's 
critics under a domestic security rationale. Moreover, in their efforts FBI officials 
employed an array of intelligence tools including investigations, mail covers, 
informers, and wiretaps. The FBI's interests were not focused only on left-wing 
groups and individuals. During this period conservative and right -wing targets were 
monitored. In total, FBI efforts reflected a pattern of later Cold -War FBI behavior in 
monitoring, providing political intelligence, and employing investigations under the 
rubric of domestic security to develop legal cases against an opponent that could 
discredit their agenda. Regarding the FBI at least, this dates not with the Cold War 
but with the late interwar period. By catering to Roosevelt's political interests at a 
time of international crisis, Hoover secured his position as director and expanded 
FBI authority and power. It was from these pre -war origins that he was able to 
develop his Bureau into an even more intrusive and powerful agency during the 
Cold War. 
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This dissertation does not examine every anti -interventionist associated with 
the America First Committee whom FBI officials monitored. The lengthy time it 
takes and costs involved in gaining access to FBI files utilizing the FOIA makes 
such an effort prohibitive. But fortunately an all- inclusive effort, while ideal, is not 
necessary to analyze the general nature and scope of FBI efforts. This dissertation 
focuses selectively on some of the most influential anti -interventionists or those who 
were special FBI targets. Chapter one outlines the origins of the FBI, its evolution, 
and interest in "subversive" activities and political surveillance from 1908 to 1932. 
Chapter two analyzes the expansion of FBI authority under J. Edgar Hoover's 
leadership from 1933 to 1939. Each increase in FBI authority is analyzed in the 
context of growing international threats and Roosevelt's response to them, revealing 
that international tensions created a perceived domestic threat that enabled Hoover 
to secure greater FBI authority. Chapter three examines the FBI's monitoring and 
investigation of Roosevelt's most popular and influential foreign policy critic, the 
legendary aviator Charles Lindbergh, from 1939 to 1944. Chapter four analyzes the 
FBI's monitoring from 1940 to 1945 of the best -organized anti -interventionist 
pressure group, the America First Committee. Chapter five focuses on Roosevelt's 
three most influential anti- interventionist critics in Congress, Senator Burton 
Wheeler, Congressman Hamilton Fish, and Senator Gerald Nye. Chapter six 
analyzes for the first time the FBI's probe into the leak of a top- secret War 
Department contingency plan to the anti -interventionist press in 1941 and 1942. 
Chapter seven examines three FBI targets whose investigations extended beyond the 
American entrance into war on 7 December 1941: the vocal Brigham family, the 
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historian Harry Elmer Barnes, and aviator Laura Ingalls. Chapter eight focuses on 
the FBI's liaison with British intelligence in America and the nature and scope of 
that relationship vis -à -vis the anti -interventionists. 
* * * 
The terrorist attacks in New York City and Washington, D. C. on 11 
September 2001 and subsequent government reaction have brought new significance 
to this study. In reaction to these events, in an effort to safeguard the nation from 
further terrorist incidents, the Bush administration sought to suspend investigative 
restrictions placed on the FBI in the 1970s. Following Hoover's death in 1972 and 
revelations of intrusive FBI domestic surveillance activities, FBI investigations had 
been formally restricted to prevent the Bureau from investigating politically oriented 
groups. Some in the Bush administration, however, believed these restrictions 
impeded FBI counter -terrorism efforts by preventing the employment of undercover 
agents to monitor without probable cause religious and political groups.34 
Testifying before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Attorney General John 
Ashcroft defended the Bush administration's anti -terror plan, which included a 
broad expansion of FBI wiretapping and investigative authority. He denied that 
American citizens' civil liberties would be restricted but added: "To those [critics] 
who scare peace- loving people with phantoms of lost liberty, my message is this: 
your tactics only aid terrorists." 35 
While the attorney general might have claimed individual liberties would not 
be violated as in the past, the Bush administration's Anti -terrorism Act has created 
the potential for the FBI to resume a political surveillance role. In the current 
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atmosphere, past fears of the influence of "subversive activities" on American 
national security have been replaced with concerns over terrorist activities. With 
increased FBI investigative authority, and a concomitant increase in government 
secrecy (i.e., a tightening of FOIA standards and restrictions on access to 
presidential records), a revival of the FBI's interest in domestic political surveillance 
is possible.36 Evidence advanced in this dissertation demonstrates that the roots of 
such FBI activity are to be found during the anti -interventionist foreign policy 
debate when administration critics were regarded as witting or unwitting dupes of 
fascists. It was during this critical period that FBI officials acquired increased 
investigative authority and resorted to sensitive investigative practices like 
wiretapping -all in the name of combating "subversive activity," but too often, in 
reality, with the prime objective of monitoring domestic political activity. 
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CHAPTER 1 
The Bureau of Investigation and the Origins of FBI Political Surveillance, 1908- 
1932. 
Following the Civil War, reflecting the rapid change from an agrarian to an 
urban -industrial nation, the United States government became more centralized. 
Government bureaucracy flourished in the Reconstruction Era and Congress passed 
new legislation to effect national rebuilding. The creation of the Justice Department 
in 1870 was one such innovation. The new department actively prosecuted the 1870 
and 1871 Enforcement Acts which sought to protect the civil rights of freed slaves 
and "carpetbaggers" (as prescribed in the 14111 and 151h amendments) from violent 
southern elements, such as the Ku Klux Klan. For the first time the federal 
government became involved in legal cases that previously had been the purview of 
the states.' 
The government's prosecutions began in earnest. Justice Department 
attorneys hired detectives (called federal marshals) or used Treasury Department 
agents to investigate and collect evidence against the Klansmen. While the 
department's investigative and conviction record was limited, the example set in 
terms of federal authority was a success. Beyond the Enforcement Acts, the Justice 
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Department acquired the responsibility to enforce new federal regulatory legislation: 
the 1887 Interstate Commerce Act regulated the railroad industry, and the 1890 
Sherman Antitrust Act sought to curb monopoly. While this legislation reflected a 
newly activist federal government, the effects of the laws were limited. Given the 
government's limited objectives, no permanent investigative agency in the Justice 
Department was deemed necessary.2 
Rather than create their own investigative division within the department, 
Justice Department officials relied upon the expertise of private detectives -notably 
the Pinkerton Detective Agency -or Secret Service agents borrowed from the 
Treasury Department. One drawback to this practice was the widely held public 
disregard for professional detectives in the nineteenth century. During the Civil War 
the Pinkertons, under General George McClellan, had acquired a reputation for 
shoddy reconnaissance; and during Reconstruction, southerners had regarded federal 
detectives as repressors. Moreover, the Pinkertons earned an anti -labor reputation 
during the late nineteenth century. During the 1892 Homestead Steel Strike, the 
manager of the Carnegie Steel Company, Henry Clay Frick, hired Pinkerton 
detectives to protect his plant and assist in strike breaking. A gun battle ensued 
between the strikers and Pinkertons, resulting in the deaths of six unionists and three 
detectives. When the smoke cleared the Pinkertons had lost and, moreover, had 
become equated in the popular mind as ruthless thugs.3 
Following the Pinkertons' controversial involvement in the Homestead 
Strike, the Republican -controlled Congress reevaluated the government's association 
with the detective agency. Wanting to avoid alienating the electorate through any 
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association with the Pinkertons, Congress prohibited federal agencies from 
employing private detectives. The result of this legislation -the 1892 Pinkerton 
Act -forced the Justice Department to rely solely on the Treasury Department's 
Secret Service to conduct their investigations.4 
Relying on the Secret Service posed no serious problems for Justice 
Department officials as federal regulatory legislation was limited. But when 
Theodore Roosevelt acceded to the Presidency in 1901, following William 
McKinley's assassination, the Justice Department's responsibilities increased 
dramatically. Believing that government should be used to contain the destructive 
aspects of the burgeoning economy, Roosevelt sought to preserve corporate 
capitalism by regulating it. In 1902 he reinvigorated the Sherman Antitrust Act by 
directing the Justice Department to prosecute the Northern Securities Company, a 
giant railroad monopoly under the direction of James J. Hill and J. P. Morgan. U.S. 
attorneys charged the company with illegal restraint of trade, believing the 
monopoly had unfairly increased freight rates. The Justice Department's 
prosecution was successful and the Supreme Court later upheld the verdict. The 
Justice Department also prosecuted the Chicago meatpackers, Standard Oil, and the 
sugar refiners for illegal restraint of trade. Yet as the government's caseload 
increased, relying on the Secret Service for investigations proved inefficient. Justice 
Department officials thereby decided that the department needed its own 
professional investigators.5 
In 1906 Roosevelt appointed Charles J. Bonaparte as attorney general. 
Realizing that changes were needed to ensure efficient prosecution of federal 
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statutes, Bonaparte began to reorganize the Justice Department. One important 
aspect of Bonaparte's plan was the establishment in the department of a permanent 
investigative division. In his 1907 annual report, Bonaparte proposed the creation of 
a Bureau of Investigation (BI) staffed with expert investigators, and in the following 
year he testified before an uneasy House Appropriations Committee advocating the 
creation of the BI. Contemporary scandals surrounding the use of government 
agents, however, caused Congress to hesitate acceding to Bonaparte's plan. An 
extended debate over federal investigative activity thereafter ensued.6 
One event that contributed to Congress's concern was the conviction in 1908, 
by way of federal investigation, of two Oregon congressmen. The scandal had its 
origins seven years earlier during Roosevelt's first term when Secretary of the 
Interior Ethan A. Hitchcock discovered irregularities concerning the use of western 
public lands. Hitchcock referred the matter to the Justice Department who then 
borrowed Secret Service agents to investigate. Their efforts resulted in the 
conviction of more than a dozen people for conspiracy to defraud the United States 
government. Among those convicted were Senator John Mitchell and 
Representative John Williamson of Oregon. 
The use of federal agents to secure the indictment and conviction of two 
United States congressmen led Congress, in light of Bonaparte's request to create an 
investigative arm within the Justice Department, to hold hearings into the loaning of 
Secret Service agents. Congress's primary concern stemmed not only from the 
western land fraud case, but also from the Secret Service having overstepped its 
legal authority and engaged in other non -criminal investigations. (By statute, the 
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Secret Service was restricted to protecting the president and investigating violations 
of federal currency and counterfeiting law.) In March 1908 William Moran, 
assistant chief of the Secret Service, testified before the House Appropriations 
Committee and exposed some of the agency's non -criminal investigations. He 
explained to the committee that loaned Secret Service agents did not violate 
investigative restrictions because Treasury Department funds were not spent when 
an agent was on loan; instead the department borrowing the agent spent their funds.8 
Outraged over the Secret Service's liberal interpretation of its charter, 
Congress focused on the issue of agent loaning. Voicing fears of a centralized secret 
police, the legislators became consumed in the issue. They were so preoccupied that 
consideration of Bonaparte's request to provide funds for a Bureau of Investigation 
was sidelined. Instead, the Congress amended its budgetary appropriations to ban 
the loaning of Secret Service agents to federal agencies. In so doing, Congress 
effectively hamstrung the Justice Department from conducting investigations as it 
had relied upon Treasury agents.9 
While Congress was out of session, on 1 July 1908 Attorney General 
Bonaparte hired investigators and, with Theodore Roosevelt's mandate, established 
the Bureau of Investigation (renamed the Federal Bureau of Investigation in 1935). 
Some historians have argued that Bonaparte willfully violated Congress's specific 
intention not to create the Bureau of Investigation. By the letter of the law, this is 
not accurate. Having been preoccupied with the issue over the loaning of Secret 
Service agents, Congress had not yet approved or denied Bonaparte's request for 
appropriations to create the Bureau of Investigation. On the other hand, the attorney 
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general did disregard the spirit of Congress's budgetary restrictions and its intent not 
to perpetuate the government's federal investigative role. I° 
Meantime, President Roosevelt attacked Congress for preventing Secret 
Service agents from working with other departments. Citing the western -land fraud 
case that involved the Oregonian congressmen, Roosevelt claimed, erroneously, that 
Congress had acted only to protect themselves from criminal investigation. He also 
blamed them for abetting lawlessness and hamstringing the Justice Department's 
mission. By painting their action in black -and -white terms, Roosevelt had 
politically outmaneuvered Congress. Whether or not the president intended it, his 
rhetoric had deflected the issue away from Bonaparte's creation of the BI. Instead, 
Congress was put on the defensive inasmuch as it sought to rebut the president's 
inflammatory accusations.1 
Congress defended itself by supporting the BI inasmuch as its creation did 
not involve the Treasury Department loaning Secret Service agents. Congress 
thereby retained its agent -loaning restriction while it concurrently demonstrated that 
it was not soft on crime, as the president had claimed during the 1908 election year. 
Nevertheless, Congress demanded an explanation for Bonaparte's independent 
action in creating the Bureau, and he appeared on the Hill to defend himself 
Bonaparte did not attempt to persuade Congress to authorize a charter for the Bureau 
of Investigation. Instead he argued that Bureau agents would not engage in non- 
criminal investigations and would only concern themselves with anti -trust and 
interstate commerce cases. Bonaparte argued further that executive oversight and 
the employment of only professional investigators would preclude any potential 
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abuses of power. Bonaparte said he personally would review daily investigative 
summaries. Besides, he argued, if he failed there was always Congress and the 
judiciary. In short, by appealing to the Progressive ideals of rational and efficient 
administration of government, Bonaparte convinced Congress that the Bureau of 
Investigation would not trammel individual rights. To Progressives, abuses would 
best be managed not by Congress but by professionals within the Justice 
Department. Out of these origins was born the FBI whose powers would grow while 
oversight diminished.12 
Despite the government's faith that Bureau activity would be effectively 
supervised, soon after its creation the organization's responsibilities rapidly 
expanded. This effectively diminished the attorney general's ability to monitor the 
Bureau closely. In 1910 Congress passed the Mann Act, or White Slave Traffic Act, 
which outlawed the transportation of women across state lines for immoral purposes. 
The law targeted prostitution rings, but soon was interpreted in a way to be applied 
to individuals. One target was heavyweight boxing champion Jack Johnson (an 
African American), who was arrested for escorting his white girlfriend across state 
lines. The law's authority fell under the rubric of interstate commerce, but was used 
instead to regulate perceived immorality. Moreover, the national character of the 
law necessitated an expansion of the Bureau of Investigation -outside of 
Washington, D.0 -to ensure efficient investigation and prosecution. The Bureau, 
thereafter, became a truly national federal agency. The long -term effects of the 
Mann Act are important: the Bureau began to accumulate derogatory information on 
the private lives of citizens, both common and prominent.13 
31 
In 1919, another law increased the Bureau's federal law enforcement role. 
When automobile sales skyrocketed after 1916, Congress passed the Motor Vehicle 
Theft Act (Dyer Act). This law made the transportation of stolen vehicles across 
state lines a felony, thus empowering the Bureau of Investigation to investigate such 
transgressions. The act enabled the BI to become involved, for example, in the John 
Dillinger case after the gangster stole an automobile and crossed state lines in 1933. 
The Dyer Act helped to popularize the Bureau in the public image and, in 
conjunction with the Mann Act, centralized national law enforcement and made the 
attorney general's oversight role increasingly more difficult, if not impossible.14 
* * * 
Domestic internal security concerns during the First World War further 
increased the Bureau's power and role as a national police force. When war broke 
out in Europe in 1914, there were already fears in the United States that external 
influences would disrupt American society. America's growing nativist fears 
stemmed not from the war but from the depressed domestic economy since 1914. 
These fears were heightened when various German attempts at intrigue were 
discovered after 1914, including a fraudulent passport scheme and various acts of 
sabotage. President Woodrow Wilson helped to inflame the issue when, in 1915, he 
singled -out "hyphenated Americans" as the source of America's trouble and called 
on Congress to enact sedition legislation. While the Congress did not act on the 
president's wishes, the tone of Wilson's wartime -preparedness campaign 
encouraged an atmosphere whereby perceived disloyalty was harshly repressed. ' 5 
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The Bureau of Investigation's surveillance activity increased dramatically 
following several insidious events. Between 1915 and 1917, for example, 
explosives were found aboard forty -seven shipping vessels bound for Allied 
countries. Moreover, when the munitions depot at New York's Black Tom Island 
exploded on 30 July 1916, followed by a similar explosion at the Canadian Car and 
Foundry Company at Kingsland, New Jersey, on 11 January 1919, Congress decided 
to act. In response, Congress authorized the president's prior desire for repressive 
legislation. In June 1917, Congress created the Espionage Act. This legislation 
made it illegal to obstruct the provisions of the 1917 Selective Service Act, to 
interfere with the American armed forces (fomenting disruption), and to steal 
government secrets with intent to aid the enemy. Later, the Sabotage and Sedition 
Acts of 1918- stronger measures yet- forbade public opposition to the government 
and war effort. Government officials also used the 1918 Alien Deportation Act to 
deport non -citizens who advocated the violent overthrow of the United States 
government. ' 6 
This legislation increased the Justice Department's responsibilities in the 
internal security area. In 1918, following passage of the Espionage, Sedition, and 
Alien Acts, the Justice Department formed the Alien Enemy Registration Section, or 
Alien Enemy Bureau. This agency concerned itself with the activities of German 
aliens, radicals, anarchists, and other perceived "subversives." It was in this section 
that J. Edgar Hoover began his career, and where he learned the wartime methods of 
administrative procedure which were used to bypass legal restraints. Hoover later 
employed what he had learned when he joined the Bureau of Investigation. ' 7 
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Meanwhile, the Bureau of Investigation was busy enforcing the Selective 
Service Act, rounding up draft dodgers (called "slackers ") from April to September 
1918. When apprehending alleged slackers, the Bureau cast a wide net. Despite the 
wartime emergency, the BI did not have adequate personnel to enforce effectively 
the conscription act. (During the First World War, the Bureau had at maximum 300 
agents.) To assist agents in their round -up, Bureau officials forged a relationship 
with the private, Chicago -based American Protective League (APL). Chicago 
advertising executive Albert M. Briggs formed the APL in 1917, recruited a group 
of some 260,000 members, and volunteered to assist in internal security work. After 
some discussion, BI Chief Bruce Bielaski and Attorney General Thomas Gregory 
accepted Briggs's offer to assist the Bureau, and APL members were issued badges 
that gave them the appearance of being official government agents. In their efforts, 
BI agents and APL volunteers rounded up anyone whom they believed was a draft 
dodger -many apprehended individuals were not "slackers" at all, but merely 
citizens who could not produce their draft cards. One authority has estimated that 
only one in two hundred men arrested was, in fact, a draft evader. ' 8 
In addition to apprehending citizens in the "slacker" raids, the Bureau 
officials monitored the political views of those they considered potential threats. 
Regarding these people as pro -German, BI agents monitored various United States 
Senators, former Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan, the Hearst newspaper 
chain, the Chicago Tribune, Irish -American activists, and other prominent groups 
and individuals. Bureau agents monitored these targets because they held political 
views similar to those of Imperial Germany. The United States senators were 
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watched, for example, because they opposed the embargo on trade with Germany. 
In all, the Bureau of Investigation won some 2,000 convictions during the First 
World War, but none of those arrested was charged with espionage, sabotage, or 
collusion with the enemy. Instead, the Bureau's targets included unionists, 
socialists, and German and Irish political activists. 19 
The Bureau also began its surveillance of African Americans during the 
Wilson administration. When race riots occurred in 1917 and 1919, the Wilson 
administration suspected that radicals had agitated blacks to riot. Government 
officials long had been wary of the influence external radicals had on minorities. 
The administration ordered a survey of both black attitudes towards the draft and of 
radical subversion within the African- American community. By 1919, as fears of 
radical influence in the black population rose, Bureau surveillance of "the Negro 
Question" became routine. In their efforts to locate the source of radical influence, 
Bureau agents focused on the minority press. The African- American press, 
thereafter, was earmarked for having agitated "the Negro elements of this country to 
riot." Through time, Bureau surveillance of the African- American community 
increased.20 
* * * 
Since before World War I, Americans had feared the importation of foreign 
radical ideas. These fears were exacerbated when, in November 1917, the Bolshevik 
Revolution in Russia put Communists in power. Soon thereafter, popular fears of a 
similar radical minority stirring revolutionary ideas appeared in the United States. 
In January 1919, after the signing of the armistice, Seattle shipyard workers (and 
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sympathetic workers in heavy industry) struck demanding better wages and fewer 
working hours. Seattle's mayor, Ole Hanson, had no sympathy for the workers' 
plight and instead equated them with revolutionary elements as seen in Russia. With 
the assistance of the police and federal troops he crushed the strike easily. Still other 
strikes cropped up in the steel and coal industries in 1919. (During 1919 some four 
million workers struck.) These strikes failed and the attempt to unionize only 
bolstered the popular perception that foreign radicals had inspired unionization 
efforts. While the strikers' motives may have been legitimate, any reconciliation to 
their viewpoint was quashed when several months later a series of mysterious 
bombings occurred.21 
In April, post office inspectors intercepted numerous bomb -laden packages 
addressed to prominent politicians and business leaders. In subsequent months, 
similar mail -bombs exploded in Chicago, Seattle, Atlanta, and New York, killing or 
wounding numerous innocent people. One significant bombing occurred at the 
home of Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer, but the bombardier failed in his task 
and only succeeded in killing himself The attempt so rattled Palmer that he decided 
to purge the country of radical influence. The serial nature of the Bolshevik 
Revolution, labor unrest, and bomb plots coupled with the International Workers of 
the World's (IWW) boisterous rhetoric and the appearance of other soviet regimes in 
Europe in 1918 and 1919, lent fear to an already wary public about insurgent foreign 
radicalism.22 
On 1 August 1919, Palmer created within the Bureau of Investigation a 
Radical Bureau -it was later renamed the General Intelligence Division (GID). The 
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GID investigated and collected information from numerous sources on the radical 
threat. To lead the GID, Palmer chose J. Edgar Hoover, who had transferred from 
the wartime Alien Enemy Bureau. Hoover organized the GID, creating a 200,000 - 
card index file on radical groups, personalities, and publications. In addition, the 
GID maintained files on Senator Robert La Follette, settlement house leader Jane 
Addams, and various black nationalists such as Marcus Garvey. Operating under the 
authority of the wartime Espionage and Sedition Acts, the GID made sweeping 
arrests before this legislation expired -it expired with the formal cessation of war. 
The imminent termination of these laws did not alter the Bureau's motivation, 
however, because officials had hoped peacetime sedition legislation would be 
enacted.23 
Because the government had to prove an individual planned the violent 
overthrow of the United States government, a difficult legal task, the Bureau of 
Investigation had a difficult, if not impossible, time pursuing radicals under federal 
legislation. As Director Frank Burke observed: "As the activities of aliens who are 
radically inclined are always most secretive in character, it quite often is next to 
impossible to prove actual membership with the organization alleged to be 
anarchistic." An easier way to dispose of the radical aliens, officials determined, 
was simply to deport them. To achieve this goal, the Bureau of Investigation 
worked with the Department of Labor's Immigration Bureau. Together, they could 
arrest and deport foreign radicals using the provisions of the 1918 Immigration Act. 
The legality of this arrangement, however, was questionable. The Labor Department 
and Immigration Bureau had the sole authority to deport aliens; the Justice 
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Department had no prerogative in this area. But the Bureau of Investigation was 
authorized to conduct dragnet raids on the pretense that alien organizations had 
violated federal law. Government officials favored dragnet raids because alien 
radicals could be arrested en masse and their organizations' papers could, at the 
same time, be seized. By mid -1919 cooperation between the Justice and Labor 
Departments had become very close.24 
Rather than taking the difficult prosecutorial route, GID chief Hoover and 
Immigration Bureau Commissioner General Anthony Caminetti sought to deport 
radical aliens through administrative means. But the two bureaucrats faced one 
further obstacle. In March 1919, Labor Secretary William B. Wilson changed an 
important aspect to the Immigration Bureau's deportation process. The Immigration 
Bureau's rule 22 permitted aliens to seek legal counsel in the deportation process, 
but not in the beginning. Being a strong civil libertarian, and citing fundamental 
fairness, Wilson altered rule 22 to allow aliens legal representation from the start of 
proceedings. This disrupted the Hoover -Caminetti plan inasmuch as the bureaucrats 
had relied upon the arrested aliens to incriminate themselves -by admitting radical 
beliefs or associations with radical groups -under interrogation, thus making them 
deportable. In most cases the interrogation process worked well because immigrants 
were not aware of their legal rights and therefore could be manipulated into 
incriminating themselves. But the radical aliens targeted by Hoover and Caminetti 
had the benefit of knowledgeable organizations that employed legal council to assist 
its members.25 
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The difficulties for Hoover and Caminetti were underscored during the 
November 1919 dragnet conducted against the Union of Russian Workers. In its 
surprise raid, the Bureau of Investigation rounded up 300 members of the Union. 
But contrary to Bureau assumptions, the URW aliens were well informed of 
immigration/deportation procedures, because the URW had kept its members abreast 
of government policy. Refusing to talk, the well- informed aliens instead demanded 
legal counsel and thereby undermined Hoover's and Caminetti's self -incrimination 
strategy.26 
Caminetti, and other like -minded officials, thereafter decided that to ensure 
success the provisions of rule 22 had to be changed. Only then would they proceed 
with their planned raids against the Communist Party and Communist Labor Party. 
An opportunity to act presented itself one month later. On 30 December, Secretary 
of Labor Wilson departed Washington leaving Solicitor General John Abercrombie 
in charge of the Labor Department. Sympathetic to Hoover and Caminetti, 
Abercrombie restored rule 22 to what it had been before Wilson changed it, thus 
allowing federal agents to interrogate aliens without legal counsel. To further 
prevent access to legal representation, immigration officials inflated bail or allowed 
none at a11.27 
With these procedural changes in place, the so- called Palmer raids began. 
On 2 and 6 January 1920, Bureau agents (coordinated from Washington by Hoover) 
raided both Communist and Communist Labor Party meetings. Government agents 
arrested some 10,000 persons across the nation, many of whom were not aliens or 
party affiliates at all. In so doing, many citizens' civil rights were violated. While 
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housed in inadequate detention facilities the prisoners were coerced to admit radical 
beliefs or associations. Despite the harsh and questionable methods government 
agents employed, the public response to the raids nevertheless was favorable.28 
On 26 January, learning of the procedural changes made to accommodate the 
deportation of aliens, Secretary Wilson restored his changes to rule 22. Moreover, 
concerned about the Immigration Bureau's liaison with the Bureau of Investigation, 
Wilson terminated their working relationship. The secretary and Assistant Secretary 
of Labor Louis Post then reviewed the arrest records of the detained aliens. Being 
more concerned with civil liberties than Hoover or Caminetti, Wilson and Post ruled 
that membership in the Communist Labor Party did not constitute grounds for 
deportation. Wilson and Post further distinguished between "conscious" and 
"unconscious" Communist Party members because many Socialists had been 
shunted to the more radical parties' membership rolls when the Communist Party 
split from the Socialist Party in 1919. So of the 10,000 netted, about 4,000 were 
arrested. Of these, only 556 eventually were deported.29 
The enthusiasm for Attorney General Palmer and the raids did not hold, 
however. Within weeks public opinion shifted and support for the raids disappeared. 
Several social reformist groups spoke out against the government's heavy- handed 
tactics, including the National Popular Government League (NPGL), the Interchurch 
World Movement (IWM), and the Commission on the Church and Social Service. 
Some government officials protested the action as well. A Pennsylvania U.S. 
attorney resigned in protest, and some immigration officials refused to cooperate 
with Bureau of Investigation agents.3o 
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Despite growing public displeasure with the raids and civil rights violations, 
BI officials were convinced that liberal senior Department of Labor officials had 
undercut the raids. Because the Bureau of Investigation had established friendly 
relations with Commissioner General Caminetti, the sudden intervention by 
Secretary Wilson and Assistant Secretary Post led BI officials to suspect their 
motives. Accordingly, J. Edgar Hoover ordered an investigation of Post, searching 
military intelligence records and IWW files to prove his radical sympathies. The 
investigation turned up nothing and a subsequent attempt by Congress to impeach 
the assistant secretary backfired and only highlighted the Bureau's abuses of 
power.31 
The Bureau did not stop with its investigation of Post. Critics of the 
Bureau's raids became the focus of further secret Bureau investigations. After the 
NPGL published a critical pamphlet entitled Report on the Illegal Activities of the 
United States Department of Justice, Hoover ordered a "discreet and thorough 
investigation" of the NPGL. Bureau agents collected information that detailed the 
personal lives of the organization's leadership, the NPGL's financial sources, and 
the group's political activities and associations (notably its relationship with Post). 
The Bureau also investigated the political backgrounds of the twelve lawyers who 
had signed and supported the NPGL's pamphlet. Included among these were such 
esteemed lawyers as Ernst Fruend, Felix Frankfurter, and Zechariah Chafee, Jr.32 
When the IWM and the Commission on the Church and Social Service 
publicly castigated the Palmer raids, they were targeted for investigation. 
Throughout, the Bureau focused on these various organizations' political 
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philosophies. BI agents never uncovered any information that confirmed the alleged 
radical sympathies of these groups or their members. Instead, the Bureau began 
what would become a long history of secret political investigations of those it 
believed were "subversive." These post -Red Scare inquiries were just the start of 
future and more pervasive investigative efforts.33 
* * * 
During the presidency of Warren G. Harding, the Bureau of Investigation 
became enmeshed in scandals that effected major changes in the organization. The 
Teapot Dome scandal was the largest of various illegalities committed by the so- 
called "Ohio Gang" of the Harding administration. The scandal centered on oil 
deposits located at Teapot Dome, Wyoming, and Elk Hills, California. The deposits 
had been set aside as naval reserves, but control of them was transferred to Interior 
Secretary Albert B. Fall. The interior secretary had been a wealthy businessman but 
lost his fortune in a Mexican mining venture, and in an effort to alleviate his 
misfortune, Fall secretly signed contracts that allowed two oil companies to tap the 
government's oil resources in Wyoming and California. The secretary then accepted 
$400,000 in "loans" from the owners of the two oil companies, Harry Sinclair and 
Edward Doheny.34 
In 1923 Montana Senators Thomas Walsh and Burton K. Wheeler (later a 
target of the FBI for his anti -interventionist politics) learned of Fall's activity and 
decided to initiate a Senate investigation. Learning of the senators' plans, however, 
Attorney General Harry Daugherty took preemptive action in an attempt to quash the 
inquiry. Bureau of Investigation Director William J. Burns dispatched agents to 
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Montana to unearth any derogatory information on Walsh and Wheeler. Agents in 
Washington, D.C., meanwhile, intercepted their mail, tapped their telephones, and 
broke into their offices. Daugherty and Bureau Director Burns, through political 
contacts, were even able to secure an indictment against Wheeler in Montana for 
alleged misuse of his office to obtain gas and oil leases for a friend. When the case 
went to trial, Thomas Walsh served as Wheeler's defense counsel. He easily 
exposed the indictment as a sham and won the case. Bureau agents were unable to 
find any incriminating evidence to use against Senator Wheeler, and instead their 
tactics were exposed during senate hearings later that year. What followed was a 
public outcry over the Bureau's illegal activity.35 
President Harding died before revelations of the scandals caused him any 
political harm. His successor, Calvin Coolidge, took steps to disassociate himself 
with the administration's illegalities. On 28 March 1924, President Coolidge 
demanded Attorney General Daugherty's resignation. In his place, the president 
appointed Harlan Fiske Stone, a conservative and highly respected reformist and 
dean of Columbia University Law School. Having been a critic of Daugherty's 
management of the Justice Department, Stone sought to implement high moral and 
professional standards and began to reform the department. 
On 9 May, Stone fired Bureau Director William J. Burns. The attorney 
general then sought a respected administrator who could replace the disgraced 
Burns. Following a cabinet meeting, Stone discussed the matter with then Secretary 
of Commerce Herbert Hoover. The commerce secretary consulted with his assistant 
(and former FBI agent) Lawrence Richey, and recommended Assistant FBI Director 
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J. Edgar Hoover to Stone. The attorney general believed in and trusted expert 
administrators and men of high moral standards not to abuse their offices. Despite 
Hoover's participation in the Palmer Raids and other Bureau abuses, with high 
recommendations Stone believed he was suited for the job. On 10 May, Hoover was 
invited to Stone's office where he was offered the job as interim Bureau director 
(Hoover was later made permanent director). Hoover accepted but insisted that he 
have full authority over Bureau hiring and promoting practices. To disassociate the 
organization from political patronage, Hoover wanted Bureau hiring and promotions 
to be based on merit.36 
As the head of a reformed Bureau of Investigation, Hoover was required to 
work within the attorney general's new guidelines. Stone disbanded the now - 
controversial General Intelligence Division (formerly headed by Hoover), banned 
the Bureau's use of wiretaps, and directed Hoover to investigate only violations of 
federal criminal statues. Hoover publicly supported the new attorney general's 
guidelines and promised that Bureau agents would not collect political intelligence. 
Believing that the Bureau's past problems were rooted in a lack of professionalism 
and low moral standards, Stone trusted the new director. And at every turn Hoover 
sought to demonstrate to the attorney general his loyalty and trust.37 
Despite Attorney General Stone's guidelines, and Hoover's promises to 
adhere to them, the new director continued to monitor those he considered 
"radicals." This activity did not reach the scale of prior efforts -clearly it could not 
under the new guidelines -but it did continue. Hoover's only authority to 
investigate groups and individuals was if the target had violated a federal statute, but 
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the director thought he would be remiss if the Bureau ceased monitoring 
"subversive" organizations. Information acquired on such radicals might become 
useful at a later date, Hoover believed, especially if Congress enacted a peacetime 
sedition law. 
To secretly gather political intelligence, Hoover devised several procedures 
that ensured confidentiality. Bureau agents continued to collect radical publications 
and newspaper clippings, attend radical meetings, and collect unsolicited material 
regarding radical activities. Because they were not pursuant to a federal indictment, 
these efforts technically did not constitute an official Bureau investigation. 
Additionally, after 1924 Bureau agents were instructed to use the misnomer 
"confidential source" (or a derivation of it) in their reports when in reality their 
source was illicit. Agents also worked in tandem with local police forces in their 
anti- radical investigations. The police units would then submit their data to the 
Bureau thereby ensuring BI "compliance" with Attorney General Stone's 
restrictions.38 
In 1925, Hoover authorized the creation of an Obscene file. In this file was 
placed information of a pornographic nature - Hoover reportedly enjoyed such lurid 
publications -and information about illicit sexual activity. The secret collection of 
this type of intelligence not only assisted the Bureau in prosecuting obscenity cases, 
but also proved valuable either to curry favor with superiors or to discredit 
opponents.39 Hoover further devised a procedure to relay sensitive intelligence 
about the personal and political lives of prominent Americans directly to his desk, 
thereby bypassing the Bureau's central records system. These reports were labeled 
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"personal and confidential," a designation that immediately routed the documents to 
Hoover where they were secretly filed in his office. Through these various 
procedures, Hoover was able to continue to monitor subversive activity while 
making a public effort to demonstrate his adherence to new department guidelines.4o 
One of the targets monitored by the Bureau of Investigation between 1924 
and 1933 was the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). Originating from the 
First World War period, the ACLU was an early and vocal Bureau critic. In 1924 
the group issued a report that criticized the BI's investigative practices. Newly 
installed as director, Hoover rebutted the report's charges in a letter to Attorney 
General Stone. The director explained that the Bureau of Investigation indeed had a 
file on the ACLU, but that it contained only unsolicited information. Despite 
Hoover's denials to the contrary, the Bureau of Investigation, in fact, actively 
monitored the American Civil Liberties Union.41 
The Bureau of Investigation monitored ACLU political statements by 
attending their meetings, monitoring demonstrations, keeping track of their litigation 
efforts, and tracking ACLU financial sources. The Bureau even employed an 
informer in the group's executive board who provided information concerning 
ACLU policies and administration. Further, still, Bureau agents worked closely with 
local Red Squads -special anti -radical police squads -to gather political 
intelligence. Hoover even ordered two investigations of the New York chapter of 
the ACLU for making critical statements about the Bureau's Mann Act prosecutions. 
These illegal investigate efforts culminated in 1931 with BI agents writing an ACLU 
history utilizing Bureau resources that documented the group's political interests.42 
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Bureau agents monitored others during this period. Among those targeted 
was William Z. Foster's Trade Union Educational League (TUEL). In 1922 the 
Bureau had pursued the TUEL in an effort to undermine the leftist labor group. By 
1924, Hoover's monitoring became more circumspect but no less thorough. As with 
the ACLU, Bureau agents employed informers and collected all types of political 
intelligence. Another liberal group agents monitored was the Sacco -Vanzetti 
Defense Committee. Devoted to rallying public opinion in an effort to prevent the 
execution of the accused anarchists, agents closely scrutinized the Defense 
Committee's politics. By compiling monthly reports from field offices, the Bureau 
officials were able to acquire a cornucopia of information on legitimate political 
activity. This enabled Bureau officials to compile dossiers on targets, without 
external interference.43 
During the presidency of Herbert Hoover, the Bureau of Investigation began 
to service, on an ad hoc and limited basis, White House requests for political 
intelligence. Three senior White House aides made the requests: Hoover's aide 
Lawrence Richey, Press Secretary Theodore Joslin, and Presidential Secretary 
Walter Newton. The first White House request for political intelligence occurred in 
November 1929 when Richey requested an investigation of the anti- radical group 
The Sentinels of the Republic. Richey's concern stemmed from a letter the White 
House received from the Sentinels that criticized the president's privately funded 
Child Health Commission. Bureau agents compiled a report on the group hut 
uncovering nothing substantial.'" 
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White House aides made subsequent requests for information on other 
groups, including the ACLU, the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People, the Foreign Policy Association, and the Moorish Science Temple of 
America. White House officials also expressed interest in minor right -wing 
organizations like the Federation of Lictor -suspected of being a fascist Italian 
front -and the American Citizens Political Awakening Association. One White 
House request involved critics of the Hoover administration. When the Navy 
League of the United States publicly criticized Hoover's defense cutbacks, the 
administration solicited a Bureau investigation. In their efforts, Bureau agents 
searched Internal Revenue Service files and perused the League's papers. But the 
largest effort undertaken by Bureau agents was its investigation of the 1932 Bonus 
March on Washington, D.C.45 
During the early years of the Great Depression, thousands of First Word War 
veterans mobilized in an effort to alleviate their worsening economic condition. In 
1924 Congress had promised the veterans a bonus of $1,000 to be paid in 1945. 
Feeling desperate, thousands of unemployed veterans demanded early payment and, 
to demonstrate their seriousness, traveled to Washington, D.C., determined to depart 
the city only when granted their bonus. In the spring of 1932, the "Bonus 
Expeditionary Force" set up camp in the nation's capita1.46 
Fearful of economic -oriented popular protest, some government officials 
believed that radical elements -i.e. communists -were responsible for organizing 
the Bonus Marchers. Hoover already had one communist- sponsored veterans' 
organization under surveillance since 1930. And when the 20,000 Bonus marchers 
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arrived in Washington, Hoover joined Army Chief of Staff Douglas MacArthur in 
convincing President Hoover that the march was a communist plot. Trusting his 
subordinates' counsel, the president ordered the Army to disperse the veterans.47 
President Hoover was criticized widely for the harsh treatment the veterans 
received. Convinced the protest was communist -inspired, the president ordered the 
Bureau of Investigation to investigate to prove communist intrigue. Bureau agents 
attended protest rallies, monitored Bonus marcher activity, and, with the help of 
local red squads, investigated veterans' groups to determine communist influence. 
Nothing was discovered, however, that confirmed communist influence.45 
Out of Progressive -Era ideals of rational and efficient government, the 
Bureau of Investigation was born during the Theodore Roosevelt administration. As 
its responsibilities grew over time, the ability of the attorney general to oversee its 
activities was limited. This led to an abuse of power that only grew with increased 
responsibilities, wartime necessity, and a post -war Red Scare. Eventually, those 
abuses became public and administrative reforms were created to deal with them. 
Instead of ending the Bureau's ability to monitor political activity, the reforms only 
lessened them. Even still, the Bureau of the 1920s was small and not a significant 
investigative force. But this would change with the rise of another global emergency 
and another president named Roosevelt. 
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The Roosevelt Administration, Foreign Policy, and the Expansion of FBI Authority, 
1933 -1939. 
When Franklin D. Roosevelt acceded to the presidency in 1933, the Bureau 
of Investigation, for the first time since J. Edgar Hoover took its reins in 1924, was 
part of a politically left -of- center administration. One might think at first glance that 
Roosevelt had no room in his administration for a conservative figure like Hoover. 
Yet despite the contrast between Hoover's and Roosevelt's political identities, the 
FBI director enjoyed a close working relationship with the president and, over a 
twelve -year period, oversaw an incremental expansion of FBI authority. Their 
amicable relationship was not readily apparent, however, at the start of Roosevelt's 
term in office, but Hoover worked hard to serve the president and his political goals. 
Through helping the attorney general with his Crime Control Program and by 
fighting the perceived rise in crime during the Depression, by 1935 the FBI director 
had risen from obsequious bureaucrat to national celebrity. After acquiring this 
newly found fame, international conflict facilitated an increased role for the FBI in 
national security matters and, thereafter, made the director particularly indispensable 
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to the president. The net result was a transformation of the Bureau into a more 
powerful and greatly expanded agency. 
Because Hoover was a Republican appointee -he became Bureau director, a 
position that was not protected by the civil service, during the Calvin Coolidge 
administration -he was susceptible to be replaced. And it was widely believed that 
this would happen. Hoover was not, however, without the political clout that would 
help him to retain his position. Hoover made multiple attempts to influence the 
incoming administration to retain his services within the Department of Justice. The 
first of several Hoover allies to advocate his retention was Supreme Court Justice 
Harlan Fiske Stone -the same man who in 1924 recruited him to lead the Bureau 
following the Red Scare scandals. While it is not clear whether or not Hoover had 
solicited Stone's help, in April 1933 the Supreme Court justice wrote administration 
advisor Felix Frankfurter praising Hoover's work. Former Assistant Attorney 
General Francis Garvan also wrote Roosevelt in support of Hoover, stating: "Do not 
let them lose you that boy, Hoover." In addition, the director lobbied local and state 
police organizations and conservative Democrats in Congress to support his re- 
appointment. Then, Hoover hired as replacements over one hundred FBI agents who 
were southern Democrats, ostensibly to muster support from conservative southern 
Democratic congressmen.' 
Despite these efforts to secure his job, Hoover's position as Bureau director 
was jeopardized in February 1933 after Roosevelt named Thomas Walsh his 
attorney general designate. There could have been perhaps no worse choice for 
attorney general, for Hoover, than the firebrand senator from Montana. Walsh had 
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served on the Senate committee that had investigated the Palmer raids and Teapot 
Dome scandal and, as such, was a longstanding critic of the Bureau and Hoover. 
Complicating matters, on 28 February Walsh announced that he planned to 
reorganize the Department of Justice through significant personnel changes. 
Hoover's prospects for continuing as director of the Bureau of Investigation seemed 
dim.2 
Hoover did not give up hope, however. Sometime during the start of the 
Roosevelt administration, the FBI director discovered that several Democrats had 
asked Senator Burton K. Wheeler, a friend and colleague of Walsh, to oppose 
Hoover's reappointment. These Democrats believed that since Hoover was involved 
in the Bureau's 1924 -25 attack on Wheeler (see chapter one), that on his own the 
senator could ensure Hoover's ouster. According to Wheeler, Hoover "got wind of 
this talk and came to see me" and denied any involvement "in the [past] reprisals 
against me." It seems clear that Hoover sought to mend his political fences, but 
ultimately the effort proved fleeting. On 2 March, while honeymooning in North 
Carolina, Senator Walsh died of a massive heart attack. The threat Walsh had posed 
to Hoover vanished but the FBI director nevertheless took steps to ensure that no 
questions were raised over the attorney general designate's untimely death. To allay 
any hint of scandal, Hoover dispatched agents to North Carolina to escort Mrs. 
Walsh back to Washington, D.C., and he ordered a thorough and documented 
medical exam on Walsh's body to rule out foul play.3 
Homer Cummings, the president's new choice for attorney general, was an 
avid New Dealer and a man less concerned with Hoover's past than Walsh. But 
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while the threat to his job was diminished, Hoover continued shoring up his 
constituency. When he learned that Postmaster General James Farley was scheming 
to have Hoover replaced with his friend Val O'Farrell, the bureau director had 
Farley's telephones tapped and shared derogatory information regarding O'Farrell 
with Attorney General Cummings. Whether or not this action directly resulted in 
O'Farrell's name being withdrawn from consideration is unclear, but thereafter 
Hoover had Cummings's support. He also had the support of Roosevelt aides Edwin 
Watson and Stephen Early.4 
Even after Cummings became attorney general, Hoover continued to 
ingratiate himself with his superior. An activist executive -department head, 
Cummings welcomed Hoover's cooperation and enlisted his support to advance the 
administration's crime -control program. Crime had became a popular issue during 
the Great Depression as there was a perceived breakdown in law and order and 
resultant perceived increase in crime. Whether it was celebrated kidnappings, bank 
robberies, or the adventures of gangsters, many people, notably New Dealers, 
believed that the crime issue had its roots in the inability of local police forces to 
deal with sophisticated (inter- state) and organized criminals. Like any good New 
Dealer, Cummings sought to use the popularity of the crime issue to involve the 
federal government in an area that previously had been the responsibility of state and 
local authorities. To inaugurate his crusade against crime, the attorney general first 
increased the Bureau of Investigation's legal authority.5 
To expand the federal police force, President Roosevelt issued an executive 
order in June 1933 that combined the Prohibition Bureau (defunct with the repeal of 
57 
the Eighteenth Amendment), the Bureau of Identification (already under Hoover's 
control), and the Bureau of Investigation. The new and enlarged organization was 
renamed the Division of Investigation and, by late summer, it had all come under 
Hoover's direction. The organization's name would go through one more change in 
July 1935 when it became, permanently, the Federal Bureau of Investigation -a 
designation reflecting its more important role in the federal government.6 
Before presenting Congress with his twelve -point crime -control program - 
twelve bills that would dramatically increase the federal government's role in 
national policing- Attorney General Cummings initiated an anti -crime public 
relations campaign to arouse public opinion and promote the FBI. During the first 
two years of the New Deal, public attention focused more on Cummings's pro- active 
activities while FBI Director Hoover remained largely unnoticed. One of 
Cummings's first innovations was to create a national "Public Enemies" list that 
took advantage of the public's interest in gangsters. It was the FBI's interaction 
with these popular criminals, however, that signaled the real start of the crime - 
control publicity campaign.? 
Following the Kansas City Massacre of 17 June 1933, where one FBI agent 
was killed and two wounded while escorting escaped bank robber Frank Nash to jail, 
Attorney General Cummings publicly announced his anti -crime crusade. Labeling 
the shooting as a "declaration of war" against the federal government, Cummings 
ordered the FBI to solve the case. He used the opportunity to advocate passage of 
his bills, and in his efforts spared no rhetoric.8 
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The Bureau's first success in its anti -crime crusade came just one month after 
the Kansas City Massacre when oilman Charles Urschel was kidnapped. While 
Urschel played cards with his wife and several friends on a hot summer night in 
Oklahoma, George "Machine Gun" Kelly and an accomplice abducted Urschel at 
gunpoint. Authorized by the 1932 Lindbergh Kidnapping Law, legislation that 
federalized a kidnapping case if state lines were crossed (in this case Urschel's 
captors had transported him into Texas), the FBI entered the case. The Urschel 
family received a $200,000 ransom demand a few days later which they paid and, 
the following day, Charles Urschel was returned unharmed.9 
Unable to identify his abductors, Urschel instead provided FBI agents with 
minute details of his ordeal, such as a discussion his captors had with a gasoline 
station attendant about local crop conditions, farm sounds where he was held, the 
mineral taste of the farm's water, and the sound of an airplane passing overhead at 
two different times of day. From these details FBI agents were able to triangulate 
the most probable location where the Oklahoma oilman had been held. They did 
this by examining airline flight schedules and drought reports, which. when 
compared with the times of day Urschel had heard the airplane, allowed the agents 
to zero in on Machine Gun Kelly's family farm. Agents raided the farm and arrested 
one of the kidnappers and, thereafter having a suspect, on 26 September located 
Kelly and apprehended him. The case proved to be a public relations bonanza for 
Hoover and the FBI for, as the story goes, before being arrested Kelly quipped, 
"Don't shoot, G -men, don't shoot," forever labeling FBI agents as G -men. 
Cummings's public relations campaign made full use of the drama by touting the 
59 
FBI's scientific methods and exemplifying the Kellys as the type of criminals the 
federal government should target.]° 
Thereafter the FBI agents pursued a number of gangsters, some of whom 
became celebrities in Depression -era American popular culture. Among those the 
government pursued and used to advance its crime program, by publicizing FBI and 
Justice Department anti -crime achievements, were Charles "Pretty Boy" Floyd. 
Lester "Baby Face" Nelson, Alvin "Old Creepy" Karpis, and Clyde Barrow and 
Bonnie Parker. But the most celebrated case. and the one that did more to promote 
and expanded a federal role in law enforcement than any other, was that of John 
Dillinger.11 
During the spring and fall of 1933. career -criminal John Dillinger was 
involved in ten bank robberies and various other misdemeanors. He was arrested 
twice and both times, often with the help of friends, he managed to escape from 
prison. In Indiana. following his second jail break, Dillinger audaciously stole his 
jailer's car and drove it west into Illinois. By driving the vehicle across state lines, 
Dillinger violated the Dyer Act of 1919 and, as a result, brought the FBI in on the 
case. Attorney General Cummings made political capital of the event when he 
publicly outlined his Twelve Point Anti -Crime Program invoking the Dillinger case 
as an example for the necessity to increase the federal government's role in law 
enforcement. ' 2 
Just as Dillinger had twice eluded police and escaped from their jails on two 
separate occasions, he did so again with federal agents. On 31 March 1934, 
following an intense gun battle, Dillinger evaded capture in SL Paul. Minnesota. by 
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retreating through an unguarded rear door of a hotel. Less than a month later he 
again escaped capture by a rear entrance, this time of the Little Bohemia Lodge in 
northern Wisconsin. Dillinger's various escapes from federal authorities during the 
Great Depression made popular press. Nevertheless, Attorney General Cummings 
was able to publicize the setbacks arguing that Dillinger only reflected the 
seriousness of the crime problem.13 
Mobilizing the Justice Department's public relations machine and painting 
the Dillinger case as an example of the federal government's commitment to fighting 
crime, Cummings argued that criminals like Dillinger made his Twelve Point Anti - 
Crime Program a necessity. The widespread publicity over the case (and others) 
created public and political support for Cummings's crime program. Indeed, on 6 
May somebody purporting to be Dillinger wrote car maker Henry Ford thanking him 
"for building the Ford V -8 as fast and as sturdy a car as you did, otherwise I would 
not have gotten away from the coppers in that Wisconsin, Minnesota case. "14 Few 
politicians in this atmosphere could oppose the federalization of crime control; their 
states' rights arguments carried little weight in such a political dynamic. Meantime, 
the attorney general worked behind the scenes to line up conservatives and New 
Dealers with his proposals and after the president publicly announced his support of 
the crime -bill package it was sent to the House floor.15 
On 19 May 1934, Congress passed the first six of Cummings's proposed 
crime bills. By June it passed three more. The FBI, thereafter, was granted full 
arrest powers and was permitted to carry firearms. Moreover, the Bureau's 
jurisdiction was broadened to include apprehending escaped felons who crossed 
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state lines to avoid prosecution and to enter kidnapping cases automatically after a 
seven -day period. Interstate racketeering -by way of the telephone or mail - 
became a felony, and the Bureau was permitted to investigate bank robberies if the 
institution was a member of the Federal Reserve. These new laws, and others, 
greatly increased the Bureau's authority. The widespread publicity wrought from 
the pursuit of celebrated criminal figures brought the FBI into a new phase in its 
history as a truly national and popular federal organization.16 
Having achieved success in its anti -crime crusade and having had its powers 
and jurisdiction greatly expanded, the FBI by 1934 -35 was ready to assume new 
responsibilities when foreign threats increasingly caught the attention of President 
Roosevelt. With fascist aggression on the rise in Europe, Africa, and Asia, 
Roosevelt became more sensitive to the domestic threat those forces might sow in 
the United States. As the world moved closer to war, and as Roosevelt's foreign 
policy increasingly assumed a more internationalist perspective between 1934 and 
1941, the FBI's role and authority in national security issues increased. The FBI's 
growth as a domestic intelligence agency can be linked to the increasing importance 
of foreign policy in American national politics during the 1930s. 
* * * 
Franklin D. Roosevelt by nature and experience was an internationalist 
politician. He was born into a wealthy and aristocratic family with whom he 
enjoyed summers in Europe. He began his formal education at Groton (and later 
Harvard and Columbia) where he debated the lively international issues of the late 
nineteenth century. The future president's upbringing, travels, and education 
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instilled in him a firm commitment to internationalism. This commitment is 
reflected in his service as President Woodrow Wilson's assistant secretary of the 
navy from 1913 to 1920 when he advocated an expansion of American naval power. 
As the Democratic vice -presidential candidate in 1920, Roosevelt championed 
passage of the Versailles Treaty and American membership in the League of 
Nations. His commitment to internationalism notwithstanding, Roosevelt was also a 
man of his time who abhorred war, believed that peace and prosperity were 
inextricably linked, and advocated a free hand for America in international 
relations.17 
Beyond his internationalist perspective, Roosevelt was also a talented and 
savvy politician. Understanding the country's desire to turn inward following the 
onset of the Great Depression, Roosevelt decided, for political reasons, not to issue 
any kind of public statements on foreign policy. Later, as a presidential candidate, 
he even went so far as to disavow his previous support for American entry into the 
League of Nations, and made no important foreign policy pronouncements during 
his campaign. Roosevelt knew that given the severity of the domestic economy, he 
would never be elected president as an internationalist. Moreover, Roosevelt 
believed that before America could successfully lead in world affairs, it first had to 
effect relief at home. In part because he made no issue out of foreign affairs, 
Roosevelt won the support of a majority of anti -interventionists -who later would 
oppose his foreign policy -such as Senators Burton K. Wheeler and George 
Norris.' s 
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Upon assuming the presidency, Roosevelt focused almost exclusively on 
domestic affairs; he made foreign relations of secondary importance. The 
devastating impact of the Great Depression in America necessitated the president's 
priorities. The gross national product had dropped from $87 billion in 1929 to $41 
billion by 1933. In 1932 the jobless rate had exceeded 15 million, an unprecedented 
level in United States history.19 Thus, from 1932 to 1934 Roosevelt the 
internationalist acted as a nationalist, focusing his attention almost exclusively on 
economic recovery at home. 
The new president's priorities were reflected in the makeup of his foreign 
policy team. Diminishing the importance of foreign policy during his first term, 
Roosevelt created a State Department that espoused both internationalist and 
nationalist views. As his secretary of state, Roosevelt chose the influential 
internationalist senator from Tennessee, Cordell Hull. Often setting foreign policy 
without consulting his secretary of state, Hull was picked more to satisfy Democratic 
politics than for his policy expertise. Thus, on the one hand Roosevelt had Hull who 
fervently believed in the benefits of reciprocal trade agreements, and on the other 
was Assistant Secretary of State Raymond Moley who advocated "a considerable 
insulation of our national economy from the rest of the world." In short, Roosevelt 
created an inconsistent foreign policy apparatus where major policy decisions were 
centralized within the White House so as not to disturb his domestic political 
agenda.20 
Roosevelt's disinterest in an internationalist approach for economic relief is 
evident in his handling of the 1933 London Economic Conference. Preparations for 
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the conference began late during the Herbert Hoover administration. The outgoing 
president had high hopes for the conference, believing the meeting could resolve the 
interconnected problems of war debts, disarmament, and currency stabilization. 
President Hoover lobbied the president -elect to go forward with the conference in 
hopes that the international economy could be stabilized. But Roosevelt and his 
aides distrusted Hoover's motives believing he wanted to commit the new 
administration to his now -discredited policies. Roosevelt made no firm promises to 
Hoover and, in the end, made no effort at all to ensure a successful conference. He 
sent a delegation to London that varied widely in its views and instructed them to 
not discuss war debts or disarmament. He also refused to allow them to make any 
agreements on currency stabilization. The president sought only the most basic and 
non -binding resolutions from which, some believe, he wanted to build stronger 
international agreements only after having restored American domestic prosperity.2 
The incongruous American delegation made no progress at the conference. 
As historian Wayne Cole has observed, "the conference proved to be an exercise in 
futility characterized by confusion bordering on chaos. "22 President Roosevelt 
further sabotaged the talks by dispatching Raymond Moley to London as his 
personal representative after negotiations had stalled. The episode raised hopes that 
Roosevelt had some plan for a currency stabilization declaration (not agreement) by 
dispatching Moley, but these aspirations were quickly dashed when Roosevelt later 
publicly announced that American domestic economic problems and solutions had 
priority over any international agreements. With this July "Bombshell Message" the 
conference effectively came to a close, but not for another few weeks. Secretary 
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Hull was able to continue talks if only to preserve hope that, in the future, some sort 
of international solution could be found. But none was effected during 1933.23 
Another failed international conference that demonstrated the United States's 
inability or unwillingness to partake in international peace efforts was the World 
Disarmament Conference in Geneva, Switzerland during 1932 -33. When Roosevelt 
took office in 1933, the conference had already dragged on aimlessly for nearly one 
year. In May, Roosevelt attempted to jumpstart negotiations by sending a message 
to each of the conferees, endorsing disarmament. While none believed that an 
agreement at that juncture could be reached, the conference continued with renewed 
hope. Still, despite an attempt in October by Roosevelt to convince the French to 
begin limited disarmament -in hopes that Germany would follow suit -no 
agreement was reached. The plan had absolutely no chance of success as Nazi 
Germany was secretly rearming and, with the perspicacity to recognize that none of 
the other powers would actually disarm, Hitler pulled out of conference and quit the 
League of Nations on 14 October 1933. Without Germany's participation, the 
conference was rendered impotent and soon folded. In the United States, 
Roosevelt's failure to elicit any agreement seemed naïve at best and only served to 
strengthen his anti -interventionist opposition in the Senate which was adamantly 
opposed to U.S. involvement in European political affairs.24 
* * 
With the expansion of Nazi power and the spread of fascism and militarism 
across the globe in the early 1930s, some administration officials became concerned 
over the rise of fascist elements in the United States during the early 1930s. 
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Extreme right- wingers in America, such as the vocal German American Bund, 
denounced Roosevelt and the New Deal as communistic. In reality the ties between 
Nazi Germany and the small but highly -visible fascist groups were limited, though 
the perception of a possible threat was strong. Indeed, in 1934 and 1935 several 
books were published examining the popularity of American Fascism, such as 
Carmen Haider's Do We Want Fascism? (1934), Norman Thomas's The Choice 
Before Us (1934), Raymond Gram Swing's The Forerunners of American Fascism 
(1935), and Sinclair Lewis's popular novel It Can't Happen Here (1935).25 
Concern led Roosevelt on 8 May 1934 to call a conference between the 
attorney general, treasury secretary, labor secretary, and FBI and Secret Service 
chiefs to discuss the situation. At the conference, the president ordered the FBI to 
monitor American Nazis and Nazi sympathizers and to determine the extent of 
German influence among domestic groups. For the next two years the White House 
received regular reports on right -wing political elements as well as other sundry 
reports on administration critics. This moment was the first increase in FBI 
authority during the Roosevelt administration that had at its origin concern that a 
foreign influence threatened to disrupt domestic affairs.26 
* * * 
Throughout Roosevelt's first term, he focused primarily on implementing his 
New Deal recovery program. By 1934, however, a new phase of American politics 
emerged: a period where the issue of intervention in European crises became 
paramount. But it was also a period where Congress played the central role in 
matters of foreign policy, working to restrict the executive. Their main concern was 
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how to deal with an expansionist Germany and Japan in relation to United States 
strategic and economic interests without becoming entangled in anything that might 
lead to war. 
Amid growing post -war disillusionment over the purpose and effects of the 
Great War of 1914 -18, various books appeared that helped feed negative popular 
perceptions of the war. In Merchants of Death (1934), Helmuth Engelbrecht and 
Frank Hanigen argued that American bankers and munitions manufacturers, in 
search of profit, purposefully compromised United States neutrality. This best 
selling Book -of -the- Month -Club selection (along with others) reflected the national 
mood. Historian Harry Elmer Barnes's book, Genesis of the World War (1926), 
previously had redirected blame for the war from Germany to the Allies and 
contributed to the public mood. Efforts by Dorothy Detzer, of Women's 
International League for Peace and Freedom, also stimulated popular questioning of 
profiteering in war. Significantly, Detzer's lobbying, with the help of Senator 
George Norris, succeeded in convincing Senator Gerald Nye of North Dakota to 
make an official inquiry into the issue.27 
The ambitious Gerald Nye was well suited to handle an investigation into the 
activity of the munitions industry and international bankers during the First World 
War. He was considered a crusader against anything that he considered an "evil." 
Being from rural North Dakota, Nye was openly hostile to financial and industrial - 
urban America, and perhaps because he represented agricultural interests, Nye 
viewed politics and foreign policy through an economic lens. After some minor 
difficulty in gaining Senate approval for his special committee, Nye moved headlong 
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in his investigation. He had President Roosevelt's endorsement by mid -May, and 
over the summer his committee conducted an intensive search into subpoenaed 
business records.28 
Significantly, during this period Senator Nye's views on the government's 
role in foreign affairs hardened. He became convinced that business interests were 
nothing more than war agitators and, more importantly, the senator believed 
government only succeeded in promoting international conflict which fed business 
(munitions and banking) interests. By December 1934, Nye focused his energy on 
the executive branch. He convinced himself that the presidency only served to 
bolster the munitions industry and, by 1939, he believed that the president's war - 
making potential was the major threat to American neutrality. Nye began to move 
away from his prior agrarian liberalism within the Republican Party to be allied with 
the hard -line economic conservatives who opposed Roosevelt's increasing 
centralization of power.29 
The so- called Nye Committee convened from 1934 to 1936 to determine the 
extent to which munitions makers and international bankers had influenced the 
Wilson administration in 1916. The committee examined countless documents, 
interviewed many witnesses -such as J. P. Morgan and Irenee du Pont -but never 
found any firm evidence or proved any notion that these interests had influenced 
American participation in war. What the committee did do, however, was advance 
what some have called the "Devil Theory" of war. They and subsequent anti - 
interventionists cast blame for war on special interests and recommended limiting 
those elements they believed cultivated international conflict. The committee helped 
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popularize already conceived notions of the nature of war and, significantly, laid the 
groundwork for passage of America's neutrality laws which became central to 
America's foreign -policy debate to 1941. As historian Wayne Cole has observed: 
"Without the Nye Committee the neutrality laws probably would not have been 
adopted by Congress. And if they had been, they almost certainly would have been 
significantly different from what they were." 30 
In their debate over neutrality legislation, the White House and Congress 
were at odds. Congressional anti -interventionists proposed a neutrality law that 
required a mandatory arms embargo while the president sought discretionary 
legislation. Reaching stalemate during the summer of 1935, anti -interventionist 
senators threatened a filibuster if no vote on neutrality was taken. Congressional 
leaders eventually agreed to a compromise that prohibited sales of munitions to 
belligerents once the president declared the existence of war (the discretionary 
compromise), banned belligerent submarines from American ports, and permitted 
Americans to travel on belligerent vessels at their own risk. Yielding to the 
country's mood, on 31 August 1935, President Roosevelt signed the bill but warned 
that its "inflexible provisions" might yet drag the country into war.3 1 
The Neutrality Act's provisions were tested two months later. On 3 October 
Fascist Italy invaded the African nation of Ethiopia, signaling the start of global 
fascist military expansion. Two days later Roosevelt declared the existence of war 
and the Neutrality Act went into effect. The act's invocation was largely symbolic, 
however, as Africa was outside of American interests at the time, and the law in no 
measurable way affected Italy's or Ethiopia's efforts. And in terms of American 
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exports, policymakers were not prepared to sever the country's $25,000 monthly 
export average with Italy in 1934, one that increased to $583,000 the following year. 
Nevertheless, anti -interventionists were pleased with the legislation and the conflict 
in Africa only heightened debate on how to improve and extend the one -year limited 
act.32 
The Neutrality Act was due to expire early in 1936. Meantime, debate 
continued in Congress and out over how to extend the neutrality provisions. Many 
anti -interventionists believed that the Italo- Ethiopian War only demonstrated the 
necessity for increasing the use of embargoes. President Roosevelt again lobbied for 
greater presidential discretion in executing neutrality, but to no avail. His opponents 
believed that granting the president further latitude would only provoke war. In 
February, Congress extended the Neutrality law for an additional fourteen months, 
adding to its provisions a ban on loans or credits to belligerents. The loan and credit 
ban was in reality a redundant provision since the 1934 Johnson Act (sponsored by 
California Progressive -Republican Hiram Johnson) prohibited private loans to 
nations who had defaulted on their First World War debts.33 
The outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in July 1936 raised further issues in 
the Neutrality debate and, significantly, in the national security area. From 1936 to 
1939 forces under General Francisco Franco (aided by Nazi Germany and Fascist 
Italy) battled the Loyalists who were fighting to preserve Spain's republican 
government (supported by Communist Russia). Roosevelt refused to invoke the 
Neutrality Act since, in this situation, the conflict was internal and not international. 
In accord with other European powers, however, Roosevelt did agree to a moral 
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embargo on arms shipments to either side. Nonetheless, some idealistic members of 
the American left saw in the Spanish Civil War a vital fight against the forces of 
fascism and, by 1937, organized volunteer units to aid the Loyalist forces. 
Contributing to concerns was the advent of the Fifth Column. In September 1936, 
one of Franco's lieutenants, General Emilio de Mola, announced by radio that four 
military columns had advanced on Madrid while a fifth column of agitators operated 
from within the city. Thereafter Americans grew increasingly concerned that 
foreign radical forces might disrupt American society from within. 
* * 
Worried about the domestic ramifications of growing Nazi and Communist 
influence, as demonstrated with domestic fascists and heady American Leftists who 
were concerned about the course of the Spanish Civil War, on 24 August 1936 
President Roosevelt called FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to the White House. 
According to Hoover's memorandum of the event -the only evidence of the 
meeting -the president "was desirous of discussing the question of the subversive 
activities in the United States, particularly Fascism and Communism." Roosevelt 
informed Hoover that "he had been considerably concerned" about the activities of 
these groups and that he wanted to obtain "a broad picture of the general movement 
and its activities as may affect the economic and political life of the country as a 
whole." The FBI director informed Roosevelt that there was no organization that 
gathered such intelligence but, Hoover pointed out, the FBI's 1916 appropriations 
statute "contains a provision that it might investigate any matters referred to it by the 
Department of State." Piqued by Hoover's suggestion, but fearful of the plan being 
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leaked through State Department channels, Roosevelt asked Hoover to meet with 
himself and Secretary of State Hull the following day.34 
On the afternoon of 25 August, Hoover met with Roosevelt and Hull at the 
White House. The president stated his concerns to the secretary of state noting that 
"it was a matter which fell within the scope of foreign affairs over which the State 
Department would have a right to request an inquiry to be made." Complying with 
the president's wishes, Hull asked him if he wanted the request to be made in 
writing. Roosevelt dissented, stating that "he desired the matter to be handled quite 
confidentially." The president's directive authorizing the FBI to conduct "a broad 
picture" of the domestic political scene remained an oral one.35 
When implementing Roosevelt's desire for a broad survey of Fascist and 
Communist movements, Hoover interpreted the president's wording to initiate 
sweeping investigations of political activity. FBI officials thereafter monitored the 
activities of alleged Fifth Columnists, pro -Nazis and Communists, and then reported 
this information to the White House. Roosevelt valued these reports on radical 
groups and individuals such as the German American Bund, the Silver Shirts, the 
Knights of the White Camellia, Gerald L. K. Smith, Gerald Winrod, and William 
Dudley Pelley.36 
* * * 
Meanwhile, with international events become increasingly more 
precarious -the Italian victory over Ethiopia, the Sino- Japanese War, Hitler's re- 
occupation of the Rhineland, and civil war in Spain -American anti -interventionists 
sought to make their annual neutrality legislation a permanent fixture. As with the 
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1935 and 1937 acts, Roosevelt wanted discretion in applying the law's provisions 
instead of the blanket embargo anti -interventionists desired. But domestic political 
problems Roosevelt had experienced with his failed Judicial Reform Bill -the so- 
called Supreme Court "Packing Plan" -which alienated Southern Democrats, 
coupled with the economic recession of 1937, prevented the president from having 
effective influence over the shape of neutrality legislation. But Roosevelt did not 
fail to maintain some degree of flexibility. In exchange for provisions that outlawed 
Americans from traveling on belligerent ships and prevented the arming of 
American merchant ships, anti -interventionists accepted a cash -and -carry provision. 
Belligerents could buy American non -military goods if they paid for them in cash 
and transported the material themselves. The act only delayed the inevitable, 
however, as it indirectly encouraged the Axis powers inasmuch as they knew the 
United States would not intervene.37 
Other events during 1937 demonstrated the influence anti -interventionists 
held in determining the shape of American foreign policy. In October Roosevelt 
delivered his famous "quarantine speech" in Chicago. In the speech the president 
said that "When an epidemic of physical disease starts to spread, the community 
approves and joins in a quarantine of the patients in order to protect the health of the 
community against the spread of disease." He further announced, undoubtedly in 
reference to the ongoing Sino- Japanese War, that "War is a contagion, whether it be 
declared or undeclared." Reporters pressed the president to clarify his statement, but 
he refused and continued to obfuscate. But the speech seemed to please both 
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interventionists, as calling for an active foreign policy, and anti -interventionists, as 
seeking to avoid war.38 
In 1938 an effort was made by Representative Louis Ludlow (Democrat, 
Indiana) to create a constitutional amendment that would have placed the country's 
war -making power directly with the people via referendum. While the initiative 
failed, it demonstrated the strong anti -war feeling of the American people and the 
obstinate power of the anti -interventionists. Meanwhile, in March, Hitler continued 
his advance by annexing Austria into the Reich. But it was the Munich Crisis of 
1938 which determined the fate of western portions of Czechoslovakia and, indeed, 
the fate of the country as a whole. At this point, the anti -interventionist tide began to 
turn, though hesitantly. Roosevelt appealed to the European powers to negotiate the 
matter and when British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain agreed to visit Munich, 
the president seemed satisfied. But when the Sudetenland was ceded to Germany, 
without any participation on the part of Czechoslovakia, and as Japanese aggression 
advanced in China, Roosevelt's attitude changed. He began work to build up 
American defense forces in 1938, recalled the American Ambassador from Germany 
following the Kristallnacht persecution of the Jews, and resolved by 1939 to revise 
neutrality legislation to effect some relief for the Allies.39 
Domestically in 1938, Americans became increasingly concerned about 
internal subversion at the hands of German spies. In February, FBI agents 
uncovered an extensive Nazi espionage ring in New York City. The ring had 
extended itself into the armed forces and defense industries, and their activities had 
been linked to the German government. The ring was undermined, however, at the 
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hands of Guenther Rumrich, an incompetent German -American agent. Rumrich was 
a ne'er -do -well who habitually found himself in trouble as an enlisted man in the 
United States Army during the early 1930s. A private citizen again by 1936, he had 
become enamored with First World War German espionage activity and after 
writing to the official organ of the Nazi party, the Voelkischer Beobachter, offering 
to provide information about the United States Army, he was recruited. Rumrich 
managed to collect a variety of innocuous intelligence for the Germans such as 
venereal disease rates among U.S. soldiers, but it was a connection the spy had in 
Scotland that led to his capture and the eventual exposure of the spy ring.4o 
One of the ways Rumrich maintained contact with his German handlers was 
through correspondence. He was instructed to correspond with a fifty- one -year -old 
woman named Jessie Jordan in Dundee, Scotland, who acted as a screen for German 
espionage activity in the United States and elsewhere. In 1937 the British Security 
Service, MI -5, was alerted to the fact that Jordan, a widow of an Imperial German 
soldier, had received a large volume of foreign mail. The British Home Secretary 
issued a warrant permitting MI -5 to intercept her mail and soon established that 
Jordan was in league with German intelligence. MI -5 officials traced the source of 
her correspondence to an address in the United States and alerted FBI Director 
Hoover to the situation. FBI officials determined the writer was Rumrich. He was 
placed under surveillance but only arrested in February 1938 after he attempted to 
defraud the State Department of blank passports. In custody, Rumrich decided to 
cooperate with his captors. Shortly thereafter his espionage ring -as incompetent as 
it really was -was dissolved. Nevertheless, the case received banner headlines in 
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the United States and helped to foster a belief that Fifth Columnists had permeated 
the nation. Moreover, the cooperation with British intelligence had helped lay a firm 
basis on which the FBI would later develop a close working relationship.'" 
* * * 
With the international and domestic situation unfolding as such in 1938, 
Hoover acquired yet more investigative freedom. Interested in the scope of the "so- 
called espionage situation," Roosevelt directed Attorney General Cummings in 
October to survey the government's investigative activities. In response to 
Cummings's query, Hoover, when reporting the FBI's activity, did not hide the fact 
that political investigations had been conducted. In fact, he urged an expansion of 
the Bureau's investigative role. But he warned Cummings against seeking 
legislative authority for such an expansion, observing that any such request might 
draw criticism from people, in Hoover's view, who did not understand the counter- 
espionage character of FBI investigations. The FBI director preferred to investigate 
under the Bureau's appropriations statute.42 
Hoover's resultant report to Cummings confirmed the political nature of 
some of the FBI's investigations. Roosevelt was not disturbed by this disclosure and 
instead concluded, not surprisingly given his leadership style, that he could control 
Hoover's actions. But the FBI director's clever filing procedures negated the 
president's ability to hold a tight reign on Hoover's activities. At the same time, 
Hoover did not feel secure enough in his position to assert the Bureau's influence to 
the extent that he later did during the Cold War. Nevertheless, he was able to 
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investigate matters with and without Roosevelt's knowledge and was able to employ 
illegal investigative methods.43 
Hoover took one more step in 1939 to ensure the FBI's sole authority to 
monitor domestic subversive activity. Upon learning of a plan to coordinate 
domestic surveillance through an interdepartmental committee, Hoover moved to 
disable the proposal. He impressed upon the attorney general that such a plan would 
cause interdepartmental chaos. Reminding Attorney General Frank Murphy 
(Cummings's successor) of the widespread civil liberties abuses during the First 
World War, Hoover argued that centralizing domestic investigations within the FBI 
could avoid the mistakes of the past. This clever civil libertarian argument worked 
and resulted in Roosevelt's secret order of 26 June 1939 placing all domestic 
investigations under the FBI, Military Intelligence Division, and Office of Naval 
Intelligence. More importantly, all domestic information collected by these agencies 
was to be coordinated with the FBI. This coordination later extended to local police 
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CHAPTER 3 
FBI Surveillance of Charles A. Lindbergh, 1939 -1944. 
The outbreak of war in Europe on 1 September 1939 signaled an 
intensification of the Great Debate, which began in 1935 over neutrality legislation, 
between interventionists and so- called "isolationists" in the United States. Almost 
immediately one of the most controversial, most popular, and most effective anti - 
interventionist spokespersons emerged, using his celebrity to advocate American 
isolation from foreign war. This person was the famous aviator Charles A. 
Lindbergh. From the day he began his two -year political crusade to sustain an anti - 
interventionist foreign policy, and extending well into the war years, FBI officials 
monitored Lindbergh's political activities. In their efforts, FBI officials authorized a 
variety of surveillance means. Agents monitored and clipped press reports, attended 
Lindbergh rallies, monitored his speeches and recorded their content, investigated 
his personal and political activity (in the process collecting derogatory personal 
information), and possibly wiretapped his telephone line. In every instance, the 
interest of FBI officials in the aviator's activity did not stem from any suspicion that 
Lindbergh was involved in criminal activity. Their interest instead was to satisfy the 
political desires, as FBI officials understood them, of the Roosevelt administration. 
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At its core, the FBI's investigation of Charles Lindbergh's anti -interventionist 
political activity derived from FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover's pragmatic desire to 
ingratiate himself with the chief executive. The Lindbergh case is especially 
important since the FBI's interest dated from the outbreak of the war in Europe. In 
fact, FBI agents scrutinized Lindbergh longer than any other anti -interventionist. As 
such, the Lindbergh investigation offers insights into the evolution of FBI 
monitoring of anti -interventionist critics of the Roosevelt administration from 1939 
to 1941 -at the very time when "isolationists" became critical and influential 
opponents -to Pearl Harbor and into the war years. Hoover's ability to provide the 
White House with useful political information or develop evidence indicating illicit 
activity on the part of this most prominent of Roosevelt's foreign policy critics 
enhanced the Bureau's standing within the administration and illustrates a pattern of 
FBI activity most commonly associated with the Cold War FBI, suggesting the 
FBI's contribution to the national security state date to the Great Debate. This in 
turn substantially increased the FBI's authority and power. 
* * * 
In 1927 Charles Lindbergh departed Roosevelt Field in New York and, 
thirty -three hours and thirty minutes later, landed at Le Bourget airport near Paris. 
In his single- engine airplane, the Spirit of St. Louis, the aviator accomplished what 
countless others had failed to do: cross the Atlantic Ocean in a single, non -stop flight 
to capture the Orteig prize of $25,000. His success in overcoming the mortal 
dangers of fog, storms, ice, and fatigue, made Lindbergh an instant international 
celebrity. People were enamored with his daring flight and only became more 
83 
awestruck when the twenty -five- year -old pilot showed no hubris during post -flight 
celebrations. He came to be regarded as an all -American boy with a down -to -earth 
personality and humbleness that defied the grandeur of his accomplishment. He had 
become a media hero. His achievement was captured on film, radio, and newspapers 
worldwide. To many, Charles Lindbergh was a god.' 
Lindbergh's newly found fame never fully dissipated. President Calvin 
Coolidge arranged passage back to America for the aviator and his airplane aboard 
the naval cruiser Memphis. Upon his arrival in the United States, Lindbergh was 
treated to numerous celebrations including a ticker -tape parade in New York City. 
He was awarded both the Distinguished Flying Cross and the Congressional Medal 
of Honor, awards traditionally presented by the president. He was even promoted to 
the rank of colonel in the Army Air Corps Reserve, the one reward he truly valued.2 
Lindbergh's innate shyness and refusal to accept lucrative deals, that would 
have made him an instant millionaire, made him particularly attractive to the public. 
The aviator refused to market his name and accomplishment. He focused his 
energies, instead, on promoting aviation. For the remainder of 1927, Lindbergh flew 
a forty -eight state tour of the United States in the Spirit of St. Louis to promote 
aviation, a tour funded by Daniel Guggenheim, an advocate of aeronautics. The 
following year, Lindbergh flew his plane on a good -will tour of Mexico and South 
America. Eventually he donated his airplane to the Smithsonian Institution in 
Washington, D.C.3 
Lindbergh's fame and celebrity only increased with his marriage in May 
1929 to Anne Morrow, the daughter of the financier Dwight Morrow who had been 
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a partner with J. P. Morgan and Company and, at the time, United States 
Ambassador to Mexico. The marriage received extensive press coverage in America 
and around the world. The couple's popularity increased when they embarked on 
survey flights together around the world mapping out possible airline routes, an 
avocation Charles Lindbergh felt uniquely suited to pursue. Anne's two best -selling 
books based on these journeys, North to the Orient (1935) and Listen! The Wind 
(1938), helped create in the popular mind, at least, a certain romance surrounding 
their lives. This public interest in the Lindberghs soon increased to unprecedented 
levels.4 
On 22 June 1930, Charles and Anne Lindbergh's first -born child, Charles 
Lindbergh, Jr., was kidnapped from their New Jersey home and subsequently 
murdered. The case became an immediate international news sensation, and the 
family willingly cooperated with the press hoping thereby to ensure that their son 
would be returned. This had proved unrealistic, and the intense curiosity 
surrounding the case only served to alienate the Lindberghs. Having held the press 
in low regard for publishing inaccurate or sensationalized storied about their lives, 
the couple regretted the shadowing they were subjected to by story -hungry reporters. 
These concerns increased with the kidnapping case and resulting trial the first of 
several "trials of the century" in America. So great was the stress on their lives 
during this ordeal, compounded as the story grew, that the Lindberghs decided to 
leave the United States and live in Europe. Only there, they believed, could they 
live in peace and escape an unwanted public spotlight.' 
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The Lindberghs found the solace they sought in Great Britain. They lived 
just south of London and valued that the locals allowed them their privacy. Living 
in England also allowed Lindbergh to travel extensively and survey the development 
of European aviation and politics. He visited France often and found disturbing the 
French government's inability to cope with Depression -era problems in any 
significant way. Visiting the Soviet Union in 1938 to survey Russian aviation, 
Lindbergh was critical of the poor state of the Soviet economy in comparison with 
other industrial countries. More significantly, between 1936 and 1938, the aviator 
also surveyed the state of German air power.6 
Major Truman Smith, the United States Military Attaché in Berlin from 1935 
to 1939, had arranged Lindbergh's tours of Germany. Upon learning from 
newspaper reports that Lindbergh had toured French aircraft facilities, Smith 
believed that Lindbergh's international celebrity might ensure similar access to 
German aircraft facilities. With Lindbergh's help, Smith hoped to get an estimate of 
German air power. After having checked with his superiors and with members of 
the German government, Smith gained approval, and then invited Lindbergh "in the 
name of General Goering and the German Air Ministry ... to visit Germany and 
inspect the new German civil and military air establishments." The Major pointed 
out that, heretofore, access to German air power had been "highly secretive" but that 
German authorities "have become extraordinarily friendly to the American 
representatives and have shown us far more than ... [the] other powers." The 
Germans, Smith believed, would be more than willing to show their air forces to 
Lindbergh than to anyone else. Major Smith assured Lindbergh that on this tour he 
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would not be besieged by the press. Lindbergh, who was "extremely interested" in 
Smith's proposal, agreed to the request. 
Lindbergh actually made three separate tours of Germany, one each in the 
years 1936, 1937, and 1938. Each time he was invited back through the good offices 
of Truman Smith and the American Embassy in Germany. During these trips the 
aviator saw the best that Germany had to offer. He toured, among others, the Focke- 
Wulf and Henschel aircraft factories and the Daimler -Benz engine factory. He 
visited various German airfields and testing grounds, and even had the 
unprecedented opportunity to fly both the Messerschmitt 109 and the JU -87 Stuka 
dive -bomber. During these visits, German officials feted Lindbergh. They paid all 
his expenses while touting the power of the Luftwaffe. From these tours, Smith and 
Lindbergh, together, were able to draft a general intelligence estimate of German air 
power. Their 1 November 1937 report was sent to the War Department where it was 
read widely. It contended that Germany was ahead of both France and Great Britain 
in air power and soon would overtake the United States. Lindbergh was so 
concerned by what he had seen that in addition to helping draft the intelligence 
estimate he wrote Joseph Kennedy, the American ambassador to Britain, in London. 
He warned the anti -interventionist ambassador that Germany possessed a superior 
military force that, if provoked, would be dangerous: "I believe that a war now 
might easily result in the loss of European civilization." Kennedy wired 
Lindbergh's letter to the secretary of state in Washington.8 
Lindbergh also tried to use his influence in Europe to promote his concerns 
about the strength of Nazi Germany. He urged both French and British officials to 
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improve their air forces and other defenses. From his tours of Germany, Lindbergh 
became convinced that a war between Germany and the other Western powers 
would only result in devastation and allow the Soviet Union to stand supreme on the 
continent. Yet, despite his high -level contacts including royalty, prime ministers, 
high -ranking military officials, and diplomats, he encountered, particularly on the 
British side, an unwillingness to listen to his arguments. His arguments in favor of 
avoiding conflict with Nazi Germany, however, as the historian Wayne S. Cole 
observed "may have encouraged appeasement policies at the time. "9 
Making no headway in his efforts with European leaders, and with war 
looming in Europe, in April 1939 Lindbergh decided to return to the United States. 
The aviator did not immediately advocate nonintervention in the European situation. 
Offered employment or invited by various individuals and groups to comment on 
foreign affairs, Lindbergh turned down these offers. He did accept, however, an 
offer from the Chief of the Air Corps, General Henry Arnold, to serve as an active - 
duty officer (for a brief period) in the capacity of an air power analyst. Lindbergh 
surveyed and offered a set of recommendations to improve American air forces and 
served on several Air Corps committees including one to consider new technologies. 
His work also provided two opportunities to testify before Congress on American 
aviation research and development. At this point, this constituted the limits of his 
professional and political life.io 
By late summer 1939, however, Lindbergh became more interested in events 
in Europe and America's policies toward them. One of the aviator's many contacts 
with prominent persons was William Castle, former under secretary of state in the 
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Herbert Hoover administration. At a dinner party one evening, the under secretary 
urged Lindbergh to use his celebrity and speak out against American involvement in 
European events. Hesitant to become involved in politics, Lindbergh declined the 
offer. Following outbreak of war on 1 September, however, he resolved to advocate 
American isolation from the European war. "I do not intend to stand by," he wrote 
in his journal, "and see this country pushed into war if it is not absolutely essential to 
the future welfare of the nation." He made arrangements through Castle to address 
the nation in a radio broadcast» 
On the evening of 15 September Lindbergh read the speech he wrote 
himself -he preferred to write his own speeches and articles, sometimes to his 
detriment because no one lessened his tone -in his hotel in Washington, D.C. Titled 
simply "America and European Wars," Lindbergh's speech advocated insulation 
from the war insofar as by "fighting for democracy abroad we may end by losing it 
at home." The war had the potential, he argued, to destroy Western civilization as 
people knew it. This speech marked the start of Lindbergh's political campaign for 
American anti -interventionism and was praised by those in sympathy with the 
aviator's views and criticized by his opponents.12 
Lindbergh continued to advocate nonintervention through several more radio 
broadcasts, one on 13 October on the theme of "Neutrality and War" and a third in 
1940 on "The Air Defense of America." He also published a number of articles in 
Reader 's Digest, Atlantic Monthly, and Collier's. The FBI almost immediately took 
an interest in Lindbergh's activity. At this point, FBI agents only monitored his 
public speeches and writings, which went no farther than advocating neutrality. FBI 
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officials' interest in the aviator stemmed from his "numerous remarks which bear 
upon his foreign or nationalistic sympathies. "13 
From September 1939 until April 1941, when the aviator joined the America 
First Committee, FBI agents only monitored Lindbergh's political speeches and 
writings. FBI agents either personally attended rallies where the aviator spoke or 
recruited informants to report on his speeches. The latter was used on 23 April 1941 
when Lindbergh addressed the America First Committee in New York City. 
Obtaining a copy of Lindbergh's speech the informant annotated it with Lindbergh's 
spoken words. He marked on the document where the audience reacted and 
underlined key phrases. The informant also reported on who had attended the rally, 
the amount of money raised, and the size and breakdown of the listeners: "The 
crowd inside the hall was 50% middle class and ... middle aged and the other half 
were young men and women of the emotional type. "14 
FBI agents also collected newspaper and magazine articles that reported on 
Lindbergh's activities. This technique of monitoring press coverage was a common 
FBI method of gathering intelligence on an individual or group and to identify other 
possible targets. Over two hundred articles were collected about Lindbergh from 
newspapers and magazines across the country, including among others: The New 
York Times, Chicago Tribune, The Washington Post, The Washington Times -Herald, 
The Atlanta Post, The Oakland Tribune, Life magazine, and The American Mercury. 
Agents from field offices nationwide sent these clippings to FBI headquarters where 
they were compiled and serialized. Private citizens also submitted a large number of 
news clippings, but these often duplicated the efforts of FBI agents» 
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FBI officials also monitored extremist, right -wing publications that 
mentioned Charles Lindbergh. One such fascist periodical was the Deutscher 
Weckruf and Beobachter (published as The Free American in the United States). 
Bureau officials reviewed and indexed this paper for pertinent information regarding 
Lindbergh. In addition to extremist newspapers, agents also reviewed right -wing 
books, such as one German book entitled Summary Report: Documents and Reports 
Illustrating German Contemporary History. FBI officials' interest in the book was 
triggered by the "disproportionately large amount of space [it devoted] to Charles 
Lindbergh" and because the aviator was referred to as "the most outstanding 
American national hero.i16 
FBI agents were also interested in pro- and anti -Lindbergh correspondence. 
Concerned citizens wrote to the FBI, or other government agencies or officials, 
expressing concern about Lindbergh or providing information they believed would 
interest government officials. Inevitably, this correspondence was forwarded by the 
recipient agency to the FBI. As Lindbergh's political efforts increased, so too did 
the FBI's correspondence file. Lindbergh's political anti -interventionism led his 
critics to label him a Nazi sympathizer. This accusation was widely accepted by 
many public- spirited citizens who questioned Lindbergh's motives in light of his 
tours of Nazi Germany -where he was awarded a medal by high Nazi officials -and 
his strong anti -interventionist position. One concerned citizen wrote: "I don't 
understand why your department doesn't bind and gag that man Charles A. 
Lindbergh." Another advised the FBI: "[I]f he was investigated he would be found 
to be a 5th columnist and perhaps one of the world's highest paid spies. "17 
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Letters written in opposition to President Roosevelt's policy or in support of 
Lindbergh proved to have greater significance. FBI officials were particularly 
interested in this correspondence. In May 1940, at Roosevelt's direction, 
Presidential Secretary Stephen Early forwarded to FBI Director Hoover "a number 
of telegrams" which were "in opposition to national defense." The White House had 
received the telegrams following a speech Roosevelt had delivered to the Congress 
on national defense. Early informed Hoover that "the President thought you might 
like to look them over noting the names and addresses of the senders." Then again, 
in June, Early forwarded to the FBI thirty -six telegrams received "expressing 
approval of Col. Lindbergh's [radio] address" that month on "Our Drift Towards 
War. "1s 
Instead of merely "noting the names and addresses" of the correspondents, 
FBI Director Hoover ordered a search of the Bureau's files for any information on 
the writers. This information was then compiled in a memorandum forwarded to the 
White House "for your convenience and ready reference." President Roosevelt had 
not requested this memorandum. Rather, on his own authority, the FBI director 
provided this information. Nonetheless, the president made no complaints. His lack 
of concern over the FBI director's action can best be understood by his comment in 
May to Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, Jr. According to Morgenthau, 
Roosevelt told him over lunch: "If I should die tomorrow, I want you to know this. I 
am absolutely convinced that Lindbergh is a Nazi." Roosevelt also wrote Secretary 
of War Henry Stimson about Lindbergh: "When I read Lindbergh's speech [of May 
20`h] I felt that it could not have been better put if it had been written by Goebbels 
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himself. What a pity that this youngster has completely abandoned his belief in our 
form of government and has accepted Nazi methods because apparently they are 
efficient." Hoover's decision to brief the White House on the background of the 
president's anti -interventionist critics marked a significant development in the 
Roosevelt- Hoover relationship, triggering an ongoing surveillance of the anti - 
interventionist movement. This was the first time that the FBI director, of his own 
volition, provided the White House with political intelligence on anti - 
interventionists culled from FBI files. Hoover exploited this opportunity of 
Roosevelt's forwarding of the telegrams to report back to the president political 
information he thought Roosevelt would find of interest.19 
As Lindbergh's involvement in the so- called Great Debate increased, so too 
did FBI monitoring efforts. Through time the aviator's comments became 
increasingly controversial while his popularity and influence among the public 
increased. In his 1939 article "Aviation, Geography, and Race" the flier's 
controversial statements about race led many to believe he was pro -Nazi. Lindbergh 
had described the European war as one "within our own family of nations, a war 
which will reduce the strength and destroy the treasures of the White race." He 
further wrote that survival depended on "a Western wall of race and arms which can 
hold back either a Genghis Khan or the infiltration of inferior blood." Years later, 
well after the conclusion of the war, Lindbergh elaborated on these comments 
claiming he was not a racist but that he did believe in the superiority of races based 
upon their achievements in culture and technology. Since Lindbergh believed a war 
among Western nations would be a disaster for civilization in general, by allowing 
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Asian elements (i.e., Russians) to dominate the continent, he advocated a negotiated 
peace settlement in Europe. Such ideas, not surprisingly led many, including high 
officials in the government, to regard the flier as a Nazi or Nazi sympathizer.20 
For the most part, Lindbergh's main priority during 1940 was to promote the 
idea that the United States must remain out of the European conflict and, instead, 
concentrate on its own defenses. He called for a clear defense policy, one which, he 
argued, the government had never articulated. With a powerful and modern air 
force, Lindbergh continually stressed, with American air bases along the East and 
West approaches to the Western Hemisphere, the country would be impregnable to 
enemy attack. "With a firm and clear -cut policy," he told Americans in a national 
radio broadcast in May 1940, "we can build an air defense for America that will 
stand above these shifting sands of war." Lindbergh's argument resonated well 
with Americans in general and other anti -interventionists in particular. His 
government work and multiple tours of foreign air forces led many to see him as an 
authority on air power.21 
The debate between interventionists and "isolationists" changed in late 1940, 
extending into 1941. During the 1940 presidential election, the debate centered on 
the need to ensure neutrality, although both sides held differing positions. Their 
differences included a conscription bill, opposed by some anti -interventionists but 
enacted into law as a defensive measure, and President Roosevelt's so- called 
Destroyers- for -Bases Deal, which was presented as beneficial to American security. 
In the fall of 1940, after the conclusion of the Battle of Britain and while 
experiencing shipping losses from German U- boats, British Prime Minister Winston 
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Churchill informed Roosevelt that British dollar reserves were dwindling. No 
longer, Churchill warned, could his country pay cash to buy American supplies as 
stipulated in the Neutrality Act of 1939, popularly known as "Cash and Carry." 
Further, the 1934 Johnson Act prevented Americans from extending loans to 
countries, such as Great Britain, which had defaulted on their First World War 
debt." 
To rectify this problem, without violating the letter of the law as defined in 
the Neutrality and Johnson Acts, President Roosevelt on 17 December announced a 
new policy. Roosevelt proposed that to ensure the British purchase of American 
supplies he would "eliminate the dollar sign" from further orders. The president 
called his idea lend -lease and employed the analogy of lending a garden hose to 
one's neighbor to extinguish his house fire. In a fireside chat later in December, 
Roosevelt argued that the security of Great Britain directly affected American 
interests. He called for supporting Britain through a military assistance program and 
justified this as intended to ensure American avoidance of war. When presenting 
this plan to Congress during his State of the Union address in January 1941, the 
president couched his policy in a moving call for the preservation of the four human 
freedoms: the freedom of speech and expression, freedom from want, freedom of 
worship, and freedom from fear.23 
Anti- interventionists mobilized in opposition to the president's proposal. 
Lend -Lease became a focal point for the president's opposition. No longer 
advocating neutrality in European affairs, as they had previously, anti - 
interventionists now directly criticized administration policy. Concerns over the 
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consequences of this policy provided momentum for the America First Committee 
leading to its emergence as a national anti -interventionist pressure group. Charles 
Lindbergh, moreover, assumed a prominent role in this debate. Lindbergh was 
invited to testify before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee who were considering the president's bill (the Lend - 
Lease bill had been submitted to both houses of Congress simultaneously). 
Lindbergh's appearances at these hearings were a popular draw. Lend -Lease, he 
argued, would weaken American defenses by sending needed supplies to Britain and 
would only lead to war and create "conditions in our own country as bad or worse 
than those we now desire to overthrow in Nazi Germany." His testimony and 
resultant lobbying efforts were closely reported by the press and even some anti - 
interventionists believed his positions to be too controversia1.24 
In the end, the anti -interventionists failed to defeat the Lend -Lease bill as the 
Congress approved the bill on 11 March 1941 within comfortable margins. 
According to contemporary polls, over 72 percent of the public approved of the 
measure.25 During the debate, moreover, Charles Lindbergh shifted his political 
tactics to criticize directly the administration's policy in sworn testimony before 
both the House and Senate. Then, in April, the aviator joined the America First 
Committee's national effort to oppose Roosevelt's foreign policy. Reflecting the 
intensity of sentiment about the nation's foreign policy course, President Roosevelt 
made a cursory remark at a press conference equating Lindbergh with the Civil War 
copperhead Clement Vallandigham (a northerner with pro- southern sympathies who 
was critical of President Abraham Lincoln). An insulted Lindbergh then sent 
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Roosevelt a public letter tendering his resignation from the Army Air Corps 
Reserve. In the midst of these tensions, FBI monitoring of Lindbergh intensified. 
Now that Lindbergh, already the most popular anti -interventionist, had joined the 
most influential and powerful anti -interventionist pressure group, the America First 
Committee, providing Roosevelt with political intelligence or working to undermine 
this critic became increasingly important to FBI officials.26 
Roosevelt might have compared Lindbergh to the Civil War era copperheads; 
others likened the aviator to Abraham Lincoln. FBI officials took interest in this 
comparison as it was said in relation to the president's Lend -Lease bill and uttered 
by right -wing extremists such as Gerald Winrod. An FBI memorandum abstracted a 
story from the right -wing Kansas newspaper Publicity that likened "Colonel Charles 
A. Lindbergh, by his courageous stand against 1776 [the Lend -Lease bill] may prove 
to be this nation's man on a white horse. Just the individual to ride roughshod into 
the nation's capitol in 1944 [an election year]." Seemingly confirming their view of 
Lindbergh as sympathetic to these elements, FBI officials noted "that to date, Col. 
Lindbergh has not objected to such use of his name.i27 
FBI officials also monitored an America First rally in Philadelphia three 
months following the Lend -Lease debate at which Lindbergh was the principal 
speaker. FBI agents were dispatched to the rally and "circulated in the crowd 
without revealing their identities to anyone." The agents recorded whom spoke at 
the meeting and described the demeanor of the crowd as "orderly, though 
enthusiastic." The agent's report included a newspaper clipping on the rally, and 
concluded "that the America First Committee was gaining in strength and that 
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undoubtedly there were more people present for the America First Meeting than 
there were for the [Fiorello] LaGuardia protest meeting the night before. "28 
FBI officials were so interested in Lindbergh's political activity following 
Lend -Lease that they took advantage of nearly any opportunity to gauge "his 
sentiments in connection with the international policy of the United States 
Government." In October 1941 the head of the FBI's Detroit field office, John 
Bugas, had learned from an informer in the Ford Motor Company of a letter 
Lindbergh had written to Henry Ford suggesting his "sentiments." The part of the 
letter that most interested FBI officials read: 
I am continuing to take an active part in opposing the propaganda and 
agitation for war. The country is still opposed to our entry, but I am not sure 
how long the people will be able to withstand the misinformation and 
propaganda that fills our press, our radio, and our motion -picture theaters 
each day. It is difficult to see how democracy can function intelligently or 
even survive without any accurate source of information to which the people 
can go, and from which they can base their decisions. 
In August 1942 this information was incorporated in an internal FBI summary 
memorandum as evidence of Lindbergh's political sympathies. 29 
An opportunity to undermine Lindbergh directly, however, presented itself to 
FBI officials on 26 May 1941 when a Texas man, Marvin E. Rutherford, volunteered 
information to agents at the Bureau's Dallas field office. An engineer and inventor, 
Rutherford held a variety of patents on mechanical devices. One of his inventions 
was at the center of his complaint to the FBI. In 1939 the engineer had designed a 
bulletproof self -sealing aviation fuel tank and had forwarded his designs to Charles 
Lindbergh who, at the time, was chair of the Air Corps's New Device Committee. 
Having received no acknowledgement from the Air Corps about his plans- 
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Rutherford had sent them via registered mail -he returned to California to continue 
his work on aircraft mechanisms at the Lockheed laboratory. 30 
While working in California, Rutherford read a newspaper article in the Los 
Angeles Examiner by General Henry Arnold of the Air Corps that described in detail 
a bulletproof self -sealing aviation fuel tank found within German airplane wreckage 
in England during 1940. Disturbed by this discovery, Rutherford concluded that 
Lindbergh, who at this time was roundly being criticized as pro -Nazi, had secretly 
passed his plans to Nazi Germany. He told FBI agents that the design, as laid out in 
the newspaper article, was nearly identical to the plans he had developed in 1939. 
He further reported that in 1941 the United States had only just begun production of 
this aviation fuel tank and that his designs had never been patented to prevent 
anyone else from copying them. Rutherford also claimed that unidentified persons 
had unsuccessfully attempted to steal other technological information from his 
home. The engineer further feared that his house was subjected to a "shake down" 
at the time he had mailed his designs to Lindbergh.31 
When the special agent in charge of the Dallas field office forwarded this 
information to FBI headquarters, FBI Director Hoover solicited the Justice 
Department's counsel. Having received this information from an unsolicited source, 
Hoover informed the assistant to the attorney general, Matthew F. McGuire, of this 
matter and asked "if you would advise this Bureau what action, if any, should be 
taken." McGuire in turn solicited the response of the head of the Department's 
Criminal Division, Assistant Attorney General Wendell Berge. Berge reported back 
that "there is no evidence of a violation of a Federal criminal statute" and he 
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"suggested that no further investigation be made in this matter." McGuire thereupon 
advised Hoover: "No investigation should, therefore, be made." Hoover, in turn, 
then advised his Dallas SAC not to investigate "in the premises. "32 
From a legal standpoint, the issue seemed closed. The Justice Department 
had determined the evidence did not warrant an investigation and, indeed, the 
Espionage Act only went into effect after war was declared. Perhaps the Conspiracy 
statute could have been employed, but Justice Department attorneys found no 
actionable evidence. Despite this, however, the matter did not cease being 
investigated. Whereas the FBI had quit, Army intelligence continued the 
investigation. Hoover more than likely, the astute bureaucrat that he was, informed 
the Military Intelligence Division of the matter and let them investigate. In return, 
MID kept the FBI director appraised. Hoover undoubtedly had exploited 
presidential directives of 1936 and 1939 that required the FBI to take charge of 
"espionage, sabotage, and violations of the neutrality regulations" and to coordinate 
its intelligence with MID, Naval Intelligence, and the State Department. The end 
result was the probe continued as the FBI director succeeded in bypassing Justice 
Department restrictions, hoping thereby that a criminal case could be developed by 
MID.33 
On 31 October, Brigadier General Sherman Miles, head of Army 
intelligence, advised Hoover that MID officials had confirmed that Rutherford had 
sent his aviation fuel tank designs to Lindbergh via the Air Corps's New Device 
Committee. With the assistance of the Post Office Department, MID officials had 
even located the individual who had received the package. By November, MID 
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officials concluded that Lindbergh had "received the plans but that no record is 
contained at the present time in the War Department files." Further, according to the 
FBI documents, Air Corps officials had "written to Lindbergh requesting the plans 
or an explanation as to the disposition of them." FBI documents do not indicate 
Lindbergh's response. The investigation apparently proceeded nowhere and was 
closed. This incident nonetheless shows the lengths to which FBI Director Hoover 
went, bypassing Justice Department guidelines, to develop intelligence that could be 
useful to the administration. If FBI agents could have developed a case against 
Lindbergh he would have been publicly shown to be unpatriotic, if not treasonous, 
and thereby his credibility would have been undermined. As it turned out, this never 
materialized.34 
The Rutherford complaint was not unique to the FBI's probe of Charles 
Lindbergh. In February 1942, the FBI's San Francisco office reported that 
immigration inspector M. Bertrand Couch had filed a complaint similar to 
Rutherford's. In 1930, Couch contended, he had sent Lindbergh plans for a 
"propellerless plane" invented by his friend Jim Allis. Couch sent the plans to 
Lindbergh, who at the time was an advisor to the Trans -World Airline, "for an 
expression of opinion as to practicality and commercial possibilities." In January 
1942, the immigration inspector had read an article in the San Francisco Examiner 
that described a jet aircraft (propellerless plane) used in Fascist Italy and he, like 
Rutherford, came to suspect Lindbergh's motives. In this instance, however, the FBI 
took no action.3' 
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From 1940, FBI officials investigated leads that Lindbergh might have been 
involved with radical (i.e., fascist) organizations. To FBI officials these inquiries 
assumed particular significance by the summer 1940 when Congress passed the 
Smith Act which authorized prosecution of those organizations which advocated the 
violent overthrow of the United States government. In February 1940, FBI agents 
learned that Lindbergh was allegedly associated with the fascist group The New 
World Movement. The FBI's informer claimed that this group had "chosen Colonel 
Lindbergh as their world leader because of his youth, his prominence and other 
characteristics." The aviator was also rumored to be connected with the 
organization called the James True Associates, an anti -Communist and anti- Semitic 
group, whose leaders reportedly "referred to Lindbergh as their leader and a good 
man for the presidency." By August 1940, an FBI source reported that the German 
propagandist Dr. Friederich Ernst Auhagen, who had been convicted under the 1938 
Foreign Agents Registration Act (for failing to register with the Justice Department 
as an agent of a foreign -controlled organization), stated that Lindbergh had been 
made a member of the Steering Committee of the American Fellowship Forum. 
According to Auhagen, the American Fellowship Forum was a "German propaganda 
unit" with some leading members who "advocated a Fascist form of government and 
one which would cooperate with the Nazi Regime. "36 
Other groups with which Lindbergh was identified, and thus subject to FBI 
attention, included the National Copperheads, led by Ellis Jones (who had been 
convicted for sedition in 1942) and Robert Hoble, who "supported the policies and 
principles of Charles A. Lindbergh." FBI officials also monitored the fascists 
102 
Joseph McWilliams and Gerald L. K. Smith who regarded the aviator as a possible 
leader of their followers. According to one internal FBI memorandum, despite his 
name being associated with "numerous" subversive organizations "no charge could 
be made that he has had any direct connection with these organizations or groups. "37 
In addition to trying to develop information to prosecute Lindbergh, FBI 
officials also collected derogatory intelligence about him. Gathering such 
information had nothing to do with a violation of federal statutes. Its only possible 
value was that it could be disseminated to discredit Lindbergh. FBI agents usually 
culled such information from Bureau informers and then relayed it to FBI 
headquarters in a secure manner, such as Hoover's "personal and confidential" 
system whereby sensitive data was sent directly to his office bypassing the Bureau's 
central records system. One example of the collection of such derogatory 
intelligence occurred in June 1941 when W. G. Banister, the FBI's special agent in 
charge (SAC) at Butte, Montana, advised Hoover that while Lindbergh was on a 
barnstorming tour in Montana during the 1920s he "lived in the home of a prostitute 
for a considerable time and associated with the prostitute's pimp." Banister noted 
that a photograph existed "showing Lindbergh with this woman and her pimp." In 
addition, the SAC reported, Lindbergh had "tried to marry two different girls who 
were employed in a laundry." And, worse yet, the aviator reportedly still owed a 
debt of thirty -eight dollars to a Butte boarding house.38 
Banister was also "reliably informed" that during Prohibition Lindbergh 
"should have been prosecuted on two different charges of bootlegging whiskey from 
Canada to Billings, Montana, by airplane." Despite the dated character of this 
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information, Banister believed it could be useful. He wrote Hoover: "These charges, 
of course, are now outlawed by the Statute of Limitations, but I believe that it is still 
possible to obtain proof of the fact that he did bootleg whiskey." The United States 
Attorney Roy F. Allan, in Billings, Banister continued, "will furnish it, properly 
supported by affidavits, etc., to [pro -Roosevelt newspaper and radio gossip 
columnist] Walter Winchell. "39 
Through another informant, FBI officials learned intelligence about the 
alleged state of Lindbergh's mental health. The data was gleaned from an informer 
who was associated with Lindbergh's close friend and colleague (they had co- 
authored a book together, The Culture of Organs [1938]) Dr. Alexis Carrel. The 
informer overheard part of a conversation between Carrel, who opposed Lindbergh's 
politics, and a psychologist over "the trend that Lindbergh's mind was taking." 
Carrel reportedly said that "Lindbergh hated the British and next to them he hated 
the United States." The informer was unable to report on the remainder of the 
conversation, but the information gathered was directed straight to Hoover via the 
"personal and confidential" system.4° 
Why did FBI agents collect and FBI officials maintain this type of 
information? Clearly, none of the reported information involved any alleged 
criminal activity on Lindbergh's part; even the bootlegging charge, if true, was not 
prosecutable due to the statute of limitations. It would appear that the decision to 
collect and maintain this information had a deterrent purpose: to discredit Charles 
Lindbergh's character. Since his transatlantic flight in 1927, Lindbergh had 
developed a reputation as a shy, clean-cut, all- American boy. Such personally 
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derogatory data could tarnish this image. And FBI officials' very interest in the 
information reflects their desire to provide the Roosevelt administration with 
information that could be used against its political opponents. This supposition, 
however, cannot be confirmed by extant FBI documentation or with records that FBI 
Director Hoover shared with the White House. Given the meticulous system the FBI 
director had devised to distribute sensitive data, and given Roosevelt's long practice 
not to put anything controversial on paper, it remains possible that in fact Hoover 
had shared this information. 
Extant FBI records, however, do document that sensitive information was 
sent to senior administration officials. Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes was 
one of the administration's fiercest vocal critics of Charles Lindbergh. Ickes so 
detested Lindbergh, whom he labeled "a ruthless and conscious fascist, motivated by 
hatred for you [Roosevelt] personally and a contempt for democracy in general," 
that he kept an indexed file of all Lindbergh's speeches and writings.41 Ickes had 
access to FBI political intelligence that he received either directly from FBI Director 
Hoover or from the White House. In October 1941, for example, Hoover provided 
Ickes with a blind FBI memorandum summarizing information in FBI files on Guy 
Junemann, an associate of the right -wing Joseph McWilliams who had ties with 
Representative Hamilton Fish (a Republican) and the America First Committee 
42 
Ickes also had access to FBI information on Lindbergh and planned to use it 
confidentially. 
In December 1941 Ickes wrote, and made arrangements to have published 
with the Vanguard Press, a scathing book about Charles Lindbergh. The book was 
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tentatively titled The Strange Case of Mr. Lindbergh or Charles A. Lindbergh: A 
Failure in Americanization. The Secretary claimed "to trace, factually and 
objectively, this young man's fatal course." For whatever reason, however, despite 
Ickes's having received a contract from a publisher, the book was never published. 
Nevertheless, Ickes retained the manuscript in his papers and it offers an interesting 
insight into the use of FBI political intelligence, some of which had been obtained 
illegally by FBI agents.43 
The most revealing aspect about the FBI -Ickes relationship involving 
Lindbergh appeared late in the manuscript. Ickes recounted a New York Mirror 
story about a 17 December 1941 private dinner party that Lindbergh attended. He 
noted that Lindbergh spoke and blamed Britain for the outbreak of war, arguing that 
America First should wait, following Pearl Harbor, and attack Roosevelt's policy 
when the time was right. "From a private source," Ickes claimed to have further 
information on this subject. He wrote: 
The party was held in the home of Edwin S. Webster, secretary of the New 
York Chapter of the America First Committee on December 17, and 50 
people were present. Lindbergh addressed the gathering. He told them that 
the real danger was not Hitler but the Yellow Peril -China and Japan. He 
said that if Germany had been permitted (by Great Britain) to attack Russia 
before 1939, Hitler could have been the bulwark against the yellow races and 
the Russians. He said that the British and the `fools in Washington' spoiled 
this plan. In conclusion he informed the group that although the America 
First Committee could not be active at the moment, it should take prompt 
advantage of the inevitable casualty lists to make the American people 
realize that they have been betrayed by Great Britain and the Roosevelt 
Administration. The[n], he said, the America First Committee would re- 
enter the political field and advocate a negotiated peace -favorable to 
Hitler.44 
This information is strikingly similar to a FBI report which Hoover sent to President 
Roosevelt on 13 February 1942.45 
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The FBI's source for this information was a wiretap, authorized by the 
attorney general, of Ethel F. Brigham. A popular opera soprano during the 1920s 
and 1930s, Brigham, during the Great Debate, criticized Roosevelt as did her 
daughter, Barbara, who was chairperson of the Greenwich Village branch of the 
America First Committee's New York chapter.46 The wiretap was initiated when 
Brigham was alleged to have threatened the life of the president, but what the 
wiretap yielded was a wealth of political intelligence on the anti -interventionists, 
including Lindbergh. 
Although the attorney general had authorized this wiretap, it was still an 
illegal surveillance method. The 1934 Federal Communications Act, and two 
supporting Supreme Court decisions, outlawed the use of wiretaps to intercept 
communications by "any person" including federal agents. In May 1940, however, 
with the war crisis mounting President Roosevelt secretly authorized the use of 
wiretaps to avert "sabotage, assassinations, and `fifth column' activities" but only 
insofar as matters concerning national defense which were limited to the activities of 
foreign nationals. (Brigham was an American citizen.) He authorized his attorney 
general to review and approve all proposed FBI wiretaps (FBI wiretapping practices 
will be discussed in depth in chapter 7). The Brigham wiretap was one such 
"authorized" device.47 
The dinner party Ickes alluded to took place on 17 December. FBI officials 
learned about the subject of that party from Brigham, who was in attendance, when 
she talked about it in a telephone conversation the next day. Brigham mentioned 
Lindbergh's "Yellow peril" remark and other information about the party. This 
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wiretap, moreover, was not the FBI's sole source of information. The FBI director 
had learned about this dinner party from the Military Intelligence Division who 
garnered a report from either Secretary of War Stimson or Assistant Secretary John 
J. McCloy. McCloy had received the report from an official in the office of the 
Coordinator of Information who got it from Reverend Leon Birkhead of the Friends 
of Democracy organization, an interventionist pressure group. Ickes's source 
conceivably could have been Stimson, McCloy, or Birkhead but other documentary 
evidence points to the FBI. On 13 February 1942, FBI Director Hoover sent a 
report, based on the FBI wiretap and MID information, describing the dinner party 
and Lindbergh's comments to the White House. Comparing the FBI report with 
Ickes's manuscript shows more similarities in specific information and layout of 
information in the FBI report than do the other documents on the dinner party. 
Given Ickes's previous access to FBI intelligence, the Bureau was most likely his 
source.48 
Secretary Ickes's use of FBI -collected information suggests that 
administration officials found Hoover's reports informative and, at times, did not 
hesitate to use the information to discredit administration opponents. Indeed, Ickes 
had planned to publish a book, based in part on FBI intelligence, with the sole 
purpose of discrediting Lindbergh's role in advocating American isolation from the 
Second World War. Ickes, moreover, was not the sole recipient of this information. 
In August 1942, Lindbergh was subpoenaed to testify for the defense at the sedition 
trial of the fascist William Dudley Pelley, leader of the Silver Shirts. To assist the 
prosecutors on their cross -examination of Lindbergh, FBI officials prepared a blind 
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memorandum (blind memoranda were written on plain nondescript stationary that 
did not record the sender or recipient) that summarized information in Bureau files 
that confirmed the aviator's "foreign or nationalistic sympathies." This summary 
included the intelligence gleaned (illegally) from the Brigham wiretap. Yet because 
Lindbergh's testimony was limited to twelve minutes on the stand, and because he 
offered nothing important to the defendant's case, Justice Department attorneys did 
not use the information in the FBI's summary to discredit him. These were not the 
sole examples of the use of FBI information and influence of the Great Debate. 
Further instances will be documented in subsequent chapters.49 
With the war effort mounting in 1942, FBI monitoring activity of Lindbergh 
lessened by year's end. But the aviator's actions still interested FBI officials. In 
November 1942, the curator of the Yale University Library informed FBI Director 
Hoover that his institution had acquired "a large collection of mail addressed to" 
Lindbergh dating from his anti -interventionist period. (The Yale University Sterling 
Library holds the still -sealed Lindbergh papers.) The curator offered to make them 
available to FBI agents. FBI officials welcomed this offer "in view of the possibility 
that it might be considered advisable to examine Lindbergh's mail in connection 
with any of the cases being investigated by the FBI." Hoover advised the Justice 
Department's War Policies Unit, but whether or not the documents were examined is 
unknown. Nevertheless, the interest highlights the continuing interest of FBI 
officials in Charles Lindbergh.50 
In time, however, FBI officials lost interest in Lindbergh's activity, as he 
ceased to be a prominent critic of the Roosevelt administration. This is reflected in 
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Hoover's response to an inquiry of the president. In 1944 the First Lady, Eleanor 
Roosevelt, received a letter from a person who was "troubled about Charles 
Lindbergh's ... whereabouts." President Roosevelt brought the matter to Hoover's 
attention and inquired how "Mrs. Roosevelt should answer this one about Charles 
Lindbergh." In contrast to his pre -war response when Hoover submitted to the 
president an extensive report, at this time Hoover merely suggested that the First 
Lady send a letter of acknowledgement and appreciation.5 
What effect did FBI officials' secret investigation into Charles Lindbergh's 
political activism have on the aviator? FBI agents never developed evidence that 
could be used to indict Lindbergh (see chapter six for an additional effort) or to 
connect him with subversive organizations or foreign agents operating in the United 
States. And, although FBI agents had gathered derogatory intelligence that had the 
potential to discredit his moral character, there is no evidence that this information 
was directly employed. Nevertheless, the Bureau's efforts did have a measurable, if 
indirect, effect. As did other anti -interventionists, Lindbergh suspected that his 
telephone was wiretapped. He confided to his journal on 7 July 1941 a warning he 
had received about FBI wiretaps: "My main concern lies in knowing whether or not 
these [wiretap] tactics are being used by the Administration." On 16 July, after 
being subjected to yet another of Interior Secretary Ickes's invectives that Lindbergh 
had foreign connections, the aviator wrote a public letter to the president. In 
addition to demanding an apology from Ickes, which he never got, Lindbergh 
offered the president his "word that I have no connection with any foreign 
government." Conveying his suspicions that the government was investigating this 
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foreign connection charge, Lindbergh continued: "Mr. President, I will willingly 
open my files to your investigation." "[T]here is no question regarding my activities 
now," he wrote, "or at any time in the past, that I will not be glad to answer." Then 
in October, in one of his last public speeches, Lindbergh accused the government of 
subverting his civil liberties.52 While the aviator obviously did not understand the 
extent of the FBI's investigation, he did express some concern over its interest in 
him. Despite not ending or directly discrediting Lindbergh's anti -interventionism, 
FBI surveillance did have a chilling effect on him. 
As Charles Lindbergh was one of the first anti -interventionists to speak out 
against U.S. involvement in the European war (dating from 15 September 1939), he 
became one of the FBI's first anti -interventionist targets. His case illustrates FBI 
priorities in the contentious political conflict between the anti -interventionists and 
the Roosevelt administration during period between 1939 to Pearl Harbor and 
beyond. From 1939 to April 1941, the FBI monitored Lindbergh's anti - 
interventionist speeches and the articles he wrote advocating neutrality. With the 
Lend -Lease debate of 1940 -41, anti -interventionists, and particularly Lindbergh, 
began to criticize Roosevelt's foreign policy directly. The intense emotions this 
engendered are captured by Roosevelt's labeling Lindbergh a "copperhead" and the 
aviator responding in protest by publicly resigning his Air Corps commission. 
Moreover, when Lindbergh, at this juncture the most prominent individual who 
opposed Roosevelt's policy, joined the America First Committee, the most 
influential anti -interventionist pressure group, the FBI's investigation received 
renewed vigor. Apparently, the FBI director felt compelled to provide the 
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administration with intelligence or attempt to bring Lindbergh to trial, or at least 
before a grand jury, to further the political interests of the White House. The FBI's 
monitoring of Lindbergh continued after Pearl Harbor in response to rumors that he 
continued to oppose the president. When it became clear by late 1942 that he was 
not a threat to the administration, FBI officials lost interest in his activities. There is 
an apparent pattern in the evolution of FBI priorities. FBI agents might have 
monitored Lindbergh from the start of his anti -interventionist crusade, but his having 
been a direct threat to administration policy apparently triggered the intensity of 
their effort. FBI Director Hoover's willingness to cater to Roosevelt's desire to 
overcome his opponents when they threatened his interests increased his standing 
with the administration. Hoover's interest in Lindbergh further suggests that the 
FBI's role as a national security apparatus had its origins during the Great Debate. 
Lindbergh was viewed as a national security threat and agents attempted to develop 
evidence that could be used to discredit him, much like later FBI efforts against 
communist and leftists during the Cold War. 
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CHAPTER 4 
FBI Surveillance of the America First Committee, 1940 -1945. 
The FBI's investigation of the America First Committee began when the 
group became a national organization in late 1940. The Committee soon found its 
footing and made a name for itself over the Lend -Lease debate of 1941. Anti - 
interventionists that year directly criticized this administration policy and, in 
response, FBI scrutiny of their political efforts intensified. 
FBI surveillance of the America First Committee reflects FBI Director J. 
Edgar Hoover's pragmatism in seeking to provide the administration with political 
intelligence and at the same time working to discredit the president's critics at a time 
when the debate between the administration and anti -interventionists over the 
president's foreign policy initiatives was at its height. From the start of the debate, 
FBI officials supplied the administration with political intelligence on this newly 
organized political opponent, information that could be used to cast doubt on the 
group's legitimacy. By late 1941 these reports led Roosevelt to ask the Justice 
Department to initiate grand jury proceedings against the America First Committee 
over that organization's financial sources. Under the directorship of J. Edgar 
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Hoover who took an interest in satisfying Roosevelt's political interests, FBI 
officials worked to achieve this goal. 
The origins of the America First Committee date from early 1940 when Yale 
University law student R. Douglas Stuart, Jr., formed the group as a student 
organization. Troubled by the events of early 1940 he had sought backing among 
his colleagues. Stuart won the support of Gerald R. Ford (the future president) and 
Potter Stewart (future Supreme Court justice), among others. By fall he had 
persuaded a number of prominent midwestern businessmen and leading Republican 
conservatives to organize his group on a national level, in part, to oppose the 
interventionist Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies, led by 
newspaperman William Allen White. With this success, the America First 
Committee in September 1940 announced its formation and headquartered itself in 
Chicago.' 
The Committee's primary objective was to undermine public support for 
President Roosevelt's increasingly interventionist foreign policy. To promote this 
objective, Stuart enlisted Robert E. Wood, chairman of Sears, Roebuck and 
Company, to serve as Committee chairman. Other prominent personalities joined 
the committee, including Mrs. Burton K. Wheeler (wife of Senator Wheeler), Alice 
Roosevelt Longworth, and Charles Lindbergh. Not pacifist, the group had four 
principal aims: 
1. The United States must build an impregnable defense for America. 
2. No foreign power, nor group of powers, can successfully attack a 
prepared America. 
3. American democracy can be preserved only by keeping out of the 
[current] European war. 
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4. `Aid short of war' weakens national defense at home and threatens to 
involve America in war abroad.2 
The America First Committee expanded rapidly with chapters opening in 
cities nationwide. It sponsored anti -interventionist speakers both at rallies and on 
the radio, published anti -interventionist literature, and supplied information to 
members of Congress. The America First Committee became the most influential 
and best -organized anti -interventionist pressure group in the country. When it 
disbanded in December 1941, the Committee had 450 local chapters and roughly 
800,000 members.3 
While the Committee declared itself to be nonpartisan, its membership was 
mostly of those who were politically conservative. Nonetheless, various radical 
groups endorsed similar political platforms and similar goals. These included Nazis, 
Communists (until the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941), and anti - 
Semites. While the Committee made efforts to distance itself from these elements, 
many Americans equated America First with these radical groups. The resulting 
popular perception thereby hindered the overall effectiveness of the organization.4 
FBI officials also shared this belief that the Committee membership either 
held fascist sympathies or were dupes of the Nazis. As Bureau agents accumulated 
increasing amounts of information about the Committee's alleged fascist leanings - 
all of it unsubstantiated -FBI officials either believed these allegations or found it 
politically expedient to forward to the administration intelligence that suggested that 
its critics were indeed "subversive." At the start of this FBI investigation, FBI 
officials found very little evidence that the group in fact had subversive connections. 
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Indeed from time to time FBI agents gathered information that accurately suggested 
that the America First Committee sought to exclude extreme elements from its 
ranks. But as the foreign policy debate heated up, and as interventionist groups 
increased their anti- interventionist invective, the FBI's accumulation of material 
suggesting fascist links, unsubstantiated though this was, multiplied. A 1942 FBI 
summary report reflects this view of FBI officials of America First's development. 
This document began by conceding that the Committee's origins were "totally 
respectable" but had evolved into a haven for fascists. In any event, FBI Director 
Hoover, in his efforts to satisfy administration desires for political intelligence, 
invariably forwarded to the White House derogatory data about the president's 
foreign policy opponents.5 
FBI agents became first interested in the America First Committee's political 
activity on 9 November 1940. The Birmingham, Alabama, special agent in charge 
(SAC) reported to FBI Director Hoover that an informer had alerted him to a radio 
program "apparently sponsored by the America First Committee" that had discussed 
the war situation. According to the FBI's informant, the questions raised and the 
answers given had "indicated to him that it was a Nazi inspired program [that] he 
thought might be part of German propaganda in this country." The Birmingham 
SAC accordingly submitted this information "in the event the Bureau desires the 
Chicago office to make any inquiry." While no further investigation was ordered, 
this report illustrates the early perception of FBI officials about the Committee's 
alleged fascist leanings. 6 
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By December, FBI officials began to receive, though on a relatively limited 
basis, more intelligence about America First. On 16 December FBI Assistant 
Director Louis Nichols, the head of the Bureau's Crime Records Division and in this 
capacity Hoover's informal liaison to the media and Congress, wrote a review of 
news reports for Assistant Director Clyde Tolson that indicated the America First 
Committee was "in favor of maintaining a strict cash and carry policy, a strict policy 
of neutrality, building adequate defense and that they would not tolerate any 
Communists or Fascists in the group."7 
At this point FBI agents had developed only a limited amount of information 
on the America First Committee. This was not surprising, however, since the group 
had only just been formed and, until the introduction of the Lend -Lease bill, had 
focused on organizing itself and opposing the interventionist Committee to Defend 
America by Aiding the Allies. When President Roosevelt announced his intention in 
December 1940 to create a new method to extend assistance to Great Britain, which 
became his Lend -Lease policy, however, the Bureau's interest in the Committee 
deepened owing to its vigorous opposition to the president's initiative. The first 
informative summary memorandum on America First was created for Assistant to 
the Director Edward A. Tatum on 29 January. This summary outlined the 
Committee's membership and particularly noted its political opposition to 
administration policies ranging from conscription, aid to Britain, and, most 
importantly, the Lend -Lease bill.8 
For the America First Committee, the Lend -Lease bill became a focal point 
to which it devoted its energies. Committee chairman Robert E. Wood vowed that 
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his organization would oppose the presidential initiative "with all the vigor it can 
exert, "9 and mobilized resources nationwide in opposition to the bill. When the bill 
was formally introduced in Congress, Chairman Wood, former Undersecretary of 
State William Castle, and leading Republican Hanford MacNider (all prominent 
America First members) testified in the resulting congressional hearings in 
opposition to the measure. The Committee's tactic was to mobilize public sentiment 
to influence congressmen to vote the bill down. The Committee accordingly 
sponsored hundreds of meetings, distributed newsletters and petitions, and paid for 
position papers in major newspapers, which were then reprinted in the 
Congressional Record, urging opposition. According to historian Justus Doenecke, 
by the end of February 1941, at the height of the Lend -Lease debate, the America 
First Committee had organized 648 "embryonic chapters" across the nation.'° 
Despite this opposition, the Lend -Lease bill passed the House of 
Representatives on 8 February by the comfortable margin of 260 to 165. The debate 
over lend -lease then shifted to the Senate with the America First Committee 
increasing its opposition. The Senate debate lasted until March and was one of the 
most heated in American history. Meantime, even though the White House received 
political updates from its congressional floor managers, FBI Director Hoover 
provided the administration with advance political intelligence both on the senators' 
actions and the influence of America First during the Lend -Lease debate. On 21 
February the FBI director informed presidential secretary Edwin Watson that 
through a "strictly confidential source" he had learned that "the debate in the Senate 
on the Lend -Lease Bill will last for about two weeks longer." Eleven senators, 
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Hoover reported, planned to filibuster the measure in an attempt to undermine its 
passage.]] This effort to keep the president informed on political matters reflects 
Hoover's interest in promoting White House political interests. 
On 26 and 27 February, Hoover reported political intelligence "pertaining to 
the activities of John L. Wheeler [son of anti -interventionist Senator Burton 
Wheeler], Chairman of the America First Committee of Los Angeles" to White 
House aide Edwin Watson, Assistant Secretary of State Adolf Berle, Assistant to the 
Attorney General Matthew McGuire, and Attorney General Francis Biddle. This 
report noted that Wheeler's wife, who was a member of the America First 
Committee, remarked about Lend -Lease that "the only way we can be safe is to see 
the pins knocked out from under Britain." Mrs. Wheeler was also reported to have 
"become imbued with pro - German sentiments because of her association with 
various individuals ... [all of] whom are under investigation by this Bureau." The 
Bureau had also discovered that John Wheeler had accepted a $2,000 check for his 
committee from an individual under investigation by the FBI.12 In a second blind 
memorandum concerning John Wheeler FBI officials focused exclusively on the Los 
Angeles America First chapter. Their memorandum specifically focused on John 
Wheeler and his wife, but noted that the revisionist historian Harry Elmer Barnes 
had lectured, sponsored by America First, in Wheeler's area against the Lend -Lease 
bill.13 The content of these two documents confirm that FBI Director Hoover's 
intention when forwarding political intelligence to the administration was either to 
sustain or to help create a belief that the America First Committee had links with 
questionable individuals -those under FBI investigation or considered pro -German 
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by FBI officials. FBI agents concurrently collected exculpatory information -such 
as Louis Nichols's memorandum to Tolson regarding the America First Committee's 
efforts to exclude extremists. Nonetheless, Hoover chose not to pass this 
information to administration officials. 
The White House valued Hoover's political intelligence reports, both those 
pertaining to President Roosevelt's anti -interventionist critics and radical elements. 
This is evident in Roosevelt's brief letter to Hoover on 14 June 1940 "to thank you 
for the many interesting and valuable reports that you have made to me regarding the 
last few months." The president thought Hoover had "done and are doing a 
wonderful job, and I want you to know of my gratification and appreciation." In a 
response characteristic of Hoover's efforts to ingratiate himself with the president, 
the FBI director wrote: 
The personal note which you directed to me on June, 14, 1940, is one 
of the most inspiring messages which I have ever been privileged to receive; 
and, indeed, I look upon it as rather a symbol of the principles for which our 
Nation stands. When the President of our country, bearing the weight of 
untold burdens, takes the time to so express himself to one of his Bureau 
heads, there is implanted in the hearts of the recipients a renewed strength 
and vigor to carry on their tasks. 
In noting the vast contrast between the Leader of our Nation and 
those of other less fortunate Nations, I feel deeply thankful that we have at 
the head of our Government one who possesses such sterling, sincere, and 
altogether human qualities.14 
Satisfied with Hoover's providing political intelligence reports, at the start of 
the Lend -Lease debate in the Senate, President Roosevelt soon requested that the 
FBI investigate an aspect of the America First Committee's political activity. In late 
February 1941, Roosevelt learned of an America First Committee circular captioned: 
"Are you willing to give up democracy ?" This document characterized Lend -Lease 
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as "a war dictatorship bill" that would bestow upon the president "absolute power." 
Disturbed by the circular, on 21 February Roosevelt asked Stephen Early, his 
secretary: "will you find out from someone - perhaps FBI -who is paying for 
this ? "15 
Early forwarded Roosevelt's request to Hoover. In response, on 26 February 
the FBI director ordered: "Get reply out to Early by tomorrow with summary of info 
on hand. If specific question not answered thereby tell him it is being checked and 
he will be further advised. "16 Then on 1 March, Hoover supplied Presidential 
Secretary Early with a blind summary memorandum on the America First 
Committee that outlined its leadership and, briefly, its financial sources which were 
reported to have originated "solely by voluntary contributions by those interested in 
the organization. "17 
Hoover responded to Roosevelt's request to " f in d out ... who is paying for 
this" by launching an investigation into the sources of the America First 
Committee's funds. The FBI director even intimated as much in a memorandum to 
Early stating: "With regard to the President's request for information as to the 
source of funds of the America First Committee.... "18 It is unclear, however, 
whether Roosevelt had wanted an investigation into the sources of the America First 
Committee's funding or just to know who had financed the publication of the 
circular that labeled Lend -Lease a war dictatorship bill. The latter purpose seems 
logical. In any event, Hoover took a broader approach. At this point however, FBI 
officials had developed only limited information concerning the Committee's 
finances. Unwilling to investigate further without approval, and perhaps reflecting 
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confusion as to the president's wishes, Hoover wrote Early: "If it is the president's 
wish that a more exhaustive investigation be made relative to the means by which 
the America First Committee is being financed, I hope you will not hesitate to call 
upon me to conduct such an investigation. "19 At the time, Roosevelt did not request 
"a more exhaustive investigation." He did, however, in November 1941, by which 
time the Great Debate had settled into a stalemate. 
The Lend -Lease debate was eventually settled when in March the Senate 
passed the measure and the president signed the bill into law. FBI officials, 
however, did not halt their surveillance of the America First Committee. On the 
contrary, on 19 March Hoover provided Roosevelt and the attorney general with 
"the contemplated plans of the America First Committee." According to FBI 
sources, the Committee had plans "to have Senators, Congressmen, and various 
peace and patriotic organizations travel throughout the United States to reach all 
areas for the purpose of opposing any plans the President might have in bringing this 
country into war." "Three Senators and several Congressmen," Hoover continued, 
would cover the northern United States while "a similar trainload of individuals" 
would cover the south. At the same time, a third group would travel east to west 
spreading the Committee's anti -interventionist message. Summing up the plan, 
Hoover reported that Committee chairman Robert Wood and Senator Burton 
Wheeler were slated to lead this campaign.20 
Hoover's information was correct and confirms his interest in anti - 
interventionist political activity. Shortly after passage of the Lend -Lease bill, 
despite the Committee having been in "financial straits," Senator Wheeler and others 
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began a tour of the country to mobilize support for their cause, their objectives 
publicized in a Chicago Tribune story of April 1941. The tour raised both funds to 
continue an anti -interventionist fight and to continue spreading the Committee's 
message.21 
Interested in the extent of this campaign's success, and responding to 
Hoover's reports, in September Attorney General Francis Biddle requested that FBI 
officials monitor an America First Committee rally in Los Angeles at which Senator 
Wheeler would speak. Biddle was interested in the size of the crowd and how it 
reacted to Wheeler's comments. The resulting FBI report, sent both to Biddle and 
Roosevelt, estimated the crowd was numbered between eight and eleven thousand 
and as "very sympathetic and friendly toward the America First Committee and 
Senator Wheeler. "22 
On 10 July, Hoover forwarded to the White House, by special messenger, an 
unsolicited report documenting one major source of funds for the America First 
Committee. Even though President Roosevelt had not requested another 
investigation into the Committee's sources of revenue, Hoover continued to pass on 
any information about the matter to the White House. His report, based on 
information provided by an informer, pointed to Joseph Patterson, owner of the anti - 
interventionist New York Daily News, and Robert McCormick, owner of the Chicago 
Tribune, as contributing "a lot of money" to the America First Committee. Patterson 
reportedly did not want it known he was donating "large sums" to the organization. 
In addition, Hoover reported that the Committee was also backing the anti- 
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interventionist publication Uncensored and provided the White House with a copy 
of this periodical.23 
In September, Hoover again forwarded information concerning America 
First's funds "to supplement the previous information concerning this group ... in 
accordance with his [Roosevelt's] request of February 21, 1941." Roosevelt's 
February request might not have given the FBI carte blanche to investigate this 
matter. Furthermore, Roosevelt had never requested "a more exhaustive" 
investigation into America First's funding as Hoover had previously suggested (that 
is until November 1941). Nevertheless, Hoover continued to provide such data 
claiming that he only sought to keep the president "currently advised in matters of 
this kind." The particular financial information which Hoover forwarded stated that 
a large Jewish organization (unnamed), through the Guggenheim Foundation, had 
withdrawn its financial support from the America First Committee because of the 
group's "anti- Roosevelt" stance, efforts to embarrass the president, and espousal of 
"anti- Jewish propaganda." FBI agents were unable to substantiate any of these 
allegations, allegations that reflected popular notions of the Committee that were not 
always accurate. The type of information Hoover provided the White House 
nonetheless did help sustain the biases about the group held by many senior officials 
or in some cases even create them.24 
By mid -October, FBI officials had uncovered what they thought was another 
avenue to gather information as to the funding of the America First Committee. An 
FBI informer provided information about the congressional election in Wisconsin's 
first district where the local chapter of the America First Committee took part. The 
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Committee had supported Lawrence H. Smith against the incumbent and Smith won. 
In Wisconsin the law required "all organizations participating in political campaigns 
to file a detailed expense account." According to the FBI's informer, Wisconsin 
State Attorney John E. Martin planned to order the local chapter of the America First 
Committee to release its financial records pertaining to this election. FBI officials 
hoped to exploit this release to identify the source of the funds behind the America 
First Committee. FBI records, however, did not disclose what happened other than a 
notation that the Committee "has refused to comply with this law as of the present 
writing.i25 The episode nonetheless shows the length to which Bureau officials 
would go to gather information to document a prosecution under the Foreign Agents 
Registration Act. 
FBI Director Hoover continued to supply the White House with political 
intelligence regarding the America First Committee throughout 1941, on the belief 
that the president might find these reports of interest. On 12 May, Hoover provided 
Presidential Secretary Edwin Watson with an advance copy of the polling data taken 
by Columbia Survey, a public opinion monitor, and due to be published eight days 
hence by Look magazine. The data involved Americans' opinions regarding 
convoys, the draft, imminence of war (58 percent believed the U.S. would avoid war 
with Germany, and 73 percent believed war would be avoided with Japan), and 
towards the defense program (in this case a split opinion). Neither Roosevelt nor his 
aides commented on Hoover's forwarding of this information. This submission 
nonetheless highlights Hoover's continued effort to supply the administration with a 
variety of political intelligence.26 
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In late August, Senator Claude Pepper, a Democrat from Florida and 
prominent critic of Roosevelt's foreign policy opponents, requested information 
about the America First Committee from Attorney General Francis Biddle. The 
attorney general forwarded the request to FBI Director Hoover. Normally unwilling 
to provide political intelligence to politicians unless they could be trusted, Hoover 
honored this request. Hoover forwarded to Biddle, who then passed it on to Pepper, 
an eleven -page blind summary memorandum on the America First Committee. The 
document, designated secret, reported on the group's origins, biographical sketches 
of its leaders and prominent members, as well as other sundry political intelligence 
on Roosevelt's opponents.27 
The following month, Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, a frequent critic of 
the anti -interventionists, contacted FBI Assistant Director Edward A. Tamm to 
obtain information about America First. According to FBI documents, Knox's 
interest stemmed from a concern that the Committee was trying "to frustrate the 
National Defense Effort through manipulation of trade unions in bringing about 
labor disputes. "28 Convinced that subversive elements had contributed to labor 
troubles, Knox identified some of these in the America First Committee. Indeed, he 
confided to his diary on 28 May 1941: "One of the first things the President must do 
... is to take positive action against the various forms of subversive activity which is 
interfering with and interrupting and delaying our defense preparations. Unless his 
fine words are followed by firm action the last condition will be worse than the 
first.i29 On 3 September Tamm responded by forwarding to Knox "a blind 
memorandum containing information in our files with respect to The America First 
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Committee." This blind memorandum was similar to that forwarded to Senator 
Pepper.3° 
FBI officials took advantage of every opportunity to collect intelligence on 
the America First Committee. In February 1941 (although this was not reported to 
FBI headquarters until June) the head (SAC) of the FBI's Kansas City, Missouri, 
field office contacted the editor of the city's newspaper, The Kansas City Star, to 
obtain permission to search the paper's files for information relating to America 
First's activities. This review uncovered the following political comments made by 
leading anti -interventionists. Committee Chairman Robert Wood reportedly said, 
"Democracy is not going to work unless men stand up for their convictions." Anti - 
interventionist John T. Flynn, a journalist who wrote about financial affairs and who 
"bitterly opposed the Administrative [sic] policy," reportedly said the administration 
was pushing the country toward war. Lastly, a member of the local America First 
chapter reportedly said: "Nazism and Democracy could live side by side" and that 
the group had mentioned nothing "except in criticism of President Roosevelt's 
foreign policy." (The final paragraph of this FBI document has been redacted.)31 
The Bureau's best opportunity to gather intelligence on the America First 
Committee came in the first half of 1941 from none other that the Committee itself. 
In January and then again in March, in an effort to clear itself of the popular notion it 
was a subversive organization, the Chicago chapter invited the FBI to examine its 
files. Chester Bowles, an anti- interventionist New York advertising executive, 
suggested that every local chapter request FBI checks of their files to "keep its skirts 
completely clean so far as anti -Semitism and Fascism, either domestic or foreign, are 
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concerned." While perfectly willing to have FBI agents collect intelligence on the 
Committee in confidence, as in the case to gather information from the files of the 
Kansas City Star, Hoover hesitated to have FBI agents publicly check the files of a 
group which opposed the Roosevelt administration. According to historian Justus 
Doenecke, however, the FBI eventually examined the Chicago chapter's files (in 
June) but refused to check other chapters' files. Word eventually spread among 
America Firsters of the Chicago chapter's request which resulted in at least one 
government agency, the Office of Price Management, asking the FBI for the 
America First Committee's membership list so that it could check the names against 
those of its new applicants. Hoover, according to FBI documents, told the OPM 
official that his bureau had no such lists.32 
By late 1942, with America already militarily involved in the Second World 
War, FBI officials were more than willing to share information with government 
agencies. In September a Treasury Department official, Samuel Klaus, solicited any 
FBI records concerning the America First Committee. (The reason for his interest is 
unknown, as the Bureau has redacted portions of the document.) In this instance, 
under the orders of FBI Assistant Director D. Milton Ladd, head of the Bureau's 
Domestic Intelligence Division, an FBI report was given to Klaus that "had all 
identifying marks linking it with the Bureau obliterated therefrom." From the FBI 
document number cited in the FBI memorandum, however, we know that the 
information had something to do with America First Committee records which FBI 
officials had somehow secured.33 
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Director Hoover was sensitive to any suggestion or criticism directed at his 
Bureau that implied impropriety. He took any such charge seriously and took steps 
to either persuade individuals, like the OPM official, that the FBI did not collect 
non -criminal information or to silence any criticism of the Bureau that he deemed 
harmful to his and the FBI's carefully crafted public image. One such incident 
occurred in October 1941. On the seventh of that month, the FBI's special agent in 
charge of the San Diego, California, field office reported to Hoover that an America 
First speaker had charged and the San Diego Union had printed that the FBI had 
tapped the committee telephones and had perused its membership lists.34 
Because of the public nature of this charge of a crime (wiretapping) by an 
official of the America First Committee, and because a sympathetic newspaper had 
picked up the story, Hoover sought to contain the incident. Pursuant to Hoover's 
instructions, the San Diego SAC contacted the head of the city's America First 
chapter who, after talking with the agent, "expressed regret" over the wiretapping 
and files examination charge. The agent, upon learning who had made the public 
remarks, contacted that individual's source of information - America First's national 
director of field operations, Earl Jeffrey. Hoover then wrote both the editor of the 
San Diego Union and General Robert E. Wood, chairman of the America First 
Committee. In Hoover's own handwritten marginalia, he wanted to make Jeffrey 
"either put up or shut up." The newspaper's editor, upon receipt of Hoover's letter, 
publicly apologized to the FBI in print, and General Wood wrote Hoover an apology 
and included with his letter a copy of his reprimand of Jeffrey. Hoover successfully 
defended the Bureau here from any harmful publicity that it might have illegally 
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wiretapped the America First Committee's telephones or examined its membership 
rosters. But while Hoover may have publicly avoided revelations of improper 
political surveillance, we know that the FBI did, indeed, use wiretaps to collect 
political information on the Committee (see especially chapter seven) and examined 
files of certain organizations (including the America First Committee itself) for data 
concerning Roosevelt's opponent.35 
In August, FBI agents learned that the Chicago chapter of the America First 
Committee had allegedly written families with relatives in the armed forces to urge 
the soldiers to refuse to leave the country without explicit congressional approval. 
Chicago chapters had also allegedly urged wives of soldiers to write their 
congressmen to request their release from active service. Apparently, FBI officials' 
interest in this activity stemmed from provisions of the 1940 Selective Service Act 
outlawing the fomenting of disruption among draftees. Yet, the Bureau's informer 
had clearly pointed out that "under no circumstances would they [the America First 
Committee] allow any literature or letters be sent out to Draftees, their wives, or 
families which would in any way be detrimental to their morale." The America First 
Committee was only interested, the informer further claimed, in opposing legislation 
that might lead to war. FBI agents unsuccessfully tried to glean further information 
about this from other sources in the Communist Party, whom they suspected of 
conducting similar tactics. The purpose of this effort was based on a desire to 
develop a case against America First. The Committee was, and had always been, 
careful to operate strictly within the confines of the law and went to great lengths to 
distinguish itself from radical groups who endorsed similar political platforms. The 
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FBI might have had a responsibility to investigate suspected fascist organizations; 
nonetheless, given the unsubstantiated nature of the intelligence gleaned about the 
Committee and Hoover's interest in providing political intelligence reports to the 
administration, the motives of the FBI director do seem suspicious.36 
* * * 
FBI officials were interested in any information that linked the America First 
Committee to fascist elements. As many Americans at the time, they uncritically 
believed the widespread innuendo -spread very effectively by interventionist 
groups that the Committee was either sympathetic toward or an unwitting tool of 
fascism.37 Such information was regularly forwarded in FBI reports to 
administration officials and had the effect of either bolstering already held beliefs 
about the group's alleged fascism or helping mold those beliefs. One report sent to 
FBI headquarters in July exemplifies the purposeful gathering of such derogatory 
information. This report noted that the interventionist publication The Hour had 
learned that the America First Committee had adopted the slogan "America for 
Americans," a term reportedly used by groups like the German- American Bund, 
Silver Shirts, and the Christian Front.38 Such links seemingly confirmed that 
America First was fascist or, in the very least, suspicious. 
Similar information suggesting that fascist groups worked with the America 
First Committee was forwarded to Hoover in July 1941 from newspaper and radio 
gossip commentator Walter Winchell, who had learned it from the Anti -Nazi 
League. When forwarding this information to Winchell, League officials stated: 
"you're welcome to use it in any way." Winchell forwarded the information to 
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Hoover, who was an intimate contact. Because the information concerned the New 
York City America First Committee and its alleged contacts with fascists from 
abroad, Hoover forwarded the information to the New York field office "for your 
information only." What, if anything, officials of the FBI's New York office did 
with the information purporting to show the fascist links of the America First 
Committee is unknown.39 
In November 1941, an FBI informer provided further information about an 
America First rally in Youngstown, Ohio, that pertained to the group's subversive 
character. According to the Bureau's memorandum on the meeting, one of the 
primary speakers, the Reverend Walter Klein, "condemned Godless Russia, 
President Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and others favorable to this country's 
foreign policy." Bureau officials were particularly interested to learn that those 
attending the meeting "were urged to wire or write their Congressmen demanding 
that he oppose any change in the Neutrality Act." The FBI memorandum also noted 
"that no American flag was displayed anywhere in the hall and that the National 
Anthem was not sung." Further, "It was the opinion that the general makeup for the 
program was pro -Nazi with a few exceptions of women who were mothers having 
their sons in the service. "40 
Such reports, suggesting that the America First Committee was in league 
with Nazi Germany, might have convinced some FBI officials that the America First 
Committee was subversive and thereby properly subject to scrutiny. In late 
November, FBI officials received a copy of a publication put out by the American 
Legion entitled: "Subversive Activities in America First Committee in California." 
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Since 1940 FBI officials had maintained a close relationship with the American 
Legion which continued until 1966. Members of this veterans' organization 
investigated, collected, and forwarded information on "subversive activities" to the 
Bureau. In this instance, the Legion provided a nineteen -page document that had the 
purpose "of preventing the misuse of sincere Americans by Nazis or other 
subversive persons operating through the America First Committee." The document 
outlined the America First Committee's links to subversive groups and 
individuals- according to the Legion's informers -and suggested that the 
Committee was being duped by fascists as a tool for Nazi propaganda.41 
FBI officials took particular interest in the America First Committee chapters 
in Washington, D.C., Chicago, and New York City. These were among the three 
largest chapters of the organization and generated a significant amount of 
intelligence for FBI officials, more than that generated by FBI surveillance of 
smaller America First chapters. FBI agents employed informers to gather 
intelligence on these three chapters. This reliance on informers proved significant 
given their questionable reliability, in general. And indeed the quality of the FBI's 
information on the America First Committee (in terms of accuracy and 
corroboration) is often suspect; FBI officials seemingly accepted the widely -held 
notion that the Committee was a dupe of fascist elements from abroad. 
Interventionist groups such as the Fight For Freedom Committee successfully 
promoted this view. 
A Bureau informer who provided intelligence on the Washington, D.C., 
America First chapter reflects the popular view that the Committee was subversive. 
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The informer, whose name has been withheld in the released FBI records on privacy 
grounds, claimed "that in making application for membership in the America First 
Committee, he wrote down his affiliations with pro -Nazi and other subversive 
organizations to see what would be the reaction, and stated that they just smiled and 
nodded." The informer continued that America First was a Fascist movement whose 
membership was "deeply polluted by the Fascist crowd." In his view the "honest 
isolationists" in the Committee were vastly outnumbered by "anti- administration 
businessmen and industrialists with an overwhelming following of appeasers, Nazis, 
Fascists, and other enemies of the democratic way of life." America First, the 
informer further claimed, was the nexus for a Fascist revolution in America as 
numerous subversive groups and over 130 congressmen were either "openly or 
clandestinely with the America First movement. "42 
Not all FBI agents reported that America First was fascist. The special agent 
in charge at Chicago, for example, reported, following the dissolution of the 
Committee after Pearl Harbor, that this "investigation to date has failed to reveal any 
indication that the structure of America First, has in any way, been used by foreign 
interests or individuals cooperating with foreign interests." The agent continued, 
"There have been a few local Chapters ... who have reportedly made available lists 
and pledged cooperation to certain radical groups but these have been isolated 
instances and in the opinion of persons interviewed, represented only a minute 
minority of the total membership. "43 
The special agent in charge of the FBI's New York City office took a 
different view. He characterized the America First Committee as a Nazi tool. He 
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summarized the totality of the information collected by the New York office: "Such 
material tends to prove support of, or connection with the America First Committee 
by such known or alleged subversive organizations as the German- American Bund, 
Christian Front, Silver Shirts, Women United, Mothers' organizations, Christian 
Mobilizers, American Destiny Party" among many other groups and extremist 
individuals. Not only did the America First Committee maintain no official links 
with any of these groups, but none of the information in his report-such as 
newspaper and magazine clippings from extremist publications that took a similar 
anti -interventionist political position as America First-proved such subversive 
connections. His reporting reflects an interest in any data that suggested subversive 
links maintained by the Committee» 
* * * 
In addition to monitoring the political activities of the America First 
Committee, FBI officials were also interested in the activities of African Americans 
and women's groups associated with the organization. The FBI's monitoring of 
those associations did not reach the scope of the Bureau's subsequent Investigations 
of these groups (mainly because blacks and women were small in number within the 
ranks of America First). This relatively limited interest fits into a pattern of concern 
over the activities of groups that senior Bureau officials somehow considered 
subversive. This characterization was not because of their involvement in illegal 
activities but their political views. 
The America First Committee's "Colored Section's or, more properly. the 
Charles A. Young Division of America First for Negroes, became a subject of FBI 
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files.45 Because very small, and probably in the larger scheme of things 
inconsequential, FBI officials only generated one document (that we know of) about 
the Committee's African- American section which was based in Washington, D.C. 
Why would some blacks wish to advocate anti- interventionism? Historian Mark 
Lincoln Chadwin has written that many African Americans either opposed U.S. 
involvement in war preferring that the nation focus on solving race problems at 
home, or, during this period, simply had no political voice or were largely 
deferential to decisions made by white society.46 
One FBI report identified the head of the "colored" section, Dr. J. Finley 
Wilson, who was associated with the fraternal group Colored Elks of the World, and 
the section's secretary, Perry W. Howard. The report further listed the eighteen 
members of the division's general committee, primarily black ministers, lawyers, 
and other professionals. FBI officials were particularly interested in the division's 
distribution "of literature in colored circles requesting the colored population to 
petition their national representatives to discourage the United States from entering 
the European war." The division had encouraged African Americans nationwide to 
organize their own America First "colored" chapters. FBI officials reported this 
particular information in a blind summary memorandum forwarded to Secretary 
Knox in August 1941 in response to his request for information about the Committee 
based on the suspicion that the Committee sought to disrupt the defense effort by 
agitating labor disputes.47 
While a predominantly white, male and conservative organization, the 
America First Committee had a limited female makeup. The Committee employed 
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several prominent American women as speakers, and several served on the national 
committee or worked for it (two will be discussed in chapter seven). In addition, a 
number of right -wing women's groups maintained an informal relationship with 
America First. By and large, however, most women and women's groups 
maintained their own separate organizations owing to the dominance of men in the 
America First Committee. Nevertheless, FBI agents were interested that some 
women were members of America First and, in particular, in those women's groups 
who had any linkage, perceived or otherwise, with the committee. To FBI officials, 
any links with the America First Committee was tantamount to membership. This 
interest in the America First Committee's female makeup highlights FBI officials' 
interest in a multitude of targets who distinguished themselves by opposing 
administration foreign policy.48 
Despite the America First Committee's failure to recruit a significant female 
membership, just before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, which ended the 
isolationist -interventionist debate, some of the Committee's leadership considered 
"enlisting" women's groups. Ruth Sarles, the Committee's liaison with Senate 
leaders, on 5 December was "not too sanguine as I look over the women's 
organizations." She feared that most of the leadership of women's groups held an 
internationalist (in effect opposing anti -interventionism) outlook and "With this sort 
of conditioning of the members' minds in years past, it would be surprising if it were 
at all easy to make headway in the non -interventionist behalf." The quick end of the 
Great Debate two days after her comments forestalled any future plans.49 
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FBI officials did, however, monitor America First women's activity since 
1940. An FBI memorandum listed some prominent female members, including 
Janet Ayer Fairbank, Kathryn Lewis, and Alice Roosevelt Longworth. FBI agent J. 
B. O'Leary specifically reported that the executive vice -president of the group Roll 
Call of American Women, based in Chicago, visited Washington, D. C., to present 
an Illinois congressman with 11,000 signatures of members who opposed the Lend - 
Lease bill and American intervention in the European conflict. O'Leary noted that 
the group had been formed in summer 1940 but merged with the America First 
Committee in December of the same year. By November, another FBI 
memorandum described a different women's group, Women Determined, as 
"nothing more than a subsidiary of the America First Committee. "5° 
Another FBI report filed by the New York City field office noted that the 
group Women United, the largest nationalist women's organization based in New 
York, had access to and was using the mailing lists of both the America First 
Committee and the Committee for No Foreign Wars. This report continued that 
Women United lacked funds to carry on its campaign, particularly a trip to 
Washington, D.C., to protest intervention in the war, but that the America First 
Committee planned to fund this event. The FBI's source identified the source of this 
America First funding as Mrs. Seth Milliken and Mrs. Grant Simmons, both of 
America First who had provided Women United with a total of $3,000.51 
In October 1941 FBI agents reported that Women United in New York had 
distributed notices of America First Committee meetings and advertised their own 
political trip to Washington to protest revision of the neutrality act. In addition the 
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New York SAC continued, Women United and We, the Mothers,52 another women's 
anti -interventionist organization, planned to merge with the America First 
Committee. FBI officials deemed important that the America First Committee 
employed aviator Laura Ingalls as a speaker. In 1942 Ingalls (see chapter seven) 
was prosecuted under the Foreign Agents Registration Act, the same legislation with 
which Bureau officials had sought to build a case against the America First 
Committee.53 
An FBI blind summary memorandum, sent to the White House, identified by 
name the female leadership of the Washington, D.C., chapter of the America First 
Committee. The memorandum outlined the political activity of Janet Ayer 
Fairbanks, and specifically that she was "Active in cause of women suffrage and 
politics; former member of the Executive Committee of the Democratic National 
Committee; was a member of the Women's National Liberty Loan Committee 
during the World War; has written several books.i54 FBI Director Hoover 
forwarded the same memorandum to Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox in 
September 1941, adding to the political information about America First that: "The 
[committee's] literature also makes an appeal to American mothers to aid the 
Committee for the purpose of preventing their sons from being embroiled in another 
European war." This memorandum further reported that America First speaker 
Catherine Curtis had founded the group Women's National Committee for Hands 
Off the Supreme Court and had helped form Women Investors in America, Inc.. 
Curtis had worked closely with the America First Committee, the FBI source 
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continued, with other women's groups associated with the Committee, and was 
reportedly "engaged in a telephone whispering campaign. "55 
Another FBI memorandum summarizing the activities of the America First 
Committee in Washington, D.C., reported that Dorothy Detzer -of the Women's 
International League for Peace and Freedom and closely associated with anti - 
interventionist Senator Gerald Nye -"is said to consider herself the brain of the 
America First Committee." The Washington SAC described her as "instrumental" 
in the organization of the Committee, and that a speech on 16 March 1 94 1 she had 
claimed that "the administration was dragging the United States into the war and that 
[a] fanatic new order in Europe could only be conquored [sic] by an alternative new 
order for the United States." While sketchy, the report reflects an interest in Detzer 
as a leading female anti -interventionist and one who, in at least the opinion of FBI 
officials, might have advocated a radical regime (i.e. a new order) to replace the 
Roosevelt administration.56 
FBI officials found the remark of another female member of America First's 
Washington, D.C., chapter, Isabel French, of particular interest, citing her comment: 
"We of America First believe that you can come to an understanding and do 
business with Hitler. The interventionists think you can't come to an understanding 
and do business with Hitler." A second female member of the chapter, Agnes 
Waters, was reported to have carried out an "anti- administration isolationist 
program" through letters and speeches that called for "the death penalty for 
President Roosevelt, as a traitor to his country. "57 
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The last reference to women and America First in the released FBI files was 
reported in 1942. The report on the America First Committee noted that 
"considerable dissention arose among members of the Women's Division of the 
America First Committee" due to arguments over "individual beliefs. "58 
The above examples constitute the totality of FBI records about the America 
First Committee women, in general. FBI agents were interested in ascertaining the 
role of individual women but were specifically interested in the political activities 
and alleged links with the America First Committee. The paucity of references to 
women was consistent with the Committee's overwhelming male character, 
particularly in most of its leadership positions. With the exception of some 
prominent America First women, most were regarded as concerned mothers whose 
only desire was to not see their sons killed in a foreign war. That FBI agents 
collected such information about these women's political activities is nonetheless 
significant documenting an interest in the political views of various types of anti - 
interventionists. The common theme of FBI reports on the activities of women was 
their actual or perceived link with the America First Committee, President 
Roosevelt's best -organized political opponent. 
* * * 
In October 1941, President Roosevelt requested that Congress revise the 
Neutrality Act to permit both the arming of merchant ships and to allow these ships 
to carry goods to British ports. The president's goal was to increase the ability of 
the United States to provide the Allies with aid -short-of -war. Anti- interventionists, 
as historian Wayne Cole noted, concluded they could not defeat the president in a 
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political battle where the issue was defined in terms of aid -short -of -war. Instead, 
they attempted to present the issue as one of war or peace. The America First 
Committee urged the public, and members of the House and Senate to regard 
revision as an act that would lead either to war (if passed) or peace (if not). This 
attempt to alter the context of the debate failed. Nevertheless, the victory over the 
anti -interventionists was a narrow one and confirmed the continuing influence of the 
America First Committee in shaping public opinion. By November the Senate voted 
for revision by a count of 50 to 37, and the House by a vote of 212 to 194. 
Nonetheless the debate over intervention was far from settled. As Roosevelt 
speechwriter Robert Sherwood (and later chief of the Office of War Information) 
wrote concerning these times, "isolationist sentiment became ever more strident in 
expression and aggressive in action, and Roosevelt was relatively powerless to 
combat it. He said everything `short of war' that could be said. He had no more 
tricks left. The hat from which he had pulled so many rabbits was empty. "59 
But President Roosevelt had, in fact, one last rabbit in his hat. To end the 
stalemate reflected in the close vote over revising the Neutrality Act. Roosevelt 
opted for a companion strategy. On 17 November, the same day he signed the 
revised Neutrality Bill, President Roosevelt directed the attorney general to burin "a 
Grand Jury investigation of the money sources behind the America First 
Committee." Roosevelt hoped that the grand jury, and the resultant publicity. might 
serve to discredit his anti -interventionist critics. He opted for the grand jury idea out 
of frustration to "get any action out of Congress." Throughout 1941, FBI Director 
Hoover had periodically forwarded to the president reports of unsubstantiated 
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information suggesting the questionable sources of America First Committee's 
funding. Many interventionists in Congress and out believed that the America First 
Committee's funds originated from fascist sources. In reality, the Committee took 
careful steps to avoid taking money from individuals who might have a tainted 
background. America First officials, for example, refused to accept donations over 
one hundred dollars unless the source had been vetted. They even refused to accept 
a $4,000 anonymous donation once until the contributor's identity was verified.60 
Hoover immediately sought to support the proposed grand jury inquiry. He 
first forwarded to Attorney General Biddle a summary memorandum of all Bureau 
information concerning the America First Committee.61 FBI officials further 
pursued a new lead. This lead originated in a sensational book in press at Harper 
and Brothers Publishers that claimed the German government secretly subsidized the 
America First Committee.ó2 The book was Michael Sayers's and Albert E. Kahn's 
Sabotage! The Secret War Against America (1942). Published by Harper's in mid - 
1942, Sayers and Kahn's book raised questions about the sources of America First's 
funding.63 
Sayers and Kahn recount examples of several suspicious characters 
associated with the America First Committee who had received money from German 
sources. The authors describe how prominent Ohio lawyer Frank Burch, who 
according to the authors had helped found the Akron chapter of America First, 
received $10,000 from the German government to distribute pro -Nazi literature. 
Sayers and Kahn also suggest that Germany had funded the extremist paper The 
Herald, which regularly printed advertising for the America First Committee.64 
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For several months FBI agents attempted to interview Russell Davenport, 
Sayers and Kahn's editor, to examine their research files. FBI officials tried time 
and again to arrange an interview with Davenport but this meeting was continually 
postponed due to constant scheduling conflicts and delays. Bureau and Justice 
Department officials concurrently weighed the available evidence. Attorney General 
Biddle, after discussing the matter with Harper and Brothers lawyer, Morris Ernst 
(also closely linked with the Roosevelt administration), suggested to Hoover that the 
evidence that America First had received foreign money was scant but seemingly 
"there is a good deal of evidence of interlocking management which might be the 
basis of registering under the [Foreign Agents] Registration Act. "65 (The Act, of 17 
October 1940, required all foreign -controlled groups to register with the Justice 
Department.) Ernst emphasized that if it could be proved America First had 
received foreign money, the organization could be prosecuted for failing to register 
under the provisions of the Foreign Agents Registration Act. 
Morris Ernst, the lawyer representing Davenport and Harper's Publishers, 
had a professional interest in discrediting the America First Committee. He revealed 
some of his thoughts long after the Sayers and Kahn lead in an 8 April 1942 letter he 
wrote President Roosevelt advising him of another discussion he had with Attorney 
General Biddle suggesting "aggressive action against American Fifth Columnists 
through the medium of Treasury Department tax returns of information from 
America First, Coughlin, et al." Then on 23 May, Ernst sent the president an 
extensive list of people who had contributed to the America First Committee which 
he had secured from "reliable" sources. When Ernst later learned that no one from 
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either the Justice or Treasury Departments was seriously pursuing the matter, he 
urged Roosevelt to continue the project. Despite Ernst's suggestions made in 1942 
(after the seeking of Sayers' and Kahn's evidence), all along FBI officials were 
reluctant to undertake Ernst's plan owing to its public nature. In a 12 December 
1941 memorandum FBI Assistant Director Edward Tamm recommended that the 
FBI avoid becoming involved in the type of effort Ernst long advocated because it 
"appears rather obviously to be an effort to curtail exposed and publicized facts 
relating to organizations such as America First -in fact that is probably the 
organization that was specifically in mind." Nothing ever came of the suggestions, 
but they illustrate the latent desire of some administration officials to discredit their 
opponents in the then heated political atmosphere, as well as the hesitancy of senior 
FBI officials to become involved in any action that would publicly be viewed as 
questionable and linked to the FBI. FBI officials preferred to work in secret.66 
Bureau officials nonetheless were keenly interested in the intelligence 
offered in the soon- to -be- published book. After some hesitation and still having 
failed to obtain interviews with the book's authors or the president of the publishing 
company, Justice Department officials decided to assign the case to the Criminal 
Division for possible prosecution under the Foreign Agents Registration Act.67 
Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December, this effort was 
temporarily suspended.68 The Bureau's investigation resumed with the start of the 
new year but FBI agents were not able to examine Sayers and Kahn's material until 
April 1942. By then the anti -interventionists had disbanded and FBI officials had 
serious questions about the reliability of both Albert Kahn owing to his alleged 
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connections with the Communist Party and the Anti- Defamation League, who had 
offered the use of its files in this matter, owing to its leftist nature. In any event, 
Bureau officials eventually evaluated the information "to be largely worthless. "69 
The FBI's monitoring of the pre -war anti -interventionists, however, did not 
cease with the United States entrance into the war, the questionable assertions of 
Sayers and Kahn and the dissolution of the America First Committee to FBI officials 
remained a concern in response to the Committee's announcement on 1 December 
1941 to take an active part in the 1942 off -year elections. Their plan was to swing 
some close elections away from President Roosevelt. Indeed, on 13 February 1942 
Hoover informed Roosevelt's secretary, Edwin Watson, about the 17 December 
dinner party at which Charles Lindbergh was present (see chapter three). In addition 
to describing Lindbergh's remarks at the meeting, Hoover advised the White House 
that Lindbergh had "indicated ... [that] the America First Committee can again be a 
political force; that there may be a time soon when the Committee can advocate a 
negotiated peace." Hoover also provided the White House with a twenty -one page 
summary memorandum on the "structure, activities, and connections of the America 
First Committee as it was organized prior to its allegedly going out of existence 
following our entry into war. "70 
FBI agents soon learned about the alleged secret activities of the America 
First Committee provided by an informer. On 26 February FBI Assistant Director 
Clyde Tolson reported to Hoover that Lindbergh at a dinner party in New York 
allegedly remarked that America First had gone underground. The FBI's source 
claimed that Lindbergh believed that "this war hysteria will wear off and we will 
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come back." In response, Hoover advised Tolson that "We ought to get to [the] 
bottom of this." 7I 
Then, on 16 March Hoover ordered senior FBI officials and SACs 
nationwide to continue to investigate the Committee and demanded a report from the 
SACs in fifteen days. As rationale to continue the probe, Hoover cited Lindbergh's 
remarks that America First had gone underground and planned to surface later. 
According to the FBI director, the Committee was remaining active via "house 
parties ... to keep alive contacts." Hoover ordered that "The investigation along 
these lines should be immediately initiated following a review of the files in your 
office for background information and should be made in a discreet manner so as to 
cause no undue publicity." Hoover urged agents to employ "confidential 
informants" as well as "sincere isolationists, who formerly were active in this 
Committee and who now realize the necessity for an all out national defense." 
Agents, however, should be careful when approaching Committee members, as they 
might be associated with the alleged underground section of the America First 
Committee. The FBI Director based this investigation on the Foreign Agents 
Registration Act. FBI agents were "to ascertain whether the structure set up by the 
America First Committee is now being used by foreign interests, or by individuals 
cooperating with foreign interests, in such a manner as to interfere with the national 
defense effort." 72 
Special agents in charge at each FBI office nationwide initiated 
investigations in their geographic areas as to the status of the America First 
Committee. Some of the larger field offices, such as Chicago, submitted reports on 
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smaller cities that fell under their jurisdiction. FBI agents followed Hoover's orders 
by employing informers to gather their intelligence. They also chronicled the 
activities of local America First chapters dating from their origins. No SAC, 
however, uncovered anything to suggest that the America First Committee had gone 
underground in anticipation of reemerging later to become involved again in 
American politics. Instead, each FBI field office confirmed that all America First 
Committee chapters had disbanded.73 
The FBI's surveillance of President Roosevelt's most prominent organized 
foreign policy opponent, the America First Committee, reflects FBI Director J. 
Edgar Hoover's motives and interests during the pre -war period. Hoover sought to 
satisfy administration political and policy interests by providing political intelligence 
to both policy makers and those who attacked policy critics; he also attempted to 
develop evidence which the administration could use to prosecute the America First 
Committee. At various times, FBI officials investigated the possibility of employing 
the provisions of the Selective Service Act or the Foreign Agents Registration Act to 
prosecute the Committee. They hoped to uncover evidence that the Committee had 
received funds from a foreign government (namely Nazi Germany) or, at least, had 
links to a foreign government through various extremist groups or foreign registered 
groups. If this could be proved, then the Committee could have been prosecuted for 
not registering with the Justice Department as a foreign -controlled or funded 
organization. 
While the FBI had the responsibility to investigate possible violations of 
federal criminal statutes, none of the Bureau's information regarding the America 
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First Committee in any credible way uncovered evidence of a crime. Rather, the 
intelligence was garnered from informers whose credibility was questionable, and 
whose bias was clear, and whose information was mostly inaccurate. On more than 
one occasion FBI agents received exculpatory information that demonstrated that the 
Committee had made a concerted effort to exclude extremists from its ranks and to 
conduct its affairs in a legal manner. 
Did, then, FBI officials believe that the America First Committee was a 
subversive organization or a dupe of the fascists? Was their purpose only to kowtow 
to the administration's perceptions along these lines by providing official FBI 
reports to that effect? Neither question can be answered definitively. No released 
document explicitly confirms that senior FBI officials believed that the America 
First Committee was controlled by subversive elements. Nonetheless, numerous 
documents imply such a belief. Nor is there any explicit evidence to confirm that 
FBI officials passed on their reports while, perhaps, not truly believing in their 
accuracy. Hoover's statement in March 1942 to interview anti -interventionists who 
now realize the necessity for an all out national defense" suggests, but does not 
prove, that Hoover was an advocate of intervention. What is clear is that FBI 
Director Hoover willingly provided political intelligence to the White House 
regarding its opponents and sought to develop any possible legal avenues that might 
lead to the prosecution of Roosevelt's opponents. 
Hoover interpreted Roosevelt's somewhat ambiguous request early in 1941 
to "find out who is paying for this [leaflet]" as a reason to Iaunch an investigation 
into the Committee's financial resources. Roosevelt never requested such a probe 
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until late in 1941. Thereafter, Hoover provided updates on the Committee's 
allegedly sinister funding until in November 1941 when President Roosevelt directly 
requested a probe into the group's funding. Hoover's interest in the America First 
Committee's financial backing, and reports to the White House on it, may have 
influenced the president to pursue that investigative avenue. 
FBI officials may have been as caught up in the hype and distortions created 
about the anti -interventionists as were many Americans. And as FBI agents 
accumulated more and more information suggesting that the America First 
Committee had fascist leanings or was a foreign controlled organization, they may 
very well have believed their own data seeing a subversive pattern in it. Later, when 
political tensions were at their height, it may have seemed prudent to try to develop a 
legal case against the Committee using this suggestive data. In any event, Hoover's 
effort to monitor and then provide political intelligence to administration officials on 
the America First Committee amidst and following the Lend -Lease debate, his 
providing of unsolicited reports on the alleged sources of the Committee's funds, his 
attempt to link the committee to fascist elements or foreign governments, and his 
interest in groups somehow linked to the Committee illustrates the FBI director's 
pragmatism. During the isolationist- interventionist foreign policy debate he 
provided the administration with information that fed into the political interests of 
the president while working to develop legal cases against the president's anti - 
interventionist political opponents. 
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SAC El Paso to FBI HQ, 4 June 1942, FBI 100 -4712 -467; report, SAC Richmond to FBI HQ, 2 June 
1942, FBI 100 -4712 -408; report, SAC Philadelphia to FBI HQ, 6 June 1942, FBI 100- 4712 -409; 
report, SAC Buffalo to FBI HQ, 2 June 1942, FBI 100- 4712 -410; report, SAC Omaha to FBI HQ, 12 
June 1942, FBI 100 -4712 -419; report, SAC Portland to FBI HQ, 5 June 1942, FBI 100- 4712 -420; 
report, SAC Butte to FBI HQ, 13 June 1942, FBI 100- 4712 -427; report, SAC Kansas City to FBI HQ, 
22 June 1942, FBI 100 -4712 -428; report, SAC Detroit to FBI HQ, 22 June 1942, FBI 100- 4712 -429; 
report, SAC San Diego to FBI HQ, 25 June 1942, FBI 100- 4712 -432; report, SAC Miami to FBI HQ, 
23 June 1942, FBI 100 -4712 -433; report, SAC Milwaukee to FBI HQ, 6 July 1942, FBI 100 -4712- 
440; report, SAC Baltimore to FBI HQ, 8 July 1942, FBI 100- 4712 -442; report, SAC New York to 
FBI HQ, 11 July 1942, FBI 100- 4712 -443; report, SAC Pittsburgh to FBI HQ, 1 September 1942, 
FBI 100 -4712 -458; report, SAC Salt Lake City to FBI HQ, 12 September 1942, FBI 100 -4712 -459; 
report, SAC Des Moines to FBI HQ, FBI 100 -4712 -460; report, SAC Salt Lake City to FBI HQ, 22 
September 1942, FBI 100- 4712 -462; report, SAC De Moines to FBI HQ, 28 September 1942, FBI 
100- 4712 -463; report, SAC Birmingham to FBI HQ, 1 October 1942, FBI 100 -4712 -465; report, 
SAC Cleveland to FBI HQ, 9 October 1942, FBI 100 -4712 -466; report, SAC San Diego to FBI HQ, 3 
October 1942, FBI 100- 4712 -467; report, SAC Sioux Falls to FBI HQ, 15 October 1942, FBI 100- 
4712 -470; report, SAC Indianapolis to FBI HQ, 14 October 1942, FBI 100- 4712 -471. 
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CHAPTER 5 
FBI Surveillance of Congressional Anti- interventionists: Burton Wheeler, 
Hamilton Fish, and Gerald Nye. 
J. Edgar Hoover's FBI took an interest in the political activities of prominent 
anti -interventionist congressmen and senators during the foreign policy debate of 
1939 -1941. While there were many legislators who caught the FBI's interest - 
insofar as Hoover could (and did) report their political activities to the White 
House -a select few in particular attracted focused FBI scrutiny. Republican 
Congressman Hamilton Fish of New York, Democratic Senator Burton Wheeler of 
Montana, and Republican Senator Gerald Nye of Nebraska represent the most 
important congressional anti -interventionists whom Bureau officials monitored. 
These three individuals are the focus of attention here because they were among the 
most influential "isolationists" in Congress and as such FBI officials monitored their 
personal and political activity to service White House political interests. 
Significantly, FBI interest in these legislators' anti -interventionist politics 
was limited compared with, for example, Charles Lindbergh and the America First 
Committee. Hoover was particularly careful when investigating Wheeler, Fish, and 
Nye because they were powerful and influential government officials. If an FBI 
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probe into the activities of important government officials had been discovered, 
Hoover's tenure as Bureau director would have become vulnerable. Yet if White 
House officials asked him to monitor or investigate the political activities of 
influential congressional anti -interventionists, Hoover, buttressed with an executive 
request, approved FBI investigations. Additionally, Hoover collected and filed 
information gathered in confidence about anti -interventionist legislators whether or 
not the White House had solicited it and, moreover, some of this information he 
forwarded to White House officials. 
During 1941, Hoover provided the White House with information concerning 
the general political activities of the anti -interventionist bloc of the United States 
Senate. His forwarding of such information to the White House increased during 
1941 because it was in that year that Lend -Lease became a central issue in the 
interventionist /anti -interventionist foreign policy debate. With the issue over aid- 
short-of-war dominant in Congress, Hoover catered to Roosevelt's political interests, 
acting as a significant source of information. 
On 21 February 1941, for example, Hoover reported to the White House that 
a "strictly confidential source" informed him that the Senate debate on Lend -Lease 
would "last for about two weeks or longer." Hoover also reported that eleven 
senators had "pledged themselves to filibuster in opposition to this Bill. "I In 
August, Hoover forwarded another "memorandum of a highly confidential 
information" to the White House concerning Senate anti -interventionists. This 
memorandum reported information about alleged attempts by some individuals "to 
influence members of the isolationist bloc in the Senate to acquiesce in the 
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Administration's foreign policy."2 A third memorandum Hoover forwarded to the 
White House, again in August, reported three pieces of information: "the attitude of 
certain members of the United States Senate regarding the expenditure of funds in 
behalf of the British under the Lend -Lease Act, the Congressional investigation 
regarding the use of cinema for propaganda purposes, and the current gasoline 
shortage. "3 In September, when Assistant Secretary of State Adolf Berle requested 
"any information which might have come to our [the FBI] attention concerning the 
attitude of Congressional groups toward the President's international relations or 
foreign policy," Hoover forwarded to him a confidential memorandum. The FBI 
memorandum reported that, according to FBI sources, the president had nothing to 
worry about from Congress until the next elections. At that point there would likely 
be "some influential opposition" to the administration's policy. This memorandum 
further observed that the Senate Appropriations Committee was growing 
increasingly concerned over how the British were spending Lend -Lease funds.4 
Roosevelt undoubtedly received from various sources many reports on the 
political activities of his anti -interventionist congressional opponents. The FBI's 
reports probably would not have been regarded as a unique information source. The 
FBI reports are significant, however, inasmuch as they do not reflect FBI officials' 
interest in criminal activity but an interest in servicing the administration's desire for 
political intelligence on its anti -interventionist critics. Far more important than the 
FBI's providing of general political information on the United States Senate was the 
FBI's investigation into certain members of that body and of the United States 
House of Representatives. The FBI's interest in Wheeler, Fish, and Nye 
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demonstrates Hoover's interest in developing information on Roosevelt's opposition 
that might be used to discredit them and, thereby, undermine their political 
influence. 
* * * 
Senator Burton K. Wheeler, a Democrat from Montana, was one of the 
president's greatest anti- interventionist critics and, despite not being a conservative, 
sided with the mostly conservative America First Committee to defeat Roosevelt's 
increasingly interventionist foreign policy. Wheeler was most aptly described as a 
western progressive politician. In 1932 he supported Roosevelt for president 
because "he is by far the most progressive" and thus viewed the New Yorker as the 
Democratic Party's "best bet.i5 After Roosevelt's election to the presidency, 
Wheeler supported the New Deal and consulted the president on legislative matters. 
This political alliance, however, began to fade especially after Roosevelt's 1937 
"court- packing" scheme and the increasing prominence of the foreign threat. By the 
start of the debate over intervention, historian Wayne Cole observed, no other 
senator was more prominent a critic of Roosevelt's foreign policy than Wheeler. 
The bitterness between the president and senator was great and is reflected in a 
comment Wheeler had made about Roosevelt's foreign policy in 1941. He referred 
to Roosevelt's Lend -Lease policy as "the New Deal's triple A" foreign policy -it 
will plow under every fourth American boy." The president responded to Wheeler's 
remarks saying that they were the "rottenest," most "dastardly," and "unpatriotic," 
thing he had ever heard.6 
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Because Wheeler was associated with the America First Committee -the 
Committee funded many of his speeches and rally appearances, and the senator's 
wife was a Committee member -FBI officials scrutinized his political activity. As a 
prominent critic of the administration, any information Hoover provided about 
Wheeler to the White House was taken with interest. But FBI officials had long had 
an interest in Senator Wheeler. During the Teapot Dome scandal of 1923 -24, 
Bureau agents (under Director William J. Burns) had attempted to discredit the 
trouble -making senator who had initiated a Senate inquiry into the activity of the 
Justice Department and Bureau of Investigation. By 1933, according to Wheeler, 
Hoover called on the senator in an effort to retain his position as FBI director in the 
new Roosevelt administration (see chapters one and two). In 1938, following the 
fallout from Roosevelt's so- called court- packing scheme, FBI Assistant Director 
Tamm noted in a memorandum (reflecting FBI officials' continued interest) that 
Senator Wheeler had lost his influence over Montana federal relief projects "as a 
disciplinary measure for his action in the Supreme Court fight." During the foreign 
policy debate of 1940 -41, moreover, FBI officials took an interest in the senator's 
anti -interventionist political activity as he opposed the president.? 
FBI officials long had been concerned with Wheeler's views of the FBI and 
their suspicions continued. In May 1940, an FBI agent clipped an article from the 
Philadelphia Inquirer that reported critical statements Wheeler had made about the 
FBI's character. Reacting negatively to President Roosevelt's 1940 proposal to 
transfer the Immigration Bureau back to the Justice Department, Wheeler had 
commented that the FBI was staffed by "a lot of cheap, two -by -four detectives." 
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Then in June, the SAC from Seattle reported that an anonymous caller had stated 
that Senator Wheeler had been critical of the FBI. The unidentified caller said that 
he had the ability to "shut Wheeler up" and inquired as to the Bureau's interest in 
this information. While the identity of the phone caller was never established, his 
call was reported to FBI headquarters and Hoover was advised about it. In May 
1941, the special agent in charge (SAC) of the Buffalo, New York, FBI office 
reported to Hoover that during an America First rally Senator Wheeler had made 
critical comments about the FBI. The SAC reported that Wheeler had "expressed an 
opinion that many U. S. citizens might hesitate to express their anti -war attitude 
because they are `afraid of the F.B.I. "'8 
In September 1940 Hoover received information that by 1941 had evolved 
into a far- reaching investigation involving Senators Wheeler, Nye, and 
Representative Fish. The FBI's New York City SAC reported that direct mail 
advertiser Henry Hoke, publisher of The Reporter of Direct Mail Advertising, had 
accused some senators and congressman of illegally distributing franked envelopes 
(congressmen had the right to mail speeches and other information to constituents 
postage -free). These envelopes, containing anti -interventionist literature, allegedly 
were then sent to German Americans who mailed them out en masse to influence the 
public. Hoke singled out the late Farmer -Labor Senator Ernest Lundeen of 
Minnesota, Democratic Senator Rush D. Holt of West Virginia, Senator Gerald Nye, 
Republican Representative J. Thorkelson of Montana, and Representative Hamilton 
Fish of using their franked envelopes in this manner. Hoover forwarded this 
information to the Justice Department's Neutrality Law Unit, and while at this time 
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it did not cause any great concern, by 1941 it evolved into a controversy for the anti - 
interventionist congressmen that suggested (by association) that they had links with 
German agents.9 
In October 1940, Hoover forwarded to the Justice Department a report 
containing information about the congressional frank and Senator Wheeler. The 
matter involved two -dozen pieces of mail bearing Senator Wheeler's frank that had 
been delivered to a post office in Manchester, Connecticut. This franked mail 
contained anti -interventionist literature, reported a clerk at the post office, that was 
addressed to persons of German descent in Manchester. At least one franked 
envelope was addressed to the leader of the local Bund organization. Hoover 
reported this incident to the Justice Department "in view of the fact that this 
information was officially reported to a representative of this Bureau." The FBI did 
not have jurisdiction to investigate a matter involving the mail, yet Hoover's 
reporting of it confirms his interest in reporting to the administration any derogatory 
information, even if unsubstantiated, about Roosevelt's critics. io 
Hoover forwarded political intelligence to senior administration officials in 
the White House, Treasury Department, and State Department that suggested (but 
did not prove) that Senator Wheeler had connections with the German embassy in 
Washington. The FBI director reported that the wife of a former German embassy 
counselor was preparing information for Senator Wheeler and Democratic Senator 
Millard Tydings about a statement Adolf Hitler had made on disarmament. Hoover 
included in his memorandum the observation that she claimed to be "working with 
Mrs. Wheeler on this `America First' organization." This information, though 
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uncorroborated, suggested to senior administration officials that Wheeler and other 
anti -interventionist foreign policy critics had ties with Nazi Germany. Such 
information lent credence to popular perceptions that anti -interventionists were 
subversives and may have bolstered this view among officials in the White House. 
By providing such unsubstantiated information, Hoover was placed in good stead 
with the administration." 
By 1941, Senator Wheeler again became associated with the franking issue, 
and this time it had far- reaching political implications. The investigation involved a 
German propaganda scheme, utilizing the congressional frank, to increase 
isolationist sentiment. While the FBI did not have investigative jurisdiction, it 
nevertheless collected information about the franking issue and forwarded it to the 
Justice Department. The FBI's investigation started first with Senator Wheeler, then 
with Senator Nye and, more significantly, with Representative Hamilton Fish. 
While the franking controversy only blossomed into a national issue between 
interventionists and anti -interventionists in the summer of 1941, Senator Wheeler's 
name had been associated, as already shown, with franking misuse since late 1940. 
In February 1941 Wheeler took steps to determine who had misused his frank. 
Wheeler contacted Hoover with two concerns. He forwarded to Hoover a set of 
letters he had received from the German Friend Society of Houston that claimed the 
senator was a Nazi agent. Wheeler requested an FBI investigation because he 
thought the letters were either written "by a pro -Nazi" or in an effort to embarrass 
him. (Wheeler's motive in forwarding this information to Hoover might have been 
an effort to counter administration beliefs that Wheeler was sympathetic to or a dupe 
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of the Nazis.) Wheeler's second concern regarded the frank. He reported to Hoover 
that someone had used his frank, without his knowledge, to mail petitions from an 
organization called American Defenders. Wheeler discovered the use of his frank 
when the post office had returned a misaddressed letter to his office. Wheeler told 
Hoover that he was "extremely anxious to ascertain whether someone is using my 
franked envelopes illegally, and whether someone is using my name in this 
connection. "12 
Hoover referred Wheeler's complaint to Lawrence Smith of the Justice 
Department's Neutrality Laws Unit. Smith responded that the alleged misuse of a 
congressional frank fell under the jurisdiction of the Post Office Department and not 
the FBI. If Wheeler's franked envelopes had been stolen from his congressional 
office, Smith continued, the matter was then one for the Washington, D.C., 
metropolitan police. Hoover relayed these details to Wheeler, and there appeared to 
have been no follow -up investigation involving Senator Wheeler, but just weeks 
later Wheeler's name again appeared in FBI documents regarding the misuse of his 
frank.13 
The FBI's SAC in El Paso reported to Hoover that a local resident had 
reportedly received from Senator Wheeler "a large box of envelopes bearing 
government franks, and not addressed." The SAC reported that each franked 
envelope contained a speech and signed letter from Wheeler that denounced 
Roosevelt's Lend -Lease bill and suggested the president sought dictatorial powers. 
The recipient of these franked envelopes apparently had addressed and mailed them 
to citizens of Clayton, New Mexico, which the FBI's informant believed had 
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violated postal codes. Moreover, the informant demanded an FBI investigation 
because the literature from Wheeler was "un- American" and because the woman 
who had addressed the franked envelopes was "outspoken in her sympathy for 
Germany." The informant also claimed that Senator Wheeler had sent similar 
unaddressed, franked envelopes and literature to others. When the informant was 
told that the FBI had no investigative authority, the informant threatened to write 
Senator Carol Hatch (Democratic senator from New Mexico who sat on the 
Judiciary Committee) to demand an FBI investigation. When Hatch's name was 
invoked, Hoover reported the incident to the Justice Department. How it was 
resolved is not recorded in extant FBI documents, yet Senator Wheeler's name 
nevertheless continued to be associated with franking abuses.14 
By the late spring and early summer of 1941, the franking issue had evolved 
from isolated incidents into a national political issue. At that time, direct -mail 
advertiser Henry Hoke had written Senator Wheeler's office accusing him of 
misusing his congressional frank. Hoke wrote a long brief that outlined Wheeler's 
misdeeds and accused him of "aiding the Nazi plan by allowing the use of Ethel 
franking privilege for the dissemination of disruptive propaganda." Wheeler 
responded to the charge by writing the man who had delivered Hoke's letter to him, 
A. H. Becker of Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Wheeler denied that he had sent anything 
other than his own speeches under his frank and he questioned why Hoke had 
ignored the interventionists' use of congressional frank.'5 
Hoke responded by writing Wheeler directly, addressing each point the 
senator had made to Becker. But Hoke was not content to restrict his concerns about 
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Wheeler through personal correspondence. On 24 July Hoke published a 
condemnation of Wheeler, entitled "War in the Mails." The article outlined in detail 
Wheeler's alleged misuse of his frank.16 When the interventionist Fight For 
Freedom Committee learned of the charges they also attacked Senator Wheeler and 
wrote the postmaster general's office to request the franking privilege be limited.17 
In June, Detroit News reporter Blair Moody telephoned FBI headquarters to 
learn if the FBI had investigated Wheeler's abuse of the congressional frank. 
Moody had probably learned of the franking issue from Hoke who had widely 
publicized it. Because FBI officials had no jurisdiction to investigate the matter, 
Assistant Director Clyde Tolson reported to Hoover "that I could very definitely tell 
him that no such investigation is being made by this Bureau." Tolson could make 
this claim as the Bureau only collected information about the franking abuse and did 
not, technically, conduct an official FBI investigation.' s 
The issue became more acrimonious when on 24 July Secretary of War 
Henry Stimson learned that several active -duty soldiers had received postcards from 
Senator Wheeler urging them to write the president to demand he avoid war. 
Stimson consulted Roosevelt on issuing a press statement about the postcards, and 
then publicly stated that Wheeler had come "very near the line of subversive 
activities against the United States, if not treason. "19 Wheeler responded to the 
charge on 28 July and denied that he had attempted to influence the opinions of 
American soldiers. He explained that over a million franked postcards had been sent 
to a commercial mailing list and that only three postcards mistakenly had been 
mailed to the soldiers. Realizing his error, Stimson publicly apologized to the 
171 
senator, but the controversy did not end. Wheeler's involvement might have ended, 
but the franking -abuse issue shifted to Senator Gerald Nye and Congressman 
Hamilton Fish.20 
An FBI informant, who had close ties to Senator Nye, reported on 8 October 
1941 that the senator said the widespread use of the congressional frank "was 
perfectly regular; that the franking has been done by everyone and there is no 
exception here." The informant also reported Nye's opinions regarding Roosevelt's 
"determination . . . to get into war." Due to the source and sensitivity of this 
political intelligence FBI Assistant Director Edward Tamm concluded that "this info 
should not be transmitted outside [of the] Bureau." (The FBI document reporting 
this information, furthermore, was filed in J. Edgar Hoover's secret office file.)21 
On 13 October 1941 Hoover wrote Attorney General Biddle that another informant 
reported that Senator Nye had been sending a great deal of franked mail to people 
beyond his constituency. While the informant did not know all the details, he 
thought it was serious enough to report to the FBI. Hoover, in light of the 
developing franking abuse story, forwarded the information to the Justice 
Department.22 
Interventionists initially believed prominent anti -interventionist legislators 
had abused their franking privilege while anti -interventionists denied that they had 
misused their frank in a way that aided Axis propaganda. In reality, German 
propagandists had been involved in a scheme to utilize the congressional frank. On 
29 July 1941, the German chargé d'affaires in Washington reported to the German 
Foreign Ministry that: 
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In recent months the mass dispatch of postcards has proved to be 
particularly effective as a propaganda action which can be carried out very 
quickly and suddenly and which is to be directed at as large a group of 
persons as possible who do not have much intellectual training. Therefore 
through the agency of the [Embassy] press officer the mailing of about a 
dozen cards, each in 100,000 -in words a hundred thousand -to a million 
copies has been organized and financed. They contained sarcastic attacks on 
Roosevelt and the warmongering members of his Cabinet, reminders of his 
campaign promise to keep America out of war, a reference to the American 
blood sacrifices in the World War, an appeal to American mothers, and they 
asked recipients to write or telegraph in this sense to their representatives in 
Congress and the White House. As all of the postcards had the letterhead of 
the American Congress or of the members of Congress concerned and 
contained mainly material which was taken from purely American sources 
and also appeared in one form or other in the official "Congressional 
Record", our hand was not in any way recognizable. Alarmed by the success 
of this campaign of postcards, the interventionist press is already starting to 
attack their being sent through Congress, but so far without success.23 
The chargé d'affaires further reported that Senator Burton K. Wheeler had been 
targeted. He also reported the argument between Secretary Stimson and Wheeler as 
reflecting the successful cultivation of infighting.24 
George Sylvester Viereck led the German black propaganda operation. 
Viereck was born in Germany and became a naturalized United States citizen in 
1901, yet he retained strong Teutonic sympathies. During the First World War he 
received support from the Imperial German government to distribute pro -German 
propaganda. With commencement of the Second World War, Viereck registered 
himself with the State Department as a paid agent of the German government, as 
was required by the 1940 Foreign Agents Registration Act. Viereck received 
financial backing through the German Library of Information, which served as a 
propaganda agency of the German government, and edited their periodical, Facts in 
Review.25 
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Viereck moved from New York City to Washington, D. C., in early 1940 the 
better to carry out his propaganda duties. Viereck then found employment as 
speechwriter in the office of anti -interventionist Senator Ernest Lundeen. After the 
senator was killed in a plane crash later that year, Viereck found employment with 
congressman Hamilton Fish. It was from this position that the German agent was 
able to manipulate the congressional frank for his own uses.26 
Viereck was introduced in July 1940 to George Hill, a forty-five- year -old 
clerk who worked in Fish's congressional office. Beginning his covert relationship 
with the clerk, Viereck told Hill that he wanted to use Fish's frank to have one of 
Senator Lundeen's speeches mailed to constituents because Lundeen's office was 
unable to handle the large amount of speech reprints. From this initial recruitment 
of Hill, Viereck manipulated Fish to have anti -interventionist literature distributed 
more widely than a lone senator or congressman could have done on his own. The 
German plan was to support the anti -interventionist political position because it 
sought to keep America from contributing to the war effort. But Viereck was 
circumspect in his relationship with Hill. To keep Congressman Fish or anyone else 
from discovering the covert relationship, Viereck kept in contact with George Hill 
via a third party, an anti -interventionist publicist named Prescott Dennett.27 
Dennett was the treasurer of the Make Europe Pay War Debts Committee, an 
organization that had among its leading members Senator Lundeen and Senator 
Robert Reynolds of North Carolina. Viereck gathered anti -interventionist literature 
that he believed would best sway Americans from advocating intervention and 
forwarded it to Dennett's office where it was sent to George Hill. Hill then worked 
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to have the material inserted into the Congressional Record, ordered thousands of 
reprints of the items (including anti -interventionist speeches made in Congress), and 
sent them back to Dennett in franked envelopes. Dennett was then able to mail the 
literature out to whomever he wished using Fish's postage -free congressional frank. 
Among the organizations that unwittingly distributed Viereck's propaganda was the 
America First Committee.28 
While the German propaganda effort was creative, it was minimally 
successful and limited. All Viereck managed to accomplish was a wider distribution 
of anti -interventionist literature which, in any event, did not cause any major 
reassessment of Americans' view of the Allies. Besides, since late 1940 the 
America First Committee had already been conducting a much larger and well - 
organized effort to prevent American intervention in the European war. 
Nevertheless, the revelation of a link between German propagandists and leading 
anti -interventionists, no matter if the anti -interventionists were unsuspecting, was a 
boon to interventionist groups like the Fight For Freedom Committee. Such groups 
would use the event to discredit the anti -interventionists by accusing them of being 
Nazi dupes. The franking abuse controversy only confirmed to some that the anti - 
interventionist movement was subversive. 
In September 1941, a federal grand jury, led by prosecutor William Maloney, 
began an investigation into German propaganda and "other subversive elements" in 
the United States. Simultaneously, Washington Post reporter Dillard Stokes took up 
the matter of the congressional frank, which had been publicized by interventionist 
groups. He revealed the link between Dennett's office and Congressman Fish's 
175 
office as well as the fact that some of the franked mail had been sent to America 
First. The increased publicity led police to seize franked mail from the Washington 
America First chapter on 25 September for use in the grand jury probe. Thereafter, 
the propaganda machine between Viereck, Dennett, and Hill became public.29 
Because Congressman Hamilton Fish had been linked to Viereck's 
propaganda machine through his clerk, George Hill, both were called to testify 
before the federal grand jury. Hill, when interviewed, lied about his connection with 
Viereck and his delivery of franked mail sacks. He was prosecuted in early 1942 for 
perjury and received a sentence of two to six years in prison. George Viereck was 
convicted for not revealing the full extent of his activities to the State Department 
under the provisions of the Foreign Agents Registration Act. Fish was asked to 
testify before the grand jury but refused on the grounds of congressional immunity, 
forcing the prosecutors to subpoena him. The result of this was another propaganda 
boon for the Fight For Freedom Committee who publicly asked Fish why he refused 
to offer testimony, suggesting he had something to hide. When the congressman 
finally testified he revealed nothing of importance to the investigation except his 
ignorance of the goings on in his congressional office. While the FBI had no 
jurisdiction in the investigation, it did monitor the grand jury investigation. The 
Justice Department's Criminal Division requested Hoover provide information 
regarding Hamilton Fish for use in Maloney's probe.3° 
The reluctance of the FBI to take part in the franking privilege investigation 
and instead remain content to collect information about it may go beyond 
jurisdictional issues. The facts are not entirely clear, but it appears that Hoover and 
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William Maloney, the federal prosecutor in the franking abuse case, had personal 
differences. Their conflict seems to have stemmed from Maloney having made 
critical comments about Hoover for not taking more of a role in the case. Hoover 
resented the implication, which apparently was repeated to news reporters Drew 
Pearson and George Allen and broadcast nationwide, and thereafter refused to assist 
Maloney. Maloney phoned Hoover, stating that his comment had been taken out of 
context and that he only wanted the FBI in on the case. He said that he resented the 
misunderstanding and wanted to rectify their differences. Hoover, however, wrote: 
"It is too late now for me to deal with Maloney on this. He has gone too far & done 
irreparable harm to the FBI. He has talked and criticized the Bureau to parties 
outside of the Dept. & his statements are absolute lies." Hoover ordered Assistant 
Director Tamm "to make certain that we do everything proper to thoroughly handle 
all aspects of this case so as not to give this whelp any real basis for howling." This 
rift seems to explain why the FBI did not take more interest in the case. Always 
sensitive about any derogatory comments about himself or the FBI, Hoover often 
refused to cooperate with individuals who publicly criticized or opposed his 
Bureau.31 
At several other points, concerned Americans solicited the FBI to take action 
against Senator Wheeler for his opposition to White House foreign policy. (No one 
ever wrote the FBI in support of Wheeler.) Hoover forwarded such requests to his 
superiors despite their unsubstantiated nature. The forwarding of such data 
contributed to a negative view of the senator and his political dissent. In late July 
1941, for example, the Women's Roosevelt Democratic Club of Los Angeles wrote 
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the FBI director accusing Wheeler of having taken a $100,000 bribe when he 
worked as a United States district attorney in Montana following the First World 
War. (This resurrected the charge made against Wheeler in the 1920s when 
Attorney General Daugherty sought to discredit him.) The group claimed Wheeler 
had accepted the bribe in return for dismissing charges of white slave trafficking. 
Intent on pressing the charge, in addition to writing Hoover the women's group also 
sent a telegram to the attorney general demanding a prosecution on the basis that 
"Senator Wheeler's propaganda to our soldiers foments a dangerous and improper 
attitude in our armed forces, imperiling their morale." Hoover forwarded this 
information to the Justice Department seeking direction. In response, Assistant to 
the Attorney General Matthew McGuire wrote: "In view of the fact that the [bribery] 
charge would be barred by the Statute of Limitations, no investigation of the matter 
should be undertaken. "32 
Throughout 1941, following passage of Lend -Lease, Senator Wheeler and 
other prominent congressional anti -interventionists toured the United States under 
the auspices of the America First Committee giving speeches to mobilize anti - 
interventionist sentiment. The attorney general, in September, became interested in 
an America First Committee rally in Los Angeles where Senator Wheeler was to 
speak. Interested in how the crowd reacted to Wheeler's speech Biddle requested 
that FBI agents monitor the event. Hoover dispatched agents to the rally and 
reported to the attorney general and the White House that the crowd "was very 
sympathetic and friendly toward the America First Committee and Senator 
Wheeler. "33 
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In late December 1941, Hoover received an unsolicited document that 
portrayed Wheeler as a subversive. This document was a legal brief prepared by the 
New York law firm of Phillips, Nizer, Benjamin, and Krim that accused the senator 
of having accepted $25,000 from German diplomats to oppose American 
intervention. Wheeler was also accused of violating the 1917 Espionage Act for 
revealing in July the government's plans to occupy Iceland. Lastly, the document 
accused the senator, as many others by this point, of illegally using his congressional 
frank to distribute information. Again, Hoover forwarded the document to Justice 
Department for their attention.34 
While the documentation is scant, it appears that by February 1942 Attorney 
General Biddle had at least considered the charges as laid out in the legal brief, 
particularly the accusation of Wheeler's having accepted German funds. Biddle 
requested Hoover's opinion as to whether the department should "make a further 
investigation." Hoover's reply is not contained in Wheeler's FBI file, but a 
document dated 28 February to Wendell Berge, head of the Justice Department's 
Criminal Division, confirms that Berge had asked Hoover if the FBI had any 
information or made any inquiry regarding the various charges. Hoover responded 
that the FBI had not made an investigation into the charges. In any event, the 
language employed by administration officials suggests that they regarded Wheeler 
as subversive and acting, if unwittingly, at the behest of the German government.35 
While Hoover forwarded unsolicited political intelligence reports to the 
White House and Justice Department (for some reports see chapter four), in at least 
one instance the White House requested information from the FBI regarding 
179 
Wheeler. The White House's interest centered on some off -the- record remarks 
Wheeler had made on 14 January 1942 to Milwaukee Journal reporter Laurence C. 
Eklund. Wheeler made comments that, coming so soon after the Japanese attack on 
Pearl Harbor, concerned some. Wheeler claimed during an interview that the 
disaster in Hawaii was far worse than the administration had revealed, and that the 
administration was too receptive to British influence. Wheeler also had referred to 
the secretary of the navy, Frank Knox, as a "big blatherskite " -a foolishly speaking 
person. Disturbed by the comments, the editor of the Milwaukee Journal wrote the 
White House. William J. Donovan, director of the Office of Coordinator of 
Information, also alerted the president to Wheeler's words as well as Frank Knox, 
who commented to Roosevelt: "It constitutes the most shockingly reckless, 
treasonable talk that I have ever seen. "36 
On 26 January Stephen Early, Roosevelt's secretary, wrote Hoover asking 
him to verify the veracity of the letter from the Milwaukee Journal to determine if 
Wheeler's remarks were accurately reported, and whether anyone else could verify 
the senator's comments. Early noted that "we would like very much to know" these 
facts and he requested an FBI "report. "37 
Pursuant to the White House request, Hoover ordered FBI agents to verify 
the requested information. FBI agents in Milwaukee interviewed the newspaper 
staff. FBI Assistant Director D. Milton Ladd reported to Hoover that in addition to 
confirming the veracity of the report on Wheeler's alleged remarks, it was learned 
that Wheeler had also "rambled on at great length in a very bitter manner against the 
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President, Secretary Knox, and England to the extent that Eklund finally had to 
terminate the interview himself. "38 
Hoover reported this information to Early on 3 February but added to Ladd's 
comments, which were included in the memorandum: "the Senator's feelings [about 
the president, Knox, and Great Britain] were apparent by his facial expressions as 
well as his remarks. "39 What the White House did with this information is unknown. 
Burton Wheeler's FBI file, however, contains further documents regarding this 
exchange of information but the FBI has withheld them -some are internal FBI 
memoranda, one a document originating with the Criminal Division of the Justice 
Department, and 14 pages withheld in their entirety.40 What information is 
contained in these cryptic documents is unknown and, until they are made public, 
the full extent of the FBI's and administration's interest in this information will 
remain unknown. We can conclude, however, that the White House was interested 
in the political statements of a leading anti -interventionist senator and Hoover 
provided such information to the White House. This sharing of political intelligence 
confirms Hoover's interest in satisfying the political desires of the White House. 
The best way to understand the FBI's monitoring of Senator Burton Wheeler 
is to examine it in comparison with that of other prominent anti -interventionists. 
Whereas Charles Lindbergh, for example, was the most prominent, popular, and 
controversial of Roosevelt's anti -interventionist opponents, and thus subject to much 
public vituperation, Wheeler was more circumspect. The senator was, without 
doubt, a leading and important anti -interventionist but he was also in a position of 
power and influence. He did not make the same controversial statements as 
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Lindbergh had that focused public attention on his every word, nor did he have the 
widely celebrated and popular background as the famous aviator. This explains why 
Hoover only thoroughly investigated Wheeler's activities if he had a White House 
solicitation. 
Significantly Wheeler had a past political relationship with Hoover. During 
the aftermath of the 1919 -20 Red Scare and Teapot Dome scandal, Wheeler was at 
the forefront in investigating the Justice Department and the Bureau. Wheeler was 
well aware of Hoover's activities as head of the General Intelligence Division and its 
activities in the mass round -up and violation of many people's civil liberties. With 
this in mind, Hoover probably held back in his investigation of Wheeler, not 
pursuing it with the elan he had with Lindbergh. At the time, Hoover did not yet 
hold the autonomy and influence that would make him untouchable; only with the 
Cold War and successive presidents would he create such a context in which to 
operate. 
* * * 
Proponents of intervention most criticized Representative Hamilton Fish 
during the Great Debate of 1940 -41 for his association with George Hill and, by 
implication, George Viereck. While the FBI did not have jurisdiction in the matter 
of the franking privilege controversy or have any desire to work with the prosecutor, 
it had investigated the prominent and vocal congressman for other suspicious 
activities. FBI agents monitored Fish's political activity, tried to develop derogatory 
information on the congressman, and forwarded political intelligence to the 
administration to service its political interests. 
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Hamilton Fish was a Republican congressman representing President 
Roosevelt's home congressional district in the United States House of 
Representatives. In many ways he was Roosevelt's political nemesis -most 
significant was the fact that he was an anti -interventionist Republican operating out 
of the president's home district. Both were from distinguished patrician families in 
the Hudson River valley. His great grandfather, Nicholas Fish, served as a colonel 
in the Revolutionary War and allied himself with Alexander Hamilton. Fish was 
also the grandson of President Ulysses S. Grant's distinguished secretary of state - 
and shared his name -whose family long had involved themselves in politics. 
Congressman Fish, also like Roosevelt, had attended Harvard University where he 
studied law (Roosevelt later studied law at Columbia), and graduated at the top of 
his class (Roosevelt did not). During the First World War he served as a company 
commander of the 369th Infantry Regiment, a unit of African Americans (Roosevelt 
served as assistant secretary of the navy). For his war service he won the Silver Star 
and French Croix de Guerre. In politics, Fish the Republican and Roosevelt the 
Democrat were at opposite ends.41 
In 1919 Fish was elected to Congress and, pártly as a result of his service 
with an African -American military unit, he garnered limited support among the 
minority population. Fish used this constituency to support some minority interests 
by advocating anti- lynching legislation and the erecting of battle monuments to 
commemorate the contribution of black soldiers. Having broad interests in war 
veterans, Fish advocated and supported the creation of the American Legion. But he 
was best known during the 1930s for chairing a congressional committee that 
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investigated communist propaganda in the United States, the so- called Fish 
Committee. A staunch anti -Communist, Fish opposed the Roosevelt administration 
in its recognition of the Soviet Union.42 
FBI officials took interest, significantly, in Fish's opposition to 
administration foreign policy, particularly as he served as the ranking minority 
member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. From the start, Fish opposed 
Franklin Roosevelt as president. He opposed the New Deal because of "its socialist 
nature" and he perceived dangers in Roosevelt's centralization of presidential power 
both as regards the New Deal and foreign policy. As the congressman later wrote in 
his memoirs: "Roosevelt, I believed, was starting us down the road to socialism and 
dictatorship. "43 
An FBI summary memorandum reflects FBI officials' interest in Fish's 
foreign policy position: "A brief glance at his voting record on foreign policy 
issues," the memorandum records, "indicates his feelings in this regard and reflects 
his isolationist trend of thought." This memorandum listed Fish's opposition to 
foreign policy legislation from military appropriations in 1938 to Lend -Lease and 
conscription, none of which had anything to do with a violation of any federal 
statute and thereby justifying FBI interest. Perhaps best reflecting FBI officials' 
view of those who opposed administration policy, particularly the Lend -Lease Bill 
which marked the peak of the Great Debate between anti -interventionists and 
Roosevelt, this summary memorandum focused particularly on Fish's view of Lend - 
Lease: 
On another occasion he referred to the Lend -Lease Bill as `a 
dictatorship -war -bankruptcy bill...a slick device to further regiment 
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America...the betrayal of the Constitutional power.' He claimed the bill 
would be `the death knell of Republican Government and virtually the end of 
Congress.'44 
FBI officials included other political intelligence about Fish in this summary 
memorandum. They took careful note of Fish's connections with the Committee to 
Keep America Out of Foreign Wars and the America First Committee. His various 
anti -interventionist comments made at rallies or in print before either of these 
committees was noted. FBI officials also noted each instance when Fish's name was 
printed or one of his comments was reported in the German- language newspaper 
Deutscher Weckruf and Beobachter or other radical publications. This FBI's 
summary memorandum confirms that FBI officials had an interest in the political 
activities of congressman Fish as he was a prominent and influential opponent to the 
administration's foreign policy.45 
In May 1942, during off -year elections and still concerned about the anti - 
interventionist Fish, the White House learned of some political gossip regarding him 
and requested an FBI investigation. In Fish's congressional district a committee was 
organized to oppose his re- election, headed by Mrs. Vanderbilt Webb from Garrison, 
New York. After a discussion with Webb, Franklin A. Schriver of Middletown, 
New York, wrote presidential secretary Edwin Watson informing him that Fish had 
received and endorsed checks amounting to several hundred thousand dollars under 
suspicious circumstances. Watson directed the unsubstantiated information to 
Hoover who ordered an investigation. FBI agents interviewed Mrs. Webb as well 
as her confidant, Henry Hoke (who had publicized the franking- privilege abuse 
charges). Mrs. Webb reported that she learned that Fish had accepted two checks 
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totaling some three thousand dollars from a German caviar retailer named Sturm. 
FBI agents also interviewed Hoke who added that Fish had accepted checks in 1940 
totaling $2,500 from the Romanoff Caviar Company. But, Hoke added, these 
checks were in the possession of the Treasury Department "in connection with an 
income tax violation. "46 
When reporting back to the White House, Hoover advised that the Bureau's 
investigation of the caviar company "is being afforded vigorous attention." The FBI 
director noted that G. F. Hansen -Sturm, the caviar businessman, had discussed 
neutrality issues with Hamilton Fish and, moreover, had requested that the 
congressman send five thousand copies of a speech to his business associate, 
Ferdinand Hansen. After Viereck's use of Fish's frank to spread anti -interventionist 
literature, Hoover regarded this connection with Fish as suspicious. He ordered an 
investigation of those connected with the caviar company "in connection with a 
violation of the Act of 1938 as amended [Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1940] 
requiring the registration of agents of foreign principals." Hoover advised that "in 
the event additional information deemed of interest to the President is developed, it 
will be called to your attention. "47 
FBI officials then sought to develop the case to provide the White House, 
even after Pearl Harbor and the dismemberment of the anti -interventionist bloc, with 
political intelligence on the associations of his prominent critics. Meantime, 
Congressman Fish had learned of these charges and subsequent FBI questioning of 
Webb. Fish also had learned that "some FBI man had knowledge of, or had shown 
some checks" to one of his constituents. Fish phoned Assistant to the Director 
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Edward Tamm inquiring whether FBI officials "knew anything about the matter." 
Tamm told Fish that he would look into the matter. Returning Fish's call, Tamm 
informed the congressman that the FBI had "no information about any such checks 
in the amounts or any similar amounts to those he mentioned and have been 
conducting no investigation." Tamm suggested to Fish that people often confuse 
other federal investigative agencies with the FBI and that he should check with those 
bodies. Fish, nevertheless, explained to Tamm that "the check was a forgery if it 
existed, and it was put out for political purposes. "48 
Tamm might have denied that FBI agents had investigated the matter, but 
one month prior Hoover had sent a personal and confidential letter to the White 
House specifically about these checks. Given the sensitivity of the investigation, 
Tamm refused to acknowledge the Bureau's investigation of Fish, particularly as it 
(and Hoover's forwarding of information to the White House) occurred during an 
election year. What most interested FBI officials, however, was whether, in fact, an 
FBI agent had revealed FBI interest in Fish's checks or, even worse, had shown 
them to one of Fish's constituents. Tamm and Assistant Director D. Milton Ladd 
inquired with the FBI's New York field office and Albany field office about the 
matter. The Albany field office reported no knowledge of the incident but the New 
York field office reported its involvement in the investigation. Significant portions 
of Tamm's memorandum have been redacted by the FBI and do not reveal what the 
field office reported. In any event, the matter illustrates the Bureau's interest in 
servicing White House requests for political intelligence and their concern about 
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keeping these efforts from the public, especially from the president's congressional 
opposition.49 
In August 1942, FBI officials again focused on Fish's political activities 
involving a cash payment but also connections to a right -wing foreign dictator. On 6 
August the Washington Post reported that Congressman Fish had received a 
payment of $25,000 from General Rafael Trujillo, the right -wing military dictator of 
the Dominican Republic. According to the Post, Fish had received this money in 
July 1939 but had only declared $22,000 on his income tax return and thereby 
committed income tax evasion. The newspaper further reported that Fish had 
received some of the money directly and some in the form of oil stocks.5° 
FBI Assistant Director Ladd advised Hoover when the Washington Post 
story broke that no information concerning the payment existed in FBI files. Ladd 
ordered an expedited and "complete survey" of FBI information concerning Fish and 
promised Hoover a report. Ladd eventually reported that the FBI had no information 
relating to the payment in its files.51 
Meanwhile, Fish responded to the Washington Post's story stating that the 
payment from Trujillo was a professional fee for handling an oil- speculation deal 
and that by law he was not required to claim the money on his 1939 tax return. Fish 
explained that he had lost the money in oil stocks and had returned the remainder to 
Trujillo. Fish also denied having been under Internal Revenue Bureau 
investigation.52 
What seemed to interest FBI officials most, however, was the relationship 
between Fish and Trujillo. Coming so soon after the Viereck -Hill franking 
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controversy and popular notions that anti -interventionists -in particular Hamilton 
Fish -were themselves fascists or dupes of the Nazis, the fact that Fish had a 
relationship with Trujillo, a right -wing foreign dictator, concerned high -level 
government officials. FBI officials learned that Fish had visited the Dominican 
Republic as part of a congressional goodwill visit in March 1939. Then in July 
1939 -when the payment to Fish had occurred- Trujillo visited the United States, 
as a private citizen, and was feted by the Pan- American Society in New York City. 
Hamilton Fish served as the principal speaker at this banquet and, according to FBI 
officials, had said: "General, you have created a golden age for your country...and, 
as I am proud to repeat at this time to a United States audience, you will go down in 
the history of your country as a builder greater than all the Spanish Conquistadores 
together." Though the comment was made in 1939, by 1942 it had taken on new 
significance to FBI officials.53 
Assistant Director Ladd prepared a summary memorandum on Fish "as of 
possible interest to you [Hoover] and other Bureau officials, and for the purposes of 
future reference." FBI officials' main interest, the memorandum confirms, was the 
cash payment Trujillo had made to Fish. In another cryptic FBI memorandum - 
large portions of which have been redacted under the provisions of the FOIA- 
Tamm reported that the New York FBI field office was due to report on Fish and 
Trujillo. The information probably had to do with Trujillo's visit to New York City 
in 1939 and Fish's meeting with him there. Tamm wrote that the information would 
be developed immediately "in order that any further information in this case may be 
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immediately brought to the attention of the White House officials." By 1942 Hoover 
kept the White House well informed as to Fish's political activities. 54 
There is no indication that the White House had solicited any of this 
information about Fish from the FBI, but it had received related information from 
Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles. Welles informed Roosevelt about Trujillo 
and Fish on 27 July before the Washington Post story had been published. 
Apparently, the federal grand jury that had examined Fish's connection to the 
franking case had come across information about Trujillo's payments to Fish. 
Maloney, the federal prosecutor handling the case, brought the information to 
Assistant Secretary of State Adolf Berle's attention as it had to do with money 
Trujillo had received from a German source (which turned out to be nothing more 
than a business transaction) which Trujillo had then paid to Fish. Berle concluded 
there had been no wrongdoing, but Under Secretary of State Welles nonetheless 
forwarded Berle's memorandum about Trujillo and Fish to the president. This, 
perhaps, satisfied the president's interest in Fish and he thereby did not request an 
FBI inquiry." 
It is interesting to note that in 1951 Fish learned from a friend that the Justice 
Department had listed him as a fascist in the 1930s/40s. Concerned over these 
allegations during the height of McCarthyism and what information the FBI might 
have on him -Fish considered himself a strong anti-Communist-the former 
congressman visited FBI headquarters to request access to his file. FBI official L. L. 
Laughlin interviewed Fish, advising him that FBI files were confidential and 
therefore not open to external review. While not permitted to view his FBI file, Fish 
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offered further details about the controversy with Trujillo. According to Fish, 
Internal Revenue investigators had approached him and claimed that he had violated 
the law by not declaring the Trujillo checks on his income tax return. Fish stated 
that he eventually convinced the investigators that no law had been broken but he 
concluded that the Internal Revenue Bureau's investigation was nothing but a 
Roosevelt administration effort to "get him." 56 
In late summer 1942, the White House asked Hoover to look into another 
matter concerning Hamilton Fish. On 22 August, Colonel Herman Beukema of the 
United States Military Academy, wrote Presidential Secretary Edwin Watson that 
Fish possessed a photograph of Roosevelt's Hyde Park library that showed a British 
flag displayed above an American one. According to Beukema, Fish thought the 
photograph could be used to "hang the President" politically. Sensitive to this 
report, Roosevelt directed his other secretary, Marvin McIntyre, to "have the F.B.I. 
look into this." Hoover reported that the photograph was actually a sketch of the 
president's library, as photography was not permitted at Hyde Park, and that 
according to Fish's confidants he believed it could be used "if he wanted to cause a 
lot of damage to President Roosevelt." FBI agents learned, however, that Fish 
refused to "use" the sketch. As compared to accusations that Fish consorted with 
foreign governments, this matter seems inconsequential. Nevertheless, it is 
representative of the type of political intelligence provided to the White House upon 
request. By providing such data, Hoover catered to Roosevelt's political interests 
and demonstrated to the administration his FBI's value.57 
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The last reference to Fish in extant FBI files that relates to his anti - 
interventionist politics regards an investigation that the FBI's New York field office 
conducted in 1944. A political opponent of Trujillo claimed that Fish had accepted a 
$200,000 bribe from the dictator to write a favorable report about the Dominican 
Republic for Congress. In their investigation, FBI agents discovered no evidence to 
substantiate the bribery charge and, as a result, "No prosecutive action was taken in 
this matter. "58 
Due to jurisdictional issues and personal animosities with the prosecutor, 
Hoover had avoided direct involvement in the franking privilege investigation. 
Nonetheless he continued to monitor Fish's political activity. FBI agents monitored 
Fish's foreign policy positions, took note of his opposition to Roosevelt, and 
investigated his various connections with anti- interventionists. Moreover, Hoover 
serviced White House requests for information about Fish's political and personal 
activity. Suspecting he was under FBI surveillance, Fish received a firm denial from 
FBI officials that the Bureau had monitored his activities. Yet FBI officials tried to 
develop information on Fish, which was then forwarded to the White House, that 
suggested he had connections with foreign governments. All of this confirms 
Hoover's interest in monitoring Roosevelt's anti -interventionist foreign policy 
critics, whatever their political persuasion, to cater to the president's political and 
policy concerns. Fish was a prominent congressman and this affected the Bureau's 
surveillance of him. 
* * 
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FBI officials scrutinized Senator Gerald P. Nye, a Republican, because he 
was a prominent and influential congressional anti -interventionist. Hailing from 
North Dakota, Nye, who was influenced by Midwestern agrarian radicalism, became 
a Republican to be successful in North Dakota politics. His biographer, Wayne S. 
Cole, concluded that Nye really never fit well into the molds of either the 
Republican or Democratic parties. He opposed urbanization, which both parties 
supported, and he backed only two Republican presidential nominees during his 
career, one being Herbert Hoover. From 1933 to 1934 Nye stood politically to the 
left of the New Deal inasmuch as he believed Roosevelt did little to ease the plight 
of farmers. But Nye's politics evolved and reflected, Cole observed, the shift among 
anti -interventionists from those identifying themselves with the political left to those 
of mostly conservative political credentials. What these conservatives opposed, 
primarily, was the centralization of power within the executive branch of 
government, an innovation that they regarded as inimical to a states' rights 
tradition.59 
Senator Nye was one of the most vocal anti -interventionist spokespersons 
and was central to the development of American neutrality policy between 1934 and 
1941. With the publication in 1934 of Helmuth Engelbrect's and Frank Hanigen's 
Merchants of Death, which argued that American bankers and munitions 
manufacturers had led the United States into the First World War in search of profit, 
and the influential lobbying of Dorothy Detzer of the Women's International League 
for Peace and Freedom, Senator Nye was convinced to investigate why America had 
entered the war. His special committee, the so- called Nye Committee, convened 
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from 1934 to 1936 and investigated the influence banks and munitions 
manufacturers had on the Wilson administration. Nye, in particular, concluded that 
the executive branch had only fed the driving force behind the munitions industry 
through its war -making power. It was at this point that Nye shifted politically to 
become allied with economic conservatives who opposed Roosevelt's centralization 
of power. Moreover, Nye's committee aroused public interest in the issue and 
contributed directly to the proposal and adoption of the Neutrality Acts of 1935, 
1936, and 1937 that attempted to isolate the United States from another world war.6o 
The first FBI memorandum regarding Senator Nye and his anti - 
interventionism was made in October 1939 when the FBI's Los Angeles field office 
received unsolicited information suggesting that Senator Nye was "in the pay of the 
German government" and a spy. The accuser, whose name the FBI has withheld 
under provisions of the FOIA, informed the Los Angeles office that from the content 
of Nye's speeches -he believed they were pro -Nazi -and on the opinion of a San 
Francisco chiropractor, he believed that Nye was a spy. Despite the speculative 
nature of the complaint, an FBI agent interviewed the informer (not always a routine 
procedure) and only then decided the charge was baseless. While FBI officials did 
not develop this first charge accusing Nye of involvement with pro -German 
elements, later, as the interventionist -anti -interventionist debate heated up, they 
looked more closely at charges brought against him.61 
In 1940, as the seriousness of the international crisis began to increase, FBI 
officials' interest in some of these unsolicited charges increased. In January and 
February 1940, an attorney from Moorhead, Minnesota, James M. Witherow, wrote 
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Hoover urging him to have FBI agents interview two men -D. H. McArthur and 
John Andrews -who had worked for Senator Nye in Washington. Witherow 
claimed the two had "very intimate knowledge" regarding German and Japanese 
officials who had visited Senator Nye's office. He also claimed that at one point the 
German Embassy had sent a secretary to Nye's office who gained access to the 
senator's files. Witherow further claimed to have worked with "the American 
intelligence services" during the First World War to help uncover German domestic 
espionage. Claiming to be familiar with German methods, Witherow claimed that it 
was a German tactic to use secretly an opponent of the White House to attack an 
administration's policy. This, he believed, is why Senator Nye had become vocal 
about the munitions industry through his 1934 -36 Nye Committee hearings.62 
Unlike the first charge against Senator Nye, Hoover took this one more 
seriously. He probably paid more attention to Witherow's complaint because, as a 
lawyer, Witherow was a respectable citizen and his complaint, as compared to the 
1939 one, seemed more believable. Whatever Hoover's motivation, he wrote in the 
margin of Witherow's letter: "Refer to Mr. Kemp [of the Justice Department] and 
ask what action we should take." Alexander Holtzoff of the Justice Department 
responded that "it is his definite opinion that no investigation should be conducted of 
Senator Nye on the basis of that letter." Yet because Witherow had mentioned 
alleged activity on the part of the German Embassy having access to Nye's files, 
Holtzoff suggested (and FBI officials' agreed) that a copy of Witherow's letter be 
sent to the State Department.63 
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While Holtzoff advised FBI officials not to initiate an investigation based on 
Witherow's letter, with a White House request Hoover ordered an investigation. An 
FBI document confirms that FBI agents collected information that bore on Nye's 
political activity. On 18 June 1940, after his secretary had received information 
from retired Democratic Senator Smith Brookhart, presidential secretary Stephen 
Early requested from Hoover a careful and thorough investigation of a matter 
concerning Nye and his associates. Brookhart had advised the White House that a 
Washington, D.C., private detective, Henry Grunewald, was "in cahoots" with 
Senator Nye. Grunewald had allegedly delivered two checks totaling $8,000 to Nye 
which, Brookhart had learned from D. H. McArthur (Nye's former secretary), had 
originated with former Secretary of War (and anti -interventionist) Harry Woodring. 
While at Nye's office, Grunewald reportedly would phone Woodring. FBI officials 
also had learned from Lieutenant Colonel C. M. Busbee, an Army officer assigned to 
the Military Intelligence Division (MID), that Brookhart had learned from a friend - 
who worked for military intelligence during the First World War -that Grunewald 
was head of German intelligence in Washington.64 
As the White House had solicited the investigation, Hoover ordered that it be 
given "continuous and preferred attention." FBI agents interviewed Senator 
Brookhart, Nye's former secretary D. H. McArthur, and Major Thomas C. 
McDonald -Brookhart's military friend. FBI agents focused on the statements 
provided by McArthur and McDonald because Brookhart's information was hearsay. 
McArthur confirmed that Grunewald had regularly visited Senator Nye's office "to 
pick up pieces of information which he could capitalize on." (Grunewald, in 
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addition to being a private detective, was a Washington political operative.) 
McArthur also stated that Grunewald had delivered cash to Nye's office, money that 
he believed had originated from Woodring. McDonald, when interviewed, stated 
that he believed Grunewald's secretive nature indicated to him that he might be head 
of a German espionage system in Washington. Moreover, McDonald witnessed a 
conversation in German between Grunewald and Colonel Edwin Emerson, whom 
McDonald claimed had worked for German intelligence during the First World War. 
From these observations, McDonald told FBI agents, he concluded that Grunewald 
was a German spy. FBI officials sought to confirm these suspicions and whether 
Grunewald had liaised with Nye and Woodring to take full advantage of their 
influence.65 
Serendipitously, Grunewald, in his capacity as a political operator, regularly 
reported political information to FBI officials. At one point, Grunewald, taking 
advantage of this relationship, invited FBI agents to his apartment to determine 
whether his telephone had been tapped. FBI officials "believing this was a good 
opportunity to closely scrutinize Grunwald's apartment" dispatched agents to 
Grunewald's apartment on 2 July 1940. But, as FBI agents reported, "Nothing was 
observed in the apartment ... which would indicate that he was pro -German or anti - 
American in any manner in his sympathies. "66 
Hoover concluded that the early investigations surrounding Grunewald, 
Woodring, and Nye had "failed to develop any substantiation of any of the charges 
made." Nevertheless, Hoover admitted that "As a matter of fact, all information 
developed relating not only to Senator Nye but to Mr. Woodring and Mr. 
197 
Grunewald, has been of a negative nature." Hoover then reported the results of this 
"negative" information on Grunewald, Nye, and Woodring not only to Early, who 
had requested the probe, but to the attorney general, assistant to the attorney general, 
and Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau.67 
Whatever Grunewald's role in a White -House solicited FBI investigation, 
Hoover valued the information obtained from the private detective. Grunewald, in 
his capacity as a Washington political operator, maintained links with prominent 
personalities (significantly some of Roosevelt's political opposition) such as Nye, 
former White House aide Thomas Corcoran, and conservative and politically- active 
businessman Henry Marsh. Grunewald also regularly provided FBI officials with 
political intelligence, information that was received without hesitation. By 1941, 
more importantly, as the Great Debate intensified, FBI officials were informed by 
Army intelligence, again, that Grunewald "was the pay -off man for German agents 
in the United States" and that he was their liaison to various peace and subversive 
groups. Assistant Director Ladd determined that MID "was merely resurrecting old 
information in view of the fact that the Bureau had previously investigated the same 
allegations." Nevertheless, using this information FBI officials established a wiretap 
on Grunewald's telephone. 68 The wiretap remained in effect from 4 June 1941 to 3 
September 1941.69 
Wiretapping was not a legal surveillance method. Since passage in 1934 of 
the Federal Communications Act, and until the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and 
Safe Streets Act permitted wiretapping with a warrant, the interception of wire or 
radio communications by anyone was illegal. Later this Act was upheld by two 
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companion Supreme Court decisions, Nardone v. US (1937 and 1939). In May 
1940, however, with the war crisis mounting President Roosevelt secretly authorized 
the use of wiretaps to avert "sabotage, assassinations, and `fifth column' activities" 
but only in cases concerning national defense and "of persons suspected of 
subversive activities against the Government of the United States, including spies." 
Roosevelt wished to limit this activity, however, by keeping it to a "minimum" and 
limited "insofar as possible to aliens." He authorized the attorney general to review 
and approve all proposed FBI wiretaps.70 
However, the attorney general in 1940, Robert Jackson, decided to leave it to 
the FBI director to maintain the record of these wiretaps. Hoover did this by 
keeping a "memorandum book" of attorney general- authorized wiretaps. By placing 
this responsibility with Hoover, Jackson effectively diminished the attorney 
general's oversight role regarding wiretaps because he knew only of those wiretaps 
that Hoover reported to him. In fact, FBI officials could, and did, authorize wiretaps 
on their own authority without informing the attorney general.7' 
The exact number of wiretaps authorized by FBI officials is not known, but 
some can be documented. Wiretaps that were not authorized by the attorney general 
were not recorded in Hoover's memorandum book, instead they were recorded on 
authorization cards that were maintained in the secret office files of Hoover's 
lieutenants. In 1954, for reasons that are unknown, fifteen wiretap- authorization 
cards from the 1940s that had been filed in FBI Assistant Director D. Milton Ladd's 
office were transferred to the secret file of Assistant Director Louis Nichols. Even 
more curious, wiretap- authorization cards routinely were destroyed every six months 
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yet these cards escaped destruction. In any event, the cards document the fact that 
the FBI had developed a level of investigative autonomy.72 
Through the Grunewald wiretap, FBI officials gathered no information about 
the private detective's alleged involvement in espionage. Instead, they accumulated 
critical comments some administration officials had made to Grunewald over the 
telephone. In September 1941 Grunewald had a conversation with former White 
House aide Thomas Corcoran during which Corcoran referred to Navy Secretary 
Knox as an "incompetent four -flusher," and dismissed Naval intelligence officers as 
an "awfully snooty bunch." Corcoran also commented to Grunewald that he 
believed Roosevelt only surrounded himself with "stuffed shirt" individuals. FBI 
agents also intercepted a conversation Grunewald had with Woodring concerning his 
desire to work with the pricing commission. These examples demonstrate that the 
Grunewald wiretap instead of revealing Grunewald's alleged espionage contacts 
instead served as a unique source of political intelligence for Hoover. (See chapter 
seven for another FBI wiretap that served as a source for anti -interventionist political 
intelligence.) Yet beyond gathering political intelligence from the Grunewald 
wiretap, Hoover also received political information from the detective himself.73 
In August 1941, Henry Grunewald provided Hoover with political 
intelligence regarding Senator Nye and Hoover forwarded it to the White House. 
Upon providing the information, Grunewald had asked that it not be sent to the 
White House. Hoover evidentially decided otherwise. At a meeting Grunewald had 
with Senator Nye, he learned from the senator that in July Nye had been approached 
by an individual who told him that if he were to "fall in line with the Administration 
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and the foreign policy of the Administration, he could probably write his own 
political ticket at the next Republican convention." It had been suggested to Nye 
that he not "vindicate" Roosevelt's policy but issue a call for unity among 
Americans. Later, Nye was told that if he were to join Roosevelt "there would be 
$50,000 at his disposal forthwith." Additionally, Grunewald reported that Nye 
suspected that Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes had wiretapped his telephone. 
Hoover sent this information to the White House marked "strictly conf[idential]. "74 
Later in August, Grunewald again provided Hoover with political 
intelligence he gleaned from Senator Nye, and again Hoover offered it to the White 
House. Grunewald reported Nye's observation that some anti- interventionist 
senators were concerned over the British spending seven billion dollars of Lend - 
Lease funds. Nye stated that the Senate would thoroughly investigate British 
spending before it approved additional dollars to Great Britain. Grunewald also 
provided information regarding the proposed Senate investigation into Hollywood's 
support of interventionism. Nye said that "a thorough [Senate] inquiry will be made 
into the entire motion picture industry in order to show that the Administration has 
been using the movies as a vehicle to propagate information about the war." 
Grunewald also learned from Nye that Senator Francis Maloney, an anti - 
interventionist Democrat from Connecticut, intended to make an issue out of the 
national gasoline shortage by claiming the administration created it as a public 
education campaign about the seriousness of the international situation. All of this 
intelligence Hoover forwarded to the White House as "highly confidential 
information. "7' 
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Not all information acquired from Grunewald was forwarded to the White 
House, however. On 8 October, during the congressional brouhaha over the 
franking misuse, Grunewald telephoned Hoover's secretary, Helen Gandy, and 
provided political intelligence he had gotten from Nye. Among other items, 
Grunewald reported that Nye believed his nationwide speaking tour, funded by the 
America First Committee, was successful. He also reported that Nye believed the 
use of the congressional frank was not an abuse because everyone in the Congress 
used it widely. Lastly, Grunewald reported that Nye believed "there is a 
determination on the part of the President to get into war, and he feels this will 
happen." Yet, Assistant Director Tamm concluded: "In view of [the] nature and 
source this info should not be transmitted outside Bureau. "76 
Hoover felt secure in exploiting an FBI source of sensitive information 
provided the source would not become public. Hoover also would only investigate 
an influential public target -such as a government official -with documented 
authorization. He never risked exposing FBI investigations or sensitive sources 
without good reason. An example of this occurred in November 1941 when 
Attorney General Francis Biddle, after receiving derogatory information about Nye's 
connections, solicited Hoover's opinion. Francis P. Miller, of the vehemently 
interventionist Fight For Freedom Committee, wrote Biddle claiming Nye had 
accepted $10,000 from a foreign government and had links with suspicious 
individuals. Responding to Biddle, Hoover commented only that the Bureau had 
never investigated Nye, despite public charges to the contrary, and that the only 
inquiry made into Nye was in response to a June 1940 White House request. Hoover 
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advised Biddle that Miller's charges were "of a very delicate nature, [and] I thought 
you might wish to discuss the matter personally with the President before coming to 
a decision." In his effort to service Roosevelt's political interests, Hoover would not 
reveal to the attorney general that his Bureau had continually monitored Senator 
Nye's political activity. Instead, he bypassed the civil -libertarian Biddle and dealt 
directly, most times, with the White House.77 
Nye's political views and activities were not Hoover's only interest. As he 
had with Senator Wheeler, Hoover monitored Nye's views of the FBI. In December 
1941 FBI officials had learned that Nye and Senator John Overton -a Democrat 
from Louisiana -had planned to survey the Senate in an effort to gauge the level of 
support for a possible investigation of the FBI for failing to sufficiently investigate 
cases of domestic sabotage. Concerned about any criticism directed at the FBI, 
Hoover dispatched Assistant Director Ladd to speak to Nye at his Senate office. 
Nye denied that he had planned an investigation of the FBI but explained to Ladd 
that the rumor had originated with "our misguided Jewish friends" whom Nye 
believed supported the interventionists. Ladd's report, containing this sensitive 
political intelligence, was not filed in the Bureau's central records system but in J. 
Edgar Hoover's secret office file where it remained undisclosed. FBI officials' 
effort to contain any criticism of the Bureau reflects Hoover's goals during this 
period: to service the Roosevelt administration's interest in political intelligence and 
to protect the image of the FBI.78 
Even after the United States entrance into the Second World War on 7 
December 1941, Grunewald continued to provide Hoover with political intelligence 
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originating with Senator Nye. On 17 December Grunewald reported that Nye said 
many anti -interventionist senators and congressmen had become "perturbed and 
upset" about the continuation of the grand jury probe into the franking privilege 
controversy. These legislators believed that the prosecutor, William Maloney, only 
sought to capitalize personally on the issue. Furthermore, Nye stated that his group 
could not understand why Roosevelt had allowed the franking probe to continue and 
that they had planned to send a representative to speak to him about ending it. There 
is no indication that this information was forwarded to the White House, but Hoover 
nevertheless continued to collect such political intelligence despite the anti - 
interventionists having disbanded and rallied behind the war effort.79 
Hoover continued to provide the White House with political intelligence on 
his anti- interventionist foreign policy critics even into 1942. On 28 May, he 
forwarded to the White House and Justice Department a letter Senator Nye had 
written to Horace Hasse -a former member of the America First Committee who 
later organized the group Americans for Peace. Nye had written in his letter, which 
Hoover had obtained from "a confidential source" (Grunewald?), that he was 
"satisfied that at the ripe time there can be a rebirth [of the America First 
Committee] that will be in the full and complete interest of America." Nye was 
concerned about the future of the country and, in particular, the "inefficient conduct 
of the war." Hoover reported that Hasse "is the subject of an intensive investigation 
by the FBI to determine whether he has violated the provisions of the Sedition 
statutes." White House officials found this sensitive information important enough 
to "file in safe. "80 
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While Hoover may have publicly rejected claims that FBI agents had 
investigated Senator Nye, agents had, in fact, monitored Nye's political activity and 
directly investigated the senator when solicited by the administration. The White 
House's request to investigate the Nye -Grunewald- Woodring matter led Hoover to a 
wellspring of political intelligence on Roosevelt's critics that emanated from 
Grunewald and his high -level political contacts. Hoover cultivated his contact with 
Grunewald, going so far as to establish a wiretap on his telephone (whether or not 
the attorney general authorized it, which was required, is unclear), and used some of 
this collected information in political reports to the White House. But not all 
information Hoover collected was sent to the White House. If the source of 
information was not secure, meaning that it could be revealed, Hoover hesitated. 
Additionally, he would not initiate an investigation unless it could be carried out in 
secret, thus not showing publicly that the Bureau had involved itself in political 
matters, or he would authorize an investigation only if directed to do so from 
superiors thus having documented proof protecting his actions. 
* * * 
An examination of the FBI's monitoring of Senator Burton Wheeler, 
Congressman Hamilton Fish, and Senator Gerald Nye -all three prominent and 
influential foreign policy critics of President Franklin Roosevelt -demonstrates the 
political motivation behind FBI Director Hoover's efforts. Even with the 
impediments of classification restrictions and having to obtain FBI files via the 
FOIA, we gain an important understanding, if incomplete, of the FBI's priorities and 
role in the Great Debate over entrance into the Second World War. Hoover sought 
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to provide the Roosevelt administration with political intelligence regarding its 
prominent and influential anti -interventionist foreign policy opposition. In so doing, 
Hoover proved his worth to the administration, retained his tenure as Bureau director 
despite holding a different political philosophy than the president, and increased his 
FBI's power. Yet unlike his confidence regarding some of Roosevelt's other 
political opponents, such as Charles Lindbergh or the America First Committee, 
Hoover trod carefully when monitoring and investigating the political activities of 
members of Congress. Hoover had not yet established himself as an unassailable 
internal security bureaucrat nor created for his FBI the level of autonomy that would 
permit him to investigate freely. While he did create a certain level of autonomy, it 
was not sufficient enough for Hoover to risk his Bureau being exposed if a 
congressman had learned of Bureau surveillance of his activity, but he did monitor 
congressional opposition and did report these political activities to the White House 
whether solicited or not. 
The FBI's monitoring of Burton Wheeler demonstrates best Hoover's 
qualified willingness to monitor a member of Congress. Wheeler had a past history 
with Hoover dating from the Red Scare of 1919 -1920. Wheeler knew of Hoover's 
work in the mass round -up of suspected radicals and the abuses wrought by the old 
Bureau of Investigation. Wheeler was also influential, it appears, in the decision to 
retain Hoover as FBI director when Roosevelt ascended to the presidency in 1933. 
Yet Wheeler was also a long -term critic of the Bureau, being subjected to 
investigation following revelations of abuses during Teapot Dome and other FBI - 
directed criticisms through the years. Moreover, with an activist Congress that was 
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not deferential to the president during the pre -war years, it is understandable that 
Hoover did not investigate Wheeler, Fish, or Nye with the vigor that was spent on a 
controversial figure like Lindbergh. Whereas Hoover placated administration 
political interests to safeguard his and the FBI's position, Congress too could not be 
ignored. 
Hoover's concern is documented by his interest in any critical comments 
made about the Bureau or any expressed concern that the FBI was, indeed, 
investigating an anti -interventionist. Thus Hoover's interest in Wheeler's 1940 
comment describing FBI agents as two -by -four detectives and his statement to the 
fact that some anti -interventionists feared expressing themselves because of the FBI. 
This is also reflected in FBI Assistant Director Tamm's denial to Fish that the FBI 
had investigated the matter of Fish's receipt of suspicious funds, despite FBI agents 
having investigated and Hoover having reported the matter to the White House a 
month earlier. Even Fish's concern dating from the 1950s that the FBI had 
monitored his anti -interventionist politics suggests a concern among FBI officials 
over exposure, if a latent one. Nye's suspicion that Interior Secretary Ickes had 
wiretapped the senator's telephone would have suggested to Hoover that these 
legislators were, in the very least, wary of any intrusive activity on the part of the 
executive branch and this would have led Hoover to exercise restraint. 
The congressional franking privilege controversy involved Wheeler, Nye, 
and Fish. It also involved an actual German propaganda operation aimed at 
distributing anti -interventionist literature in an attempt to influence American public 
opinion. But while Hoover was content to monitor the developments in this case 
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and to compile unsolicited information about it, for two reasons he did not involve 
the FBI actively, as far as we can ascertain, in the investigation. One, the Bureau did 
not have jurisdiction in the matter as it involved an abuse of federal mail regulations 
(a purview of the Post Office Department investigators). Two, Hoover was at 
personal odds with William Maloney, the federal prosecutor conducting the grand 
jury inquiry into the matter. The FBI director felt he had been publicly criticized by 
Maloney and thereby refused to offer FBI cooperation beyond that information 
which he had already forwarded to the Justice Department. Yet when some piece of 
information cropped up about the franking abuse, such as that Henry Grunewald had 
provided to Hoover regarding Nye's opinions of the matter, Hoover filed the 
information -sometimes it was filed in his secret office file due to the sensitivity of 
the source. 
Hoover was most comfortable in initiating an FBI investigation of a 
congressman when the White House solicited one. Likewise, if the FBI had 
received public, unsolicited charges against one of the congressmen, Hoover 
reported the complaint to his superiors and if they advised an investigation then he 
would proceed. With some type of authorization to legitimize an FBI investigation, 
and thus insulate Hoover from public charges in the event the matter became public, 
he felt secure to investigate. This attitude is clearly demonstrated by the attorney 
general's request that FBI agents monitor a Wheeler speech in California to gauge 
the public's reaction to him in 1941. It is also reflected in Presidential Secretary 
Early's request that Hoover check into the veracity of the Milwaukee Journal's 
charge that Wheeler had made scurrilous comments about the administration during 
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wartime. The White House request that the FBI investigate Fish's receipt of checks 
during the 1942 off -year elections, as well as reports forwarded to the White House 
regarding Fish and Trujillo and the former's having a photograph of the president's 
library, are representative of Hoover's catering to administration requests. Likewise, 
the White House's 1940 request to investigate the Grunewald- Woodring -Nye spying 
charge was promptly executed for the president. 
FBI Director Hoover was content to refer unsolicited intelligence regarding 
congressmen to his superiors for direction. Whether Hoover received authorization 
to investigate or not, this was, indirectly at least, a means by which derogatory 
information was reported to senior administration officials and may have sustained 
negative views of otherwise legitimate foreign policy opponents. More importantly, 
Hoover also forwarded unsolicited intelligence to the White House but only if the 
source was safeguarded. Thus, Hoover reported to the White House Nye's political 
comments or news about the political activity of the Senate acquired from Henry 
Grunewald. 
Taken as a whole, the effort to service administration interest in the political 
activity of its anti -interventionist opposition, while perhaps confined at least 
regarding congressmen, reflects Hoover's priorities during the Great Debate. He 
had an interest in protecting his assets and expanding the FBI's role and power. This 
he did with great success, building for himself a basis on which the FBI would 
blossom into a more powerful and influential Cold War internal security agency. 
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CHAPTER 6 
The FBI, the Victory Program Leak, and the Chicago Tribune, 1941 -1942. 
On 4 December 1941, the Chicago Tribune and its sister paper the 
Washington Times -Herald published a sensational story that reverberated in the 
already bitter anti- interventionist /interventionist foreign policy debate. Just three 
days prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the anti -interventionist 
newspapers reported on a top- secret War Department contingency plan, the so- called 
Victory Program. Carried under the banner headline "F.D.R.'S WAR PLANS!," the 
story seemed to confirm the darkest suspicion of the anti -interventionists who saw 
the plan as evidence of Roosevelt's duplicity and intent on leading the United States 
into the European war. Interventionists, on the other hand, viewed the revelation as 
traitorous behavior on the part of Roosevelt's critics. 
The political consequences of this leak triggered a FBI investigation to 
identify who had leaked this top- secret contingency plan to the Chicago Tribune. As 
the chief federal law enforcement agency, the FBI was delegated the responsibility, 
instead of the military, for determining who had leaked the document. In the 
ensuing FBI investigation, FBI Director Hoover spared no effort and, indeed, the 
affair reflected his pragmatism whereby in return for placating administration desires 
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he gained increased authority. He likely pursued the matter with such élan as some 
high -ranking members of the Roosevelt administration avidly sought to hold the 
anti -interventionists responsible for the leak, which was an embarrassment to the 
government. But the leak of the plan was not the national security breech that some 
thought; rather as a contingency plan only, its revelation only served to embarrass 
the administration and give political fire to the anti -interventionists. By servicing 
administration interests, Hoover placed himself in good stead with leading officials 
in the administration during turbulent times. While the plan was revealed just days 
before the American entrance into the Second World War, and thus this momentous 
event was overshadowed in the public mind at least, it nevertheless stirred deeply 
held emotions on both sides of the foreign policy debate, even into 1942. The 
investigation, moreover, reached and involved many prominent members of the anti - 
interventionist community that included one United States representative, two 
United States senators, a host of military officers, Charles Lindbergh, Henry Ford, 
and reporters and staff from the Chicago Tribune. Moreover, until now, the FBI's 
investigation in this episode has never before been fully documented.' 
The person most responsible for developing the Victory Program, and the 
man who became a primary focus of FBI investigators, was Army Major Albert C. 
Wedemeyer. A brief sketch of Wedemeyer's biography will illustrate why, later, he 
became the focus of government investigators and why he came to some of his 
beliefs and why he acted as he did. A native Nebraskan of German extraction, 
Wedemeyer received a traditional Jesuit education steeped in ideals of duty and 
obligation. Following his graduation from high school Wedemeyer received an 
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appointment to the United States Military Academy at West Point in 1916 from 
Senator George W. Norris. (Norris would become an influential anti- interventionist 
senator during the Roosevelt administration.) With the crisis of the Great War of 
1914 -18 and America's late entrance into the conflict, Wedemeyer graduated early 
from the academy but never participated in any combat. In the post -war years, as a 
newly minted junior officer, Wedemeyer studied infantry tactics and became a 
military instructor and, later, assumed command of an artillery unit.2 
Wedemeyer served in a variety of capacities from 1923 to 1934. After 
spending three years in the Philippines as an infantry officer, he became a staff 
officer - a job that embarked him on a distinguished career. In Washington, D.C., 
China, and the Philippines (again), Wedemeyer learned the finer details of army staff 
work. His efforts won him, in 1934, an appointment to the Command and General 
Staff College in Leavenworth, Kansas, where he graduated with honors. The 
college's commandant was so impressed with Wedemeyer's work that he nominated 
him to study European military tactics in Germany at the Kriegsakademie, the 
German Staff College. In 1936, Wedemeyer left for Germany.3 
During his two -year study in Berlin, Wedemeyer learned much in the way of 
war -making and war preparation. But his trip, while decidedly useful in expanding 
his understanding of preparedness, in later years led investigators to question the 
officer's loyalties amidst popular notions of Nazi intrigue among America Firsters- 
which included Wedemeyer. During his brief tour in Germany, Wedemeyer was 
afforded special privileges not commonly granted foreign visitors. He participated 
in German military maneuvers at one point, commanding an anti -tank company. He 
?i8 
cultivated personal relationships with several high -ranking members of the German 
military including Claus von Stauffenberg, Major Ferdinand Jodl- brother to 
Hitler's later army chief of staff -and the then -current chief of staff, Ludwig Beck. 
Wedemeyer learned much about German preparedness and strategy from his 
German contacts. His tour proved to be so valuable that upon its conclusion he 
submitted a report in 1938 to General George Marshall, then chief of the War Plans 
Division. Undoubtedly impressed by this report, Marshall later elevated Wedemeyer 
to the War Plans Division in May 1941, by which time Marshall had risen to chief of 
staff.4 
Wedemeyer's time in Germany may also have contributed, in some way, to 
his later anti -interventionism. Writing in 1958, Wedemeyer stated that during his 
stay in Germany he had "discerned a great deal of truth about Communist aims, 
practices, and methods unknown or ignored in America until recently. "5 He had also 
come to regard Nazi Germany in a positive fashion. "[M]y two years experience 
with the German people in general and the military pedagogy in particular had 
caused me to render favorable reports concerning them. "6 Wedemeyer saw in Nazi 
Germany a bulwark against Communist Russia. To him "the German search for 
Lebensraum did not menace the Western World to anything like the same degree as 
the world -wide Communist conspiracy centered in Moscow." Wedemeyer's views 
as such shared a common thread with those of another ardent anti -interventionist, 
Charles Lindbergh. Both Wedemeyer and Lindbergh had spent time in Nazi 
Germany from 1936 to 1938, and both were impressed with what they had seen. 
Moreover, both authored favorable reports on German progress. Both men 
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subsequently became targets of FBI investigations due, in part, to suspicions cast by 
their time spent in Hitler's Germany. 
Following passage of the Lend -Lease Act in March 1941, the American 
government was faced with the task of arranging procurement of war -related 
material for Great Britain. The War Department was delegated responsibility for 
determining the projected needs under the new Lend -Lease program. Having no 
direction in the matter from higher authorities, War Department personnel set about 
developing various plans to cope with Lend -Lease needs. In his effort to develop a 
viable scheme, Under Secretary of War Robert Patterson sought an estimate of the 
overall needs of possible wartime American industry from the administration. On 
18 April he requested from Secretary of War Stimson "a decision as to the ultimate 
munitions production required by the War Department so that appropriate plans can 
be started."8 
According to the official history of the Victory Program, Secretary Stimson 
wholeheartedly agreed with the under secretary's desire for more specific direction. 
Nonetheless, the War Department continued to fumble about on developing a plan 
for which military officials had no national strategic goals or estimates. No progress 
was made until President Roosevelt, on 9 July 1941, finally stepped in and issued a 
directive to the secretaries of war and navy to explore "at once the overall 
production requirements required to defeat our potential enemies." The official 
history suggests that Under Secretary Patterson's executive officer, General Burns, 
the War Department's liaison to the White House, had influenced Lend -Lease 
supervisor Harry Hopkins to bring pressure to bear upon the White House for 
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direction. Whatever the manner of events, Roosevelt's directive, after a period of 
confusion, put the department on track.9 
Soon thereafter, responsibility for drawing up a global wartime contingency 
plan devolved from the secretary of war to General Marshall to General Leonard 
Gerow of the War Plans Division -those responsible for creating military plans - 
and finally to Major Albert C. Wedemeyer. As Wedemeyer later pointed out, never 
before had American military authorities devised such an all- encompassing plan. "It 
meant traveling on uncharted seas without a compass toward a fatal Shangri -la," 
Wedemeyer wrote, "since no national aims or strategic objectives were given us." 
Despite this impediment, Wedemeyer was authorized to coordinate with other 
government departments to acquire the information he needed. Due to the project's 
7sensitivity, however, all work was carried out in secrecy. The Navy had 
concurrently drafted its own estimates that were subsequently added to the larger 
plan developed by the War Department. i ° 
Wedemeyer was an ironic choice to develop a war plan that was to be 
designed "to defeat our potential enemies." For during the American inter -war 
years, Albert Wedemeyer was a confirmed advocate of American isolation from 
foreign war. He was convinced from his broad reading on war and national strategic 
planning that American involvement in a second worldwide conflict would lead to 
national devastation. Despite his underlying political sympathies, Wedemeyer's 
Jesuitical sense of duty kept him focused on his assigned task. "It was my job," he 
wrote years later, "to anticipate developments and continuously make plans so that 
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my country would be prepared for any contingency which fate, politicians, or power - 
drunk leaders might precipitate. "11 
Working with a staff of six, Wedemeyer set about developing a national plan 
for wartime production estimates. But the major lacked two key pieces of 
information to create a coherent plan: a national wartime objective and a military 
strategy to realize that objective. Without such direction from the administration, 
which was never formally decided upon in 1941, Wedemeyer could not arrive at any 
useful figures. Therefore, he drafted his own assessment of national objectives and 
submitted this statement to Secretary of War Stimson for approval. Stimson 
approved the major's statement and Wedemeyer set about creating the Victory 
Program, a plan that was based on the assumption that the United States should 
"eliminate totalitarianism from Europe and, in the process, to be an ally of Great 
Britain; further, to deny the Japanese undisputed control of the western Pacific. "12 
The War Plans Division staff worked diligently on the Victory Program 
throughout the summer of 1941. In a relatively short period of time (from July when 
Roosevelt requested a national estimate to September when the Army's plan was 
submitted) Wedemeyer and his staff completed their task. A vast number of 
government resources were used to create a politico -military plan of a scale never 
before seen in American history. Between 20 and 25 September the completed plan 
was distributed to the highest -ranking members of the War Department and, later, it 
was given to the president. But Wedemeyer's sense of accomplishment was dashed 
when, on 4 December 1941, the fruits of his top- secret labor received banner 
headlines in two of the nation's most prominent anti- interventionist newspapers.13 
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* * * 
Following the Chicago Tribune's and Washington Times -Herald's (which 
was loosely connected to the Tribune)14 published account of the Victory Program 
on 4 December, Wedemeyer's life became markedly uncomfortable. He vividly 
recalled that morning when he arrived at his office in the Munitions Building: 
I sensed at once an atmosphere of excitement. Officers were milling around 
and there was a buzz of conversation which ceased abruptly as my secretary, 
in visible agitation, handed me a copy of the Washington Times -Herald. The 
room was silent and all eyes were fixed upon me as I read the screaming 
banner headlines ... I could not have been more appalled and astounded if a 
bomb had been dropped on Washington." 
The developer of the top- secret contingency plan had cause to be worried, for 
he was responsible, to a large degree, for its security. The newspaper story, written 
by the Tribune's Chesly Manly, gave details of the plan, including its estimates for a 
10,000,000 -plus -men combined armed force consisting of an 1,100,000 -man Navy, a 
150,000 -man Marine Corps, a 6,745,000 -man Army, and a 2,050,000 -man Army Air 
Force. Additionally, the article reprinted in its entirety President Roosevelt's 9 July 
memorandum authorizing the plan to his war secretaries. Quoting extensively from 
the Victory Program, the anti -interventionist paper concluded that the plan proved 
that Roosevelt had no intention of keeping American armed forces within the 
Western Hemisphere, as he had previously promised. The story became an 
immediate political sensation. ' 6 
Anti- interventionists depicted the revelation as a smoking gun. To them, the 
Victory Program was clear -cut evidence that Roosevelt had been maneuvering the 
country into war. Anti- interventionists planned to use the revelation to their 
advantage. Ruth Sarles, director of the America First Committee's speakers bureau, 
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wanted to distribute the plan across the country "in tens of thousands." She hoped 
"that every speaker who goes on the platform for AF [America First] will denounce 
it in ringing terms, that all will hammer `No AEF'. "17 The Republican anti - 
interventionist congressman H. Carl Anderson of Minnesota remarked to an 
America First representative that the publication "vindicates what we have been 
saying right along. A blind man could see through it all." Republican Dan Reed of 
New York predicted that "When this story gets around to the people it will 
strengthen our cause greatly. "18 
Interventionists, on the other hand, viewed the contingency plan leak in 
strikingly different terms. Senator Carter Glass of Virginia, honorary chairman of 
the rabidly interventionist Fight for Freedom Committee, commented that "the 
freedom of the press was never intended to extend to people who treasonably make 
public army and navy secret plans. "19 "It was a scandalous thing to have happen," 
Secretary of War Stimson noted in his diary, "and was typical of the mental attitude 
of the isolationists at that time. "20 And whereas the anti -interventionists hoped to 
use the Victory Program to stimulate opposition to Roosevelt's foreign policy, 
Stimson had a related, if opposing, objective: "The thing to do is to meet the matter 
head on and use this occurrence if possible to shake our American people out of 
their infernal apathy and ignorance of what this war means. "21 
The White House was also deliberating what to do about the matter. On the 
morning of 4 December, according to Secretary Stimson's diary, without having 
consulted with the president, White House Press Secretary Steven Early held a press 
conference. Early stated that no one in the White House but the president had 
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knowledge of the Victory Program. When asked if there were any conflicts of 
interest for other papers to reprint the Manly story without violating voluntary 
censorship restrictions, Early replied: "I don't think anyone would be correct in 
printing it unless they got it from a government source, unless they attributed it to 
the paper that built the story." He added, "I consider the press is operating as a free 
press and the responsibility in this case is more on government then the press, if the 
story is true." This prompted a further question as to whether the White House 
considered the publication as treasonable or unpatriotic. "Your right to print," Early 
replied, "is unchallenged and unquestioned. "22 
At the War Department that morning, Secretary of War Stimson recorded 
that officials there, such as Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy, had "very 
long faces." To him "nothing more unpatriotic or damaging to our plans for defense 
could very well be conceived" than that done by the anti -interventionist press. 
Concerned about Early's comments at his press conference earlier that morning, 
Stimson immediately phoned Roosevelt. The war secretary criticized Early's feeble 
comments at his press meeting and, according to Stimson, Roosevelt agreed with 
Stimson. The whole issue of the leak, Stimson claimed, caused the president to be 
"full of fight." Apparently sensing Roosevelt's mood, Stimson suggested 
prosecuting those involved in the leak under the Espionage Act. Roosevelt "was 
delighted to hear this" because he had previously been advised that no violation of 
the act had occurred. In the meantime, the president directed "that we should not 
answer any questions about it at our press conferences and that the first action taken 
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should be the arrest of those responsible for the disclosure, including if possible the 
managers of the newspapers. "23 
After further deliberation, Stimson, the following day, concluded that the 
president's policy of not speaking out on the leak was wrong. The secretary of war 
drafted a press statement, phoned the president, and read it to him. Advising the 
president that the War Department had a press conference that morning and that he 
"didn't want to duck such an important matter," Stimson asked for permission to 
make a public statement. Roosevelt agreed and authorized Stimson's statement.24 
Both Roosevelt and Stimson had scheduled press conferences with 
Roosevelt's slated to go first. Preferring to allow his war secretary to comment, the 
president told reporters that he had nothing to say but referred reporters to Stimson. 
Stimson, accordingly, found his press room "jammed as never before- people 
standing up all around me. "25 Stimson offered reporters a more forceful and positive 
statement followed by two questions. He outlined the War Department's 
responsibilities: 
It does not preclude the study of possible eventualities, one of the 
primary duties and responsibilities of the War Department.... Failures to 
make such studies would constitute a serious dereliction on the part of the 
responsible military authorities. The object of the study referred to by the 
press was to determine production requirements.... We are not preparing 
troops nor have we asked for funds for an A.E.F. 
What would you think of an American General Staff which in the 
present condition of the world did not investigate and study every 
conceivable type of emergency which may confront this country, and every 
possible method of meeting that emergency? What do you think of the 
patriotism of a man or newspaper which would take those confidential 
studies and make them public to the enemies of this country ?26 
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At a Cabinet meeting later that day, President Roosevelt informed his 
department heads on his recent decision to comment. While the Cabinet was in line 
with the president, not all agreed fully with Stimson's public statement. Harold 
Ickes, ardent opponent of the anti -interventionists, found it to be "entirely too 
defensive." Vice President Henry Wallace agreed with the statement but objected to 
the questions following it. In any event, Stimson was not deterred. To him, the 
"extremely weak" comments of Press Secretary Early "which virtually condoned the 
publication of the statement [Victory Program] on the basis of Freedom of the Press" 
justified his action.27 
Much of the Cabinet meeting was spent discussing whether to prosecute 
those responsible for the Victory Program leak. Ickes urged the president to go 
forward with prosecutions against the Chicago Tribune and Washington Times - 
Herald. The question whether the Espionage Act offered an avenue to exploit was 
settled, to the Cabinet's satisfaction, when Attorney General Francis Biddle 
defended such action. Following the meeting, Stimson pressed Roosevelt to pursue 
charges of conspiracy against those involved. The secretary demanded that the 
charges should be broad and not narrowly focused because, he thought, "it is vitally 
important to make ... a great State prosecution to get rid of this infernal disloyalty 
which we now have working in the America First and in these McCormick family 
papers." Roosevelt also met privately with the attorney general. Biddle 
confidentially advised the president that he and Hoover had learned "that at least one 
copy [of the Victory Program] had been handed to a Senator and that Wheeler was 
talking about investigation." Keenly interested in this information, Roosevelt 
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promised not to share the details with any other cabinet members. Given the 
charged atmosphere created with the leak, Biddle probably feared the worst if 
unsubstantiated information was leaked from the White House. In any event, the 
FBI was authorized by Attorney General Biddle to investigate. 28 
FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, in this politically charged episode, found an 
avenue to cater to the political desires of some administration officials -to seek 
retribution against administration critics -by investigating their activities. He 
brought to bear the full resources of the FBI. The FBI had jurisdiction and not the 
military due to an agreement of June 1940 on the division of labor among the 
various intelligence agencies. On 4 December, Hoover accompanied by FBI 
Assistant Director Edward Tamm, met with Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox and 
other high -ranking Navy Department officials to discuss the Victory Program leak, 
the Navy's contribution to it, and how the report had been distributed. Revealing his 
priority to focus on the administration's policy critics, Hoover further inquired of the 
Navy officials "as to whether any dissension or opposition had been expressed 
toward the plans." Other than disagreement on whether the plan was practical, the 
officers could offer no information on internal opposition to the plan itself. Navy 
officials gave Hoover a registered copy of the Victory Program to assist FBI 
investigators 29 
Using their copy of the Victory Program, FBI officials immediately 
compared the actual contingency plan and the one published by the anti - 
interventionist press. The FBI's investigators focused on the thirty-five quotations 
reported by the Washington Times -Herald and Chicago Tribune. Each quotation 
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was examined with utmost care and any inconsistency between the two documents 
was laid out in full detail. While FBI officials found numerous minor and 
insignificant discrepancies -such as a misplaced comma or an omitted word -they 
nonetheless came to the conclusion that the press had indeed had access to the secret 
Victory Program.3° 
General Gerow concurrently informed Wedemeyer that the president had 
ordered an investigation. Wedemeyer replied that he had not divulged any secret 
War Department documents, but, he later wrote, "I could not be certain that I had 
never neglected to exercise proper precautions." Gerow, having worked with 
Wedemeyer who by now had been promoted to colonel, and having known him 
personally, expressed his trust in the man. Given Wedemeyer's known anti - 
interventionist political sympathies and the very fact that he was responsible for 
piecing together the plan, others suspected him of guilt. Assistant Secretary of War 
John J. McCloy, still new in his position, that day called Wedemeyer to his office for 
a discussion. While the colonel stood at attention, according to Wedemeyer, 
McCloy said to him: "Wedemeyer, there is blood on the fingers of the person who is 
responsible for the release of this top secret war plan to the newspapers.i31 
Shortly afterwards, on 9 December, Wedemeyer was visited, not 
unexpectedly, by two FBI officials, one of whom was Edward Tamm, Hoover's 
second in command. Wedemeyer was understandably concerned. Years later, in 
1957, he described the event. While the passage of time had undoubtedly colored 
his memory of the event's details, he conveyed his lasting bitterness. "When Edgar 
Hoover, Thams [sic, Tamm], Genau and other FBI men descended upon me in my 
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office, at that time in the Munitions Building, about December 1 [sic], 1941, I was 
confused, worried, and a little bit angry." He described the incident: "[FBI agents] 
descended upon me like vultures upon a prostrate antelope. "32 
Despite his vivid description of the FBI officials' visit, Wedemeyer 
described Tamm as "so courteous as to be disarming." The FBI assistant director 
asked whether Wedemeyer knew how the War Department's security protocols had 
been breached. He also inquired how Wedemeyer had ensured the security of the 
sensitive documents under his care. Wedemeyer evaluated this first meeting with 
FBI officials as centering on evaluating his "sincerity and sense of responsibility." 
He conveyed his concern that he may have been careless at some point, but 
otherwise Wedemeyer claimed not to have any sense of guilt.33 
At a subsequent interview, FBI agents asked how Wedemeyer disposed of 
the final copies of the Victory Program. At one point Wedemeyer confused the 
dates when he gave Secretary Stimson his copy of the plan. This was not surprising, 
however. Since the plan was completed on 10 September but not fully assembled 
(with the Navy portion) and distributed until 25 September, Wedemeyer's confusion 
reveals no important inconsistency. To FBI officials, who regarded the anti - 
interventionist colonel as a prime suspect, however, this slip was a red flag. 
Suspecting that the Victory Program had been leaked during this September period, 
they concluded: 
Colonel Wedemeyer was very ill at ease during this interview and several 
times fell back upon the old adage, `I could not remember,' and seemed to be 
thinking up excuses for himself and his actions. ...[A]s it was not until the 
middle of October, 1941, that Colonel [Richard] Scobey received 
instructions to finally assemble and produce the entire document, Colonel 
Wedemeyer becomes responsible for any leakage up to that date.34 
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In a subsequent interview FBI agent Joseph Genau questioned Wedemeyer 
about his time in Germany. Genau asked whom Wedemeyer had befriended in 
Germany, particularly in high -ranking military circles. He then asked whether the 
colonel had corresponded with any of these German friends. Wedemeyer replied 
that when the war broke out, his German correspondence had dwindled. The FBI 
agent also inquired whether Wedemeyer had attended any Nazi Party meetings from 
1936 to 1938. Wedemeyer answered in the negative, conceding that had he been 
given the opportunity he would have attended out of "curiosity" to observe firsthand 
the "mass psychosis and unusual spectacle." 35 
Agent Genau then turned to Wedemeyer's contacts with the anti - 
interventionist movement. He asked: "Do you have any contacts with a person or 
persons within the America First Organization [sic] ?" "Yes," Wedemeyer 
responded, "I have several friends connected with that organization: Mrs. [Robert] 
Taft, John T. Flynn, Senator Wheeler, and Colonel Lindbergh. I haven't seen them 
for some time because I've been too busy." When asked if he sympathized with the 
efforts of the America First Committee, Wedemcyer responded: "In many ways, 
yes. "36 To FBI officials these ties were a significant investigative lead as Hoover's 
FBI had an interest in and history of providing political intelligence on such 
prominent policy critics. 
This answer prompted further questions about Wedemeyer's connections 
within the America First Committee. Genau was particularly interested in 
Wedemeyer's connection with Charles Lindbergh. Responding to a series of 
questions, Wedemeyer admitted to having first met Lindbergh in Germany during 
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his tour there in 1938 and to have met with Lindbergh "occasionally" back in the 
United States. Genau was also interested in Wedemeyer's statement that "I respect 
him and agree with many of his ideas concerning our entrance into the war." Genau 
thereupon inquired when he had met with Lindbergh in America, the most recent 
meeting only having been, Wedemeyer said, one month past. Wedemeyer's only 
response was to say his visits were purely social and that when together they 
discussed national and international politics. Nevertheless, to FBI officials 
Wedemeyer's link with Lindbergh the most popular and influential of Roosevelt's 
critics -only served to cast further suspicions on the colone1.37 
* * * 
On 6 December, after having verbally briefed Biddle to prepare him for his 5 
December Cabinet meeting with Roosevelt, Hoover submitted his preliminary report 
to the attorney general. The FBI director advised Biddle that "from the system 
employed in the handling of secret documents in the War Department it is 
impossible to accurately and exactly" determine who had leaked the Victory 
Program. Nevertheless, to service administration interest in the matter, the FBI 
director continued to dig deeper to identify the perpetrator. He proposed two 
courses of action to the attorney general. First, Hoover suggested calling a grand 
jury inquiry to interrogate the suspects under oath. The resultant publicity, Hoover 
warned, might embarrass the administration. Hoover's second recommendation, and 
the one he advocated due to the sensitivity of the matter, was "to de- emphasize the 
inquiry which is being carried on concerning this matter, and to have it appear that 
the inquiry is in a quiescent status." The second option, Hoover counseled, would 
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enable the FBI to locate the "officer or person" who had leaked the plan. The 
attorney general apparently chose the latter option, but the first was considered at a 
later date.38 
At this very early stage in the investigation, Hoover advised Biddle, the FBI 
had learned from two "thoroughly reliable confidential informants" that the Victory 
Program plan "had been furnished by one of the highest ranking officers of the War 
Department to an isolationist Senator." Hoover continued: "The copy was allowed 
to remain in the Senator's possession over night and a number of typewritten copies 
of the plan were prepared." The FBI informant further reported that "certain 
members of the General Staff of the War Department were not at all in sympathy 
with the Administration's apparent plans or preparations for war." According to the 
Bureau's source, this group of officers regarded their superiors as "boneheads" and 
they held little respect for their abilities.39 
A second "reliable and dependable" informant who "was rather closely 
associated with certain aspects of the publication of this story" reported that the 
Victory Program plan had been obtained "on the Hill" from "a General Staff officer 
of the War Department." The informant could not, however, identify this officer. 
The newspapers involved, this informant further reported, were anxious that an 
official investigation would be conducted of the leak to lend publicity to the fact that 
Roosevelt has a war plan. The newsmen, the informant continued, had hoped that 
the story would spark an "insurrection" among the General Staff that would result in 
a scandal "of greater proportion than the Dreyfus case." In light of these details, FBI 
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officials, while not able to prove their suspicions did, in fact, suspect that 
Wedemeyer had leaked the plan.4° 
"There was ample evidence to suggest my guilt," Albert Wedemeyer wrote 
newsman Walter Trohan in 1953.41 On the face of it, the circumstantial evidence of 
a disgruntled "isolationist" within the inner- circle of the War Department pointed 
directly to Wedemeyer. But this suspicion could not be proved, as an FBI agent 
reported: 
The facts and circumstances surrounding the preparation and handling of this 
report in the period between the date the President requested it on July 9'h 
and the time when it was actually submitted to him on September 251'', and 
the comparatively wide distribution of 35 mimeographed copies of the report 
subsequent to its distribution by the Secretary of the Joint Planning Board, 
make it impossible to establish any evidence or manifestation of guilty 
conduct on the part of this officer [Wedemeyer] at this time.42 
Wedemeyer, nonetheless, remained under suspicion. First, Wedemeyer, by 
this time a lieutenant colonel, was suspected because of the time he had spent at the 
Kriegsakademie between 1936 and 1938. While not sufficient to cast doubt on his 
loyalties, information purporting that he was "most pro -German in his feelings, his 
utterances, and his sympathies" along with his connections with Charles Lindbergh 
did, in fact, lead FBI officials to suspect his motives. FBI officials had further 
learned that Wedemeyer "engaged in a rather heated discussion with fellow officers 
at the War Department concerning his lack of sympathy with the administration's 
international program." He was "opposed to the Lend -Lease program" and "is 
otherwise very isolationist in his statements and sympathies." But more to the point, 
the investigators cited the fact that Wedemeyer "has had constant access to the plans 
for the Iceland Expedition and the proposed capture of the Azores, both of which 
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projects have been the subject of premature publication in certain [anti - 
interventionist] newspapers.i43 
While their circumstantial evidence led FBI officials to suspect Wedemeyer, 
they tried to identify the officer who had passed the Victory Program on to an 
unnamed "isolationist" senator who then offered the story to the Chicago Tribune. 
When the FBI's special agent in charge of the Detroit, Michigan, office, John Bugas. 
informed Washington of a possible lead, Hoover proceeded with it. Bugas 
telephoned FBI Assistant Director D. Milton Ladd, the head of the FBI's Domestic 
Intelligence Division, that a source had overheard a conversation between Charles 
Lindbergh, automobile manufacturer and fellow anti -interventionist Henry Ford, and 
Harry Bennett (Ford's director of personnel, labor relations, and plant security). 
During this conversation, Lindbergh reportedly said "he was obtaining considerable 
information from an Army officer." This officer, whom Lindbergh had visited in 
Washington, D.C., had provided the aviator information concerning the Army and 
Navy. The FBI's informant also claimed that Lindbergh and the officer in question 
held similar political beliefs.44 
Instructed to interview Bennett about his conversation with Lindbergh, 
Bugas reported back that Ford was concerned over Lindbergh's assertions about 
military strength and his appearing to be an authority without having first -hand 
knowledge. Ford admonished Lindbergh that American military leaders had to 
know better than he about technical and military strength of the armed forces. 
Lindbergh, however, disputed Ford by stating "that he was getting a great many of 
his facts from the people holding high positions in the Army." Bennett recalled 
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Lindbergh having named one such officer but could not remember the name. 
Bennett did recall, however, that from time to time Lindbergh visited this officer at 
the War Department "whose views were in line with Lindbergh's and who would 
usually furnish Lindbergh with information concerning these matters." Regarding 
the Victory Program leak, Bennett said nothing was mentioned to indicate Lindbergh 
knew of it.45 
FBI Assistant Director Tamm thereupon directed Bugas to interview Henry 
Ford. Wanting to avoid any misconceptions when interviewing the avidly anti - 
interventionist Ford, Tamm instructed Bugas to treat him courteously. Bugas 
emphasized his own personal acquaintance with Ford. When Tamm informed 
Hoover of this development, the FBI director scribbled on the memorandum: "Press 
this & let me know result. "46 
Hoover thereupon briefed the attorney general about the Bureau's plan to 
interview Ford to discover the name of Lindbergh's military contact. "If Ford gives 
us the information concerning Lindberg [sic]," Hoover advised Biddle, "who is the 
source of Ford's information, my idea is to have two of our best men see Lindberg 
[sic] and call upon him to give us the information he has." Should Lindbergh refuse, 
FBI agents would confront him with the fact Ford had identified this officer 
(assuming that Ford could and would do so). Continuing, Hoover postulated that, 
however Lindbergh responded, "we can then give consideration as to whether he 
should be called before a Grand Jury." Hoover urged that Lindbergh "should either 
be made to put up or shut up." Agreeing with Hoover, Biddle observed that if 
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successful the effort "might give the President a chance to clean out some `brass 
hats ' from the War Department.47 
The following day Hoover received a report on the Ford interview. Detroit 
Special Agent in Charge (SAC) Bugas advised the FBI director that Ford had invited 
Lindbergh to Detroit to discuss the aviator's "attitude towards the Jews." At the 
time, Lindbergh had made some anti -Semitic remarks, particularly in a now - 
infamous Des Moines speech where he labeled Jewish elements as war agitators. 
When asked whether Lindbergh had mentioned Army or Navy war plans, Ford could 
not recall Lindbergh making any comment about that. Hoover's plan, which rested 
on Ford s information, seemed to have fallen through.48 
Ford's failure to provide useful information did not deter FBI officials, 
however. SAC Bugas again interviewed Ford's director of plant security, Harry 
Bennett, to see if he could recall any of the details about the Ford -Lindbergh 
conversation. While Bennett could not recall the name of the officer whom 
Lindbergh had "frequently" contacted for his information, he did remember that 
Lindbergh was apprehensive about maintaining this contact. Instead, Bennett 
reported, Lindbergh sought as a contact a man named Major James Higgs. Bugas 
advised Hoover that "Bennett believes that Higgs would know the name of 
Lindberg's [sic] principal contact." Bennett offered to ask Lindbergh directly who 
his source was, but was admonished by Bugas not to take any action without prior 
FBI approval.49 
On 20 December, FBI Assistant Director Edward Tamm interviewed Higgs 
in the presence of two officials from Army intelligence. Reporting the results to 
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Hoover, Tamm identified Higgs as from the National Guard, and not a regular Army 
officer. Higgs was employed in the War Department as a public -relations expert, 
serving in the office of General Henry "Hap" Arnold, chief of the Army air corps. 
Tamm found it "interesting to note" that Higgs had been a newspaper reporter in St. 
Louis, Missouri, when Lindbergh was there in 1927. In any event, Tamm asked the 
public -relations man whether he had seen the original document. Tatum doubted 
Higgs's denial to having seen the plan, observing that Higgs's job was to publicize 
the Air Corps in an attempt to gain recruits. The FBI agent believed that Higgs had 
to have known Air Corps estimates were he to carry out his assigned task. Tamm 
further asked Higgs about his relationship with Charles Lindbergh. While Higgs 
claimed to know "Colonel Lindbergh" only in a formal manner, Tamm did not 
believe him since the major referred to Lindbergh several times by his nickname, 
Slim. Despite having interviewed Higgs for a lengthy period, Tamm was unable to 
develop anything "of an affirmative nature" regarding the War Department leak. 
Nevertheless, the assistant FBI director concluded that "it appears definite that Higgs 
has been involved in some War Department politicing [sic] or sculduggery [sic] 
about which he is considerably worried. "so 
While FBI officials tried -in vain to identify the name of the military 
officer who had provided an "isolationist senator" with the Victory Program, agents 
were hard at work identifying the suspicious senator. The Bureau had two 
Democratic senators in mind: Senator Burton K. Wheeler of Montana and Senator 
David I. Walsh of Massachusetts. Wheeler was suspect almost immediately given 
the fact that earlier in the year, in July, he had publicly revealed a proposed military 
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plan to send an American expeditionary force to Iceland. Wheeler had also 
informed the press about British expectations that the United States would become 
involved in the war and "disappoint[ment]" that America was not.51 Walsh became 
a suspect in January 1942 when an unidentified FBI informant (whose name the FBI 
has withheld) reported a rumor that Walsh had received one of the thirty five 
mimeographed copies of the War Department plan and had made it available to a 
reporter of the Chicago Tribune. The FBI's informant had left employment with the 
Washington Times -Herald over a dispute with the paper's publisher, Mrs. Eleanor 
Patterson, McCormick's cousin. Probably enjoying the idea of some form of 
retribution, the informant reportedly was "tickled to death" to assist the FBI and 
believed that Walsh and Chesly Manly, the author of the controversial Tribune 
article, enjoyed a close relationship.52 
Interestingly, the FBI was almost on the mark with its suspicions as to 
Chesly Manly's source for the Victory Program plan. FBI officials had initially 
suspected the prominent anti -interventionist Senator Wheeler but they decided to 
focus on Senator Walsh, instead, as the prime candidate because agents had similar 
uncorroborated information as to his guilt. They were wrong. Burton Wheeler - 
who in the early 1950s admitted his role and in 1962 publicly stated as much -in 
fact provided the Victory Program to Manly. 
Wheeler's role began on 8 June 1940, the day after he had delivered a 
nationally broadcast radio speech in which he urged Americans not to panic over the 
rapid pace of events in Europe. According to Wheeler, an Army Air Corps officer - 
a captain - visited him at his Senate office. Wheeler did not know the man. but 
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decided to listen to what he had to say. (Wheeler never identified this officer.) The 
unidentified Air Corps captain offered to provide the senator with official military 
figures, and on this occasion informed Wheeler that the American air forces were 
completely inadequate to face world powers such as Nazi Germany. The officer 
intimated that any government official who stated otherwise was lying. For the time 
being, this is all the officer provided Wheeler, but their relationship became a lasting 
one. 53 
After several subsequent meetings with the Air Corps captain, Wheeler 
finally received from him the bombshell information about the Victory Program. In 
September 1941, the captain informed Senator Wheeler that the president had 
assembled a master plan for an American expeditionary force to Europe. Fascinated 
by this new information, Wheeler asked if the captain could secure a copy of this 
plan. The captain agreed to Wheeler's request, but he was unable to do so until 3 
December. That day, he delivered the Victory Program plan to Wheeler at his home 
"wrapped in brown paper and labeled `Victory Program. ' Curious as to why the 
captain would expose this top- secret document to someone not in the executive 
branch, the captain replied: "Congress is a branch of the government. I think it has a 
right to know what's really going on in the executive branch when it concerns 
human lives." Wheeler kept the plan overnight to study it.54 
"As I scanned its contents," Wheeler subsequently wrote, "my blood pressure 
rose." The senator believed that in light of the way the neutrality acts, lend- lease, 
and the destroyers for bases deal had been presented as measures designed to avoid 
American participation in war, revealing this Victory Program would undercut those 
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arguments. Wheeler wanted to prove to the American public that if the country 
continued on its present course, war was inevitable. He did not believe that 
revealing the top- secret plan violated the law. Because it was only a contingency 
plan of production requirements, and was not an operational war plan, he saw no 
reason not to inform the American public of the government's plans.55 
Wheeler decided the best way to publicize the Victory Program was to 
ensure its publication in a paper sympathetic to the anti -interventionist cause. He 
decided to show the plan to the Washington correspondent of the Chicago Tribune, 
Chesly Manly, because "I liked Manly and knew his paper would give the plan the 
kind of attention it deserved." When presented with the document that night, 
according to Wheeler, Manly was "startled and fascinated." The two men met at the 
senator's home "for several hours" at which time Manly copied the most important 
sections of the plan; the document had to be back at the War Department the 
following morning. The next day, 4 December, the story went public.56 
During the initial phase of the FBI investigation, FBI officials sought to 
identify the military officer who leaked the contingency plan and the public official 
to whom it went. They investigated those prominent anti -interventionists -whether 
in the public or military sphere -who might be the perpetrator or perpetrators. FBI 
agents tracked down information that suggested the complicity of a United States 
senator. Investigators also interviewed those directly responsible for writing the 
story: journalist Chesly Manly, Chicago Tribune managers, and others associated 
with the so- called "isolationist" press.57 
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FBI and G -2 (military intelligence) officers subjected Chesly Manly to 
lengthy interrogations. They attempted to persuade the newspaper correspondent to 
reveal his source and the details surrounding the leak. Manly, however, refused to 
cooperate on the grounds of freedom of the press. The investigators continued to 
press him to identify his source by constantly rephrasing their questions. Each time, 
however, Manly answered: "I am not at liberty to answer any question that goes to 
the source of my information." FBI agent Genau pressed Manly further, asking him 
if his source was "above patriotism ?" Manly denied the matter had anything to do 
with patriotism. Changing tactics, the interrogators asked him to reveal which 
numbered copy of the Victory Program he had seen. Knowing this could reveal his 
source, as each copy was charged out to a particular individual, Manly refused to 
answer. Time and again the FBI and Army investigators prodded him and even 
employed some hyperbole: 
There is ... a deadly earnestness to get to the bottom of this and we are 
trying to clear you and your paper of this espionage. It is definitely, until 
you prove to the contrary, a possible case of espionage. I can tell you this, 
that if it ever got out to the public -even a rumor -that there were copies of 
the document you had several weeks prior to Pearl Harbor, they would tear 
down that building in Chicago, and you know it. That's just the type of 
hysteria we don't want in this case. 
Manly assured the investigators that no espionage had taken place. 
Reporting to Secretary of War Stimson on the interview, the interrogators stated that 
Manly, in their view, had obfuscated during the questioning. Stimson noted that "it 
looks as if my old friend Wheeler was pretty close to trouble.i58 
On 10 December 1941, army intelligence officers also interviewed the 
publisher of the anti -interventionist New York Daily News, Joseph Patterson, and 
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shared the fruits of their effort with the FBI. The Army interviewers hoped that 
Patterson's connections with the Chicago Tribune would lead to useful information 
regarding the leak. Unlike Manly, when asked about the contingency plan revelation 
Patterson admitted: "A Senator called [i.e., telephoned] Mr. [Arthur S.] Henning, 
manager of the Washington Office of the Chicago Tribune ... and through this 
medium had Mr. Henning this story." Unable to identify the senator, Patterson 
informed investigators that McCormick had standing orders to find any stories 
that 
could be used to scoop the Chicago Sun, a paper set to go into print for the first 
time 
on 4 December 1941.59 
Following Patterson's lead, on 6 January 1942, FBI and Army investigators 
located and questioned Arthur Henning who was in Washington, D.C. 
Henning 
refused, however, to reveal the source of the Victory Program leak. When asked 
whether he was under directions to scoop the Chicago Sun, Henning, amused 
at the 
suggestion, replied: "This thing just happened. It was a providential occurrence ... I 
received no instructions from my superiors." Henning admitted to having 
seen a 
copy of the plan made by his source but added that his source "had a legal right 
to 
have the plan in his possession." When asked whether the source originated 
from 
Capitol Hill, Henning said: "These ridiculous things may be dismissed 
from your 
mind. "60 
FBI and Army investigators found Henning's attitude and information 
of 
seeming importance. Following their initial interview, the investigators 
again 
questioned McCormick, this time about Henning. Denying 
any knowledge of 
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Henning's sources, McCormick nonetheless agreed to ask Henning, in some way, to 
help the investigators without violating the confidentiality of newspaper sources.6I 
FBI agents again questioned Henning on 12 January 1942. Prefacing their 
interview by asking whether Colonel McCormick had talked with him about 
assisting in the investigation, Henning answered in the affirmative. But he refused 
to divulge any further information. Asked if anyone in government or Congress had 
supplied the plan, Henning replied: "I must refuse to answer the question. The 
individual who had it got it legally and properly. I must protect my source and will 
not give my source away if I can possibly help it. "62 
At this point the FBI's investigation seemed to have stalled. FBI Assistant 
Director Tatum advised Hoover that "we should not mess around with kid gloves in 
dealing with Arthur S. Henning ... or for that matter with Colonel McCormick." 
Tatum recommended calling Henning, McCormick, and Chesly Manly before a 
grand jury to reveal their source "or be cited for perjury or misconduct." The FBI 
director agreed, adding: "[W]e have ourselves largely to blame because of 
unagressive handling of case by our own people." Hoover seems to have blamed 
others for the apparent failure of his original investigative plan, that of investigating 
quietly. Deciding to change investigative tactics to discover who was responsible 
for the leak of the Victory Program, and thus placate administration political desires, 
Hoover wrote Attorney General Biddle on 27 January. Reviewing some of the 
Bureau's leads, Hoover noted that hundreds of people had been interviewed, but due 
to the procedures used at the War Department for handling secret documents it was 
"impossible" to determine who could have possibly leaked the plan. Hoover pointed 
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out that "a minimum of 109 persons" had "legitimate" access to the contingency 
plan (he noted a similar number had access to it in the Navy Department). In 
addition to these, Hoover wrote, the number of authorized people having access to 
the plan -War Department personnel often shared documents without charging 
them out each time -"is legion. "63 
The FBI director then outlined the FBI's effort to that date. He disclosed that 
an investigation into a rumor that Congressman Philip A. Bennett of Missouri paid a 
War Department clerk for this information had turned up nothing. He also noted 
that the Bureau's "extensive investigation" to determine if Charles Lindbergh had 
relayed the information to the newspapers via "personal friends or contacts" in the 
War Department had similarly failed. Furthermore, FBI investigations of those War 
Department officers who were regarded as "anti- British, anti -Administration, or 
otherwise out of sympathy with the Administration's international policies" had 
unearthed nothing. Hoover also reported the results of the inquiries with Manly, 
Henning, and McCormick.64 
Because his tactics had unearthed no information, Hoover informed Biddle 
that he would discontinue further investigation. He recommended, instead, "that 
consideration be given to the initiation of a grand jury inquiry into the facts in this 
situation." He specifically suggested subpoenaing Arthur Henning and Chesly 
Manly before the grand jury to force them to reveal their source. Hoover noted that 
"Every indication is that this source will be a Congressional one." An attempt could 
then be made "to compel" the congressional source to reveal who in the War 
Department had delivered the plan.65 
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Having exhausted all avenues of inquiry by following his option of 6 
December to employ a low -key investigation, Hoover now advocated the use of a 
grand jury to discover the source of the War Department leak. The original plan 
having failed, and in an effort to provide the administration with answers, Hoover 
suggested aggressive tactics. This was not Hoover's first proposal to utilize grand 
jury proceedings. He advocated use of a grand jury when, for example, Charles 
Lindbergh seemed to be a promising lead in the case. And while Hoover proposed 
to halt the investigation, this did not occur. FBI officials followed up any leads they 
had obtained following 27 January and conducted a large number of interviews. 
Meantime, the administration dragged its heels in deciding on the case. With the 
country at war following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December, and no 
firm suspects to indict, the administration hesitated. 
The FBI's determination to locate the persons who were involved in the leak 
is further documented by a cryptic and heavily redacted FBI document. On 13 
February 1942 FBI Assistant Director Ladd reported to Hoover on his conversation 
with Senator Gerald Nye. Ladd mentioned that there was a great deal of speculation 
in the Senate about the FBI's investigation; that members of the Senate Military and 
Naval Affairs Committees and certain "isolationist" senators were under 
investigation for suspicion of leaking the Victory Program. According to Nye, 
Chesly Manly had told Senator Burton Wheeler "that if this investigation continued 
to involve these various Senators [notably Wheeler and Walsh] he, Manly, would 
expose the entire thing, advising as to the source from which he obtained the 
material." FBI officials' response to this disclosure is unknown as the remainder of 
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the document has been completely blacked out. Manly's concern seems evident. 
Throughout the investigation FBI agents nipped at the heels of the senator who was 
responsible but agents were unable to confirm their suspicions. Manly knew this 
and, in a seeming bit of anger, wanted to go public with the information. Cooler 
heads prevailed in the end and he did not.66 
For the next two months (February to March) FBI agents continued to write 
up investigative summaries and conduct interviews. They particularly interviewed 
military and civilian employees in the office of the secretary of war. From what 
Bureau personnel had learned, somebody in the upper echelons of the War 
Department had provided the plan to a member of Congress. Intent on exploring 
every possible avenue available to them -until the administration decided on 
whether to go forward with grand jury proceedings, which would attract press 
coverage despite the proceedings being secret-FBI officials conducted extensive 
interviews. They interviewed Henry Stimson's personal secretary, Elizabeth Neary, 
as well as thirty -two other people. Among the common questions asked were 
whether the interviewee had access to the Victory Program and whether or not he or 
she knew anyone in the United States Senate or House of Representatives. None of 
the subjects revealed anything of use to FBI investigators.67 
Having heard nothing from Biddle, on 2 May Hoover again wrote the 
attorney general to inquire what the administration had decided to do. Hoover 
informed Biddle that all relevant reports had been submitted to the Justice 
Department's Criminal Division and, he asked, "whether the Bureau should close its 
file on this ease or whether you contemplate taking some further action." While no 
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reply exists in the Victory Program case file, on 4 May the FBI director wrote across 
his copy of the memorandum he sent Biddle: "File may be closed. "68 
This did not, however, end the matter. By June 1942, the administration had 
decided to consider indicting and prosecuting those involved in the Victory Program 
leak. This decision did not stem out of some sudden reconsideration of the evidence, 
however. Near the time of the Battle of Midway in 1942, the Chicago Tribune 
published a story written by Stanley Johnson that contained information about 
Japanese naval strength in the Pacific. Concerned that information in this article had 
come from official government sources, the administration sought to indict the 
Tribune and Johnson for printing "seditious" material. While the government's 
attempt to indict the newspaper and reporter ultimately failed (because they could 
not establish what damage the article had done), the excitement raised over the issue 
renewed consideration of possibly taking action on the Victory Program leak. On 17 
June Assistant Attorney General Wendell Berge requested from FBI Director 
Hoover the summary report of the leak investigation.69 
With a prosecutorial spirit reinvigorated during the fast -moving events of 
1942, FBI officials outlined their evidence and how a prosecution, under the 
Espionage Act, would be conducted against those involved in the leak. The Bureau 
suggested prosecuting Chesly Manly, Arthur Henning, the Chicago Tribune, and 
the Washington Times -Herald under three sections of the Espionage Act of 1918. 
One section of the Act criminalized the possession of a government plan relating to 
national defense matters with the intent to distribute it to an unauthorized person. 
According to FBI officials, Manly and Henning were liable inasmuch as they 
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provided the newspapers with the Victory Program. The newspapers' actions were 
also deemed unlawful since they made the plan available to the public. A second 
section of the Act criminalized the copying of a government national defense plan 
with the intent to use the information to the detriment of the United States or to the 
advantage of a foreign power. Bureau officials believed the suspects had intended 
either to injure the United States defense effort or to aid a foreign power. The third 
section punished the acquisition of government plans knowing the very act was a 
violation of the law. In a memorandum dated 17 June, a FBI official detailed the 
evidence available to suggest the defendants knew the plan "would be used to the 
injury of this country and to the benefit of a foreign nation." As witnesses the 
Bureau chose Albert Wedemeyer and fifteen others to testify to various sundry facts. 
On this basis, then, the FBI recommended prosecution of Manly, Henning, and the 
two newspapers.70 
While their reason is unrecorded, Justice Department attorneys decided 
against pursuing this case. With the tide of war shifting somewhat in mid -1942 after 
the Battle of Midway, and with other more pressing matters occupying the White 
House, interest in pursuing the matter had dissipated. The case was put to rest in 
July and FBI agents compiled a closing report. While this closing report does not 
indicate the Bureau's final conclusions about the leak, a 1952 memorandum on the 
case does. This document confirms that FBI officials had suspected a Brazilian 
Army officer, General Goes Monteiro, who "visits Washington frequently" and had 
contacts with members of the anti -interventionist community. The Bureau's source 
for this suspicion was an unidentified informant. In any event, FBI officials were 
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never able to determine who leaked the Victory Program to the anti -interventionist 
press. While correctly suspecting Senator Wheeler, agents proved unable to develop 
any evidence to implicate him. Despite this failure, FBI officials' efforts to satisfy 
administration desires for action against the anti -interventionists -advocated by 
Roosevelt, Stimson, Ickes, and Biddle -to discover who was responsible for the leak 
enhanced their standing with the president and senior administration officials» 
FBI efforts to discover the source of the leak and, if possible, develop 
evidence to prosecute those involved were prodigious. FBI agents interviewed 
hundreds of persons associated with both the War Department and the anti - 
interventionist press. Confidential informants were engaged, one of whom was a 
disaffected former employee of the Washington Times -Herald. FBI officials were 
particularly interested in Albert Wedemeyer because he was both involved in the 
development of the plan and associated with elements of the "isolationist' 
community who adamantly opposed administration policy. Given both the 
administration's and the FBI's concern about Lindbergh since 1941, he featured 
prominently in this investigation even though all information about his alleged role 
was circumstantial. Anti- interventionist Senators Wheeler and Walsh also became 
suspects, as did Missouri Congressman Bennett. And, of course, the Chicago 
Tribune and Washington Times -Herald and their respective associates -Manly, 
Henning, and McCormick -were of central interest. Unable to discover who had 
leaked the Victory Program, by January 1942, realizing that investigating the matter 
in a non -public manner had failed, Hoover advocated employing a grand jury to 
pressure those involved and provide the information desired by administration 
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officials. By then Hoover had concluded that the FBI's unassertive methods had led 
to this investigative failure and now was willing to advocate more aggressive means. 
Subpoenaing those whom FBI officials suspected knew the identity of the source, as 
Tamm noted, would render them liable to be indicted for perjury or obstruction of 
justice. By changing tactics, Hoover believed he could satisfy the desires of 
administration officials and not appear to have failed in their eyes. But with the war 
effort mounting, passions over the contingency plan leak faded. The last opportunity 
presented itself with the Battle of Midway leak. The failure then to indict the 
Chicago Tribune and Stanley Johnson for publishing this article on Japanese naval 
strength at the Battle of Midway in 1942 effectively ended any effort to uncover the 
Victory Program leak. Throughout, FBI officials' efforts highlight one of Hoover's 
overarching concerns to placate administration political desires -in this case to 
exact some form of retribution on those political opponents who published a story 
while not harming national security but being highly embarrassing to the White 
House. In this case again, the pragmatic FBI director, despite failing to develop 
evidence to warrant prosecutions, worked to satisfy those in the Roosevelt 
administration who sought retribution. He continued to pursue this course after 
Pearl Harbor as FBI officials worked to develop evidence to prosecute those anti - 
interventionists whom the administration considered seditionists, as will be seen in 
the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 7 
The FBI Surveillance of Anti- interventionists Extending Beyond Pearl Harbor: The 
Brigham Family, Harry Elmer Barnes, and Laura Ingalls. 
Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the subsequent United 
States entrance into the Second World War, FBI officials continued to monitor some 
anti- interventionists who in their view were subversive. Although the anti - 
interventionist movement had rallied behind the war effort after 7 December 1941, 
these particular persons received special FBI attention owing to their controversial 
political stances or statements. In the context of a newly inaugurated war, FBI 
officials concluded that their views constituted a threat. FBI officials continued to 
rely on the Foreign Agents Registration Act to recommend indicting an individual 
either for not registering as an agent of a foreign government or for advocating the 
overthrow of the United States government by force or violence (a tenet of the Smith 
Act). Three targets demonstrate this concern. Ethel Brigham and her family were 
vocal ultraconservative anti -interventionists who were closely associated with the 
New York chapter of the America First Committee. For FBI officials the Brighams 
became a cornucopia of political intelligence regarding the president's foreign policy 
opponents. FBI agents continued to monitor Harry Elmer Barnes, the noted 
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revisionist historian, who even after the declaration of war criticized the White 
House. FBI officials sought to develop a sedition case against him. Laura Ingalls, 
the noted aviator and controversial America First speaker, continued to speak out 
against the administration and was eventually prosecuted for violating the Foreign 
Agents Registration Act, the only anti- interventionist to be successfully prosecuted. 
In all three cases, Hoover's effort serviced President Roosevelt's political interests, 
dating from 1940, to silence his anti- interventionist critics. Now that the country 
was at war and the crisis atmosphere was great, Hoover continued to forward 
political intelligence reports to the White House and to develop cases against the 
president's critics. Extant records indicate that Roosevelt and other administration 
officials from December 1941 did not respond to Hoover's forwarded information. 
With new priorities following the American entrance into the war, the White House 
was probably preoccupied with other pressing matters. Nevertheless, Hoover 
continued his previous pattern in monitoring and investigating Roosevelt's foreign 
policy critics on his own with no objection from the White House. 
* * * 
One anti -interventionist target whom FBI agents monitored before and after 
the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was Ethel Brigham and her family. The FBI's 
investigation of Ethel (and her family), a vocal ultraconservative in her politics, 
proved to be a valued source of political intelligence on the anti -interventionists. 
The principal means by which the Bureau collected this political intelligence was a 
wiretap of Ethel Brigham's telephone. Hailing from New York City, the Brighams 
(but particularly Ethel and her daughter Barbara) were associated with the 
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Greenwich Village branch of the America First Committee's New York chapter with 
Barbara serving as the branch's chairperson. The Brighams, moreover, were 
prominent persons. Ethel was a leading opera and concert soprano in the 1920s and 
1930s, singing in London, Berlin, and New York; Barbara was a leading America 
First figure in her chapter; Ethel's son Daniel was a foreign correspondent for the 
New York Times; and daughter Constance was an actress who performed on 
Broadway. The FBI's monitoring and gathering of political intelligence on the 
Brighams corresponded with a broader pattern of monitoring Roosevelt's prominent 
foreign policy critics.' 
The vice president of the United States, Henry Wallace, brought the 
Brighams to the attention of the Justice Department on 3 November 1941 after 
receiving a telephone call about them from a friend. Wallace's confidant, whose 
name the FBI has redacted in the released FBI files, said he had "a lead concerning 
the activities of the America First Committee" that might include an assassination 
plot on Roosevelt's life. While at a hotel in Washington, D. C., the vice president's 
friend had met somebody in the Brigham family or a friend of theirs (it is difficult to 
determine from the FBI files owing to extensive redactions) and was invited to tea at 
the Brigham's apartment the next time he was in New York City. Soon thereafter, 
this person had visited the Brighams in New York for tea and, afterwards, had 
accompanied them to the cinema. After the film Ethel and Barbara had bought a 
newspaper that contained a story that reported that Roosevelt had placed the United 
States Coast Guard under the authority of the Navy. This, reportedly, enraged the 
two women who exclaimed Roosevelt "ought to be killed for taking such action" 
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and that "he would be killed before long." The informant had subsequently learned 
that the Brighams were supposedly associated with an organization, which FBI 
officials later learned was named the One Gun Club, that allegedly had 500,000 
members and planned a revolt if Roosevelt took the country into war.2 
Upon receiving this information, an FBI official placed the Brighams on 
"loose surveillance" that was to "be handled very discreetly." FBI Director Hoover 
concurrently notified the Secret Service of these charges, as it was this agency's 
responsibility to protect the president and investigate threats made against his life. 
On 4 November 1941 Hoover explained the situation to the attorney general and 
requested authorization to wiretap Ethel Brigham's telephone. Since 1934 with the 
inception of the Federal Communication Act the use of wiretaps was illegal. In 
1940, however, Roosevelt had secretly authorized their limited use, with the attorney 
general's approval, in national defense cases (see chapter 5 for the details on 
wiretapping authority). The attorney general acceded to Hoover's request and on 10 
November FBI agents installed a wiretap.3 
The wiretap, however, was not the Bureau's only source of information 
about the Brigham matter. To gather "more detailed information concerning the 
identity and activities of' the Brighams, FBI agents consulted the Credit Bureau of 
Greater New York as well as the Brighams' local postal carrier to learn details about 
them, including that Ethel and Barbara worked at the local America First Committee 
chapter. FBI agents thereupon placed the chapter under surveillance and monitored 
the activity of the two women there. Agents further checked with the Automobile 
Registration Bureau to confirm the ownership of the car the Brighams had been 
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driving. Finally, on 13 November agents initiated a mail cover -a surveillance 
method of recording the names and addresses of senders and recipients of mail -on 
the Brighams but it proved to be unproductive.4 
The FBI wiretap remained in place until 30 December with a single seven - 
day interruption. In a memorandum to the attorney general, Hoover reported that on 
12 November he had temporarily suspended the wiretap "inasmuch as it revealed 
that Mrs. Brigham had been interviewed by Federal agents with respect to the 
[assassination] matter." Hoover advised the attorney general that because Secret 
Service agents had directly confronted Brigham and questioned her, "the possibility 
of obtaining additional information, either through the technical surveillance 
[wiretap] or through Mr. [deleted, but Wallace's friend] is extremely doubtful." 
Hoover nonetheless advised his superior that FBI agents would continue to develop 
this information "as opportunity is presented" and on 19 November the wiretap was 
re- established.5 
It is unclear whether the attorney general was aware that Hoover continued 
the wiretap. The FBI director's statement that the wiretap would afford no further 
useful information coupled with his statement that the Bureau would try to obtain 
further information "as opportunity is presented" suggests that the attorney general 
may not have known of the wiretap's continuance. Did Hoover find the Brighams 
such a tantalizing source of political intelligence that he did not want to discontinue 
the wiretap? Given the Brigham's ultraconservative character and vocal nature did 
he purposefully mislead the attorney general by implying that the tap proved 
worthless insofar as the original wiretap justification had been effectively removed 
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when Secret Service agents interviewed Brigham? Was Hoover's instruction then 
based on his conviction that the Brigham's views made them a threat? Or did the 
attorney general understand, given Hoover's use of the word "temporary," that the 
wiretap would be continued? We may never know for certain. In any event, the 
Brigham wiretap continued for the remainder of 1941. 
What is clear is that in the nine communications and one summarizing report 
from New York SAC P. E. Foxworth to Hoover concerning the fruits of the Brigham 
wiretap, all the reported information concerned the political activity of the Brighams 
and other anti -interventionists. When briefing Hoover on the information obtained 
through this wiretap, Foxworth used the euphemism "from a confidential source that 
is known to the Bureau" when, in fact, he meant electronic surveillance. 
Substituting the word wiretap with the confidential- source phrase enabled Foxworth 
to conceal the Bureau's use of a sensitive and illegal (even though authorized by the 
attorney general) wiretap. A reader of this report (if publicly compromised) would 
assume the phrase meant a human source of information, not a technical one. In a 
personal and confidential letter6 of 18 November, Foxworth revealed that FBI 
officials had learned of the Secret Service's interview of Brigham through the 
wiretap. Foxworth further reported that Brigham had refused to participate in a 
political demonstration sponsored by the anti -war group Women United. The 
group's plan to burn Roosevelt's campaign pledges, Brigham concluded, could 
trigger an "unfavorable reaction it might have upon the America First Committee." 
(Women United was a group to the right of the America First Committee which FBI 
officials also believed to be subversive.) Brigham had discussed a campaign 
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conducted by her chapter, Foxworth continued, to urge congressmen to vote against 
neutrality revision. In his concluding paragraph, Foxworth noted that no further 
information had been developed either regarding an assassination plot or to identify 
any other organization with which the Brighams were associated. Only political 
intelligence had been gleaned from the wiretap. 
On 25 November Foxworth sent a letter and teletype message to Hoover 
both, again, originating from "a confidential source known to the Bureau" (i.e., the 
Brigham wiretap). The New York SAC reported in his letter that Brigham had used 
the German expression "Das ist gut" over the telephone while speaking to a person 
with a "decided German accent." Foxworth further reported that Brigham had a 
conversation about the America First Committee possibly becoming the American 
Party, a political party that would only support anti -interventionist candidates. This 
information was deemed important enough to send immediately to Hoover via FBI 
teletype. Among other sundry political information, Foxworth reported that Ethel's 
nephew, Phillip, who was a member of the Coast Guard (apparently a reservist), 
frequented a club called the German- American Place. Phillip reportedly disliked 
wearing his Coast Guard uniform which prompted Ethel to remark: "He will have a 
good time at the German- American with that damn thing on!" Again, nothing but 
political information was reported with some of this included in a later report to the 
White House. 8 
Foxworth's letter and teletype of 25 November regarding the information 
gleaned from the wiretap, moreover, piqued Hoover's interest in Brigham and led 
him to request "a comprehensive report." Rather than submit a comprehensive 
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report, on 13 November Foxworth directed Hoover's attention to a five -page letter 
he had sent Hoover the day following his request in which he had promised a report 
in the near future. The letter summarized the fruits of the wiretap from 25 
November to 2 December. This included some anti- Semitic remarks made by 
Brigham as well as personal information regarding her friends and family. She also 
discussed political matters involving the New York chapter of the America First 
Committee, particularly the fact that "the America First Committee was constantly 
in touch with the anti -war leaders in Congress and that they refused to sponsor any 
movement of that kind [forcing a war vote] when there was no chance of it being 
successful." Brigham also discussed on the telephone that she knew of a man who 
saw the president every two weeks and suggested that he may be used to deliver 
messages from America First to the White House. This information was later 
reported to the White House.9 
On 13 December, Foxworth sent two letters to Hoover reporting on the 
wiretap. The first covered the usual political intelligence of Brigham's America 
First activity, specifically her negative opinion of Roosevelt following Pearl Harbor 
and the closure of the Greenwich Village chapter. FBI officials were particularly 
interested in Ethel's fitful remark to Barbara following the United States entrance 
into war: "Where is that One -Gun Club that's going to do something ?" This 
information was later reported to the White House.'° 
Foxworth's second letter of 13 December reported that FBI agents had 
successfully cultivated an informant based on information developed through the 
wiretap. FBI officials learned that a woman had visited the Brighams and became 
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involved in a heated political discussion with Ethel over U.S. involvement in the 
war. The Brighams' guest, apparently, did not agree with Ethel's politics. Later, 
FBI agents recorded Ethel stating over the telephone that "what's bothering me now 
is what that little bitch will do to me, but I swear by all that is holy that if she does 
try anything I will call up the wives of the men she has been having in her room." 
Foxworth's letter to Hoover thereafter states that "Arrangements were then made to 
interview Miss [deleted] personally." FBI agents obtained from the newly- recruited 
informant further details about the Brighams and, most significantly, a list of their 
associates. Hoover forwarded this list to the White House.l 1 
On 16 December Foxworth reported more of the Brighams' comments about 
their politically -vexed house guest turned FBI informer. Ethel Brigham reportedly 
stated that the leaders of the country had nothing to lose in the war and that when 
she finally saw "Roosevelt's four sons on a battleship headed for battle then she will 
`Whoop it up. "' Brigham added that, nevertheless, the sons would never be in 
danger. The remainder of Foxworth's letter, much of which is heavily redacted, 
reports the activities of persons associated with Brighams whom FBI officials 
suspected of being Irish Republicans. The exact details of these individuals and the 
FBI's interest in them cannot be ascertained due to deletions in the document. Yet, 
the information bearing on the Brighams personally was of a political nature.12 
In a teletype message of 19 December, Foxworth notified Hoover of 
information developed from the Brigham wiretap regarding the America First 
Committee and Laura Ingalls, the anti -interventionist convicted under the Foreign 
Agents Registration Act. Having intercepted a conversation between Emil Morosini, 
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a New York lawyer whom FBI agents believed subversive, and Barbara Brigham, 
FBI officials learned that Morosini "was horrified to learn of Laura Ingalls' arrest as 
a non -registered [foreign] agent." He asked Barbara whether the America First 
Committee of New York could raise the $7,500 bail for Ingalls. Barbara expressed 
concern inasmuch as she had worked with Ingalls and that Ingalls' arrest was "a 
slap" for the America First Committee. Hoover reported this political intelligence to 
the White House early in 1942.13 
The following day, in a subsequent teletype message to Hoover, Foxworth 
reported other political intelligence gleaned from the Brigham wiretap, in this case 
regarding Charles Lindbergh. Foxworth learned that Brigham had attended a dinner 
party at the home of Edwin S. Webster, secretary of the America First Committee's 
New York chapter, where Lindbergh was present. Lindbergh reportedly urged 
America Firsters to rally behind the war effort, yet Brigham said he "seemed 
discouraged as the govt has no plan nor does it know for what it is fighting." This 
information was included in a political intelligence report to the White House 
separate from that sent regarding the Brighams. (See chapter three for more 
detail.)14 
With the discontinuance of the wiretap at the end of December 1941, SAC 
Foxworth submitted to FBI headquarters on 15 January 1942 a summary report on 
the Brigham investigation. The eighty -nine page report, labeled "INTERNAL 
SECURITY- G[ermany]," recapitulates the information Foxworth had forwarded to 
Hoover in his nine previous personal- and -confidential letters. The SAC continued to 
employ euphemistic language such as "confidential source known to the Bureau" 
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when writing of wiretap -procured information. A section of his report was devoted 
exclusively to information gathered about prominent persons, such as Lindbergh, 
much of which has been redacted. The report again documents the vast amount of 
political intelligence FBI officials garnered about Brigham, the America First 
Committee, and some prominent anti- interventionists. The only information 
concerning a threat involved the One Gun Club, an organization that FBI officials 
believed advocated the overthrow of the United States government. But all 
intelligence gathered about this group was derived from heated conversations among 
the Brighams, who were prone to make wild, emotional statements when agitated. 
In any event, the vast amount of information forwarded to Hoover (and then to the 
White House) dealt with political matters concerning Roosevelt's foreign policy 
critics.15 
Hoover had two primary concerns subsequent to receiving Foxworth's 
comprehensive report. He directed the SAC that "It is imperative that the possible 
existence of an organization of such considerable proportions [the One Gun Club] 
advocating revolution be exhaustively investigated." But, Hoover warned Foxworth, 
insofar as one of the group's alleged associates was affiliated with a New York City 
law firm, the investigation "should be handled in a most discreet manner." Hoover's 
second concern was to ascertain the identity of the person whom Barbara Brigham 
mentioned over the telephone as having seen Roosevelt twice a week who allegedly 
hated the president as much as the Brighams. In these matters Hoover demanded 
immediate action and regular reports.16 
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Meantime, on 26 January Hoover sent a detailed memorandum to the White 
House on the Brighams. In his cover letter to Presidential Secretary Edwin Watson, 
the FBI director stated that one of the Brighams had threatened the life of the 
president -the basis of the investigation. Hoover then mentioned that Ethel 
Brigham knew an acquaintance of the president who saw him biweekly. Hoover 
advised Watson that the FBI memorandum listed possible names of this individual 
who knew the president, names that were ascertained from the Brigham 
investigation. The attorney general also received a copy of the memorandum, 
though in his cover letter to Biddle Hoover only referred to the threat against the 
president. No mention was made of the wiretap on either of these documents to the 
White House or the attorney general.17 
The memorandum forwarded to the White House and attorney general was 
based on the nine letters and SAC Foxworth's summary report. By far, most of the 
information in these documents had been obtained from the Brigham wiretap. Some 
of the names which Hoover listed had been provided by the informant who had been 
recruited in the course of the Brigham wiretap. The memorandum listed a number 
of prominent anti -interventionists, including Charles Lindbergh, Laura Ingalls, and 
Catherine McCormick. Not surprisingly, the reported information reflected the 
White House's interest in the ongoing political activities of its anti -interventionist 
America First opposition even though the organization had disbanded following 7 
December 1941. 
The Brigham wiretap afforded further political intelligence that, along with 
information from other sources, Hoover forwarded on 13 February a second 
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unsolicited memorandum to the White House. This memorandum was based on 
information developed from various sources and reported that the America First 
Committee had planned to reemerge politically under Charles Lindbergh's 
leadership. Hoover believed that at the present time the group had gone 
underground. This information was based on intelligence gleaned from the Brigham 
wiretap and information supplied to the Bureau by Army intelligence. Later, Interior 
Secretary Harold Ickes, in his scathing book manuscript on Lindbergh, utilized this 
political intelligence (inaccurate though it was). The book was never published but 
this particular information originated from the FBI memorandum. (See chapter three 
for the full story.)18 
SAC Foxworth, moreover, continued to investigate the One Gun Club and its 
possible link to a plot against Roosevelt. Both of these avenues of investigation 
involved the Brighams and were supplemented by FBI physical surveillance and 
recruited informants as the wiretap had been discontinued. An FBI report of 2 
March 1942 and a confidential FBI letter of 18 May 1942 illustrate the sources and 
information gathered subsequent to the discontinuance of the Brigham wiretap. At 
some point after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, while attending the play "The 
Land is Bright," Ethel Brigham was alleged to have made "a violent outburst" 
against Roosevelt and his foreign policy. To FBI officials these comments were 
"un- American." FBI agents located cast members and audience members from the 
play and interviewed them about Brigham's comment. One informant stated that 
"There was no question in anyone's mind at the theatre as to the attitude of Mrs. 
Brigham, she being a boisterous advocate of isolationism and strongly opposed to 
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the President and his Foreign Policy." Nothing about the One Gun Club had been 
learned in this case and, again, only political intelligence was reported.19 
Through contacts at the State Department, FBI agents were able to ascertain 
Brigham's travel history. They contacted what one FBI official described in a 19 
May 1942 FBI report as a "confidential informant" who provided Brigham's 
passport records. FBI officials learned of her travels throughout Europe and some 
personal and descriptive data. FBI agents also followed up leads from Pennsylvania 
that Brigham had "subversive tendencies" but uncovered nothing of value.20 
Despite their inability to develop information by monitoring the Brigham 
family after discontinuing the wiretap, FBI officials continued to believe that the 
Brighams had information relative to the One Gun Club. This continued belief was 
precipitated by a memorandum given to FBI agents in New York claiming that one 
of the Brighams (probably Barbara) "definitely knows" of the existence of the One 
Gun Club, financed by millionaires and secretive in nature. The information 
outlined in the memorandum was speculative and not based on firm evidence. 
Nonetheless, some FBI officials recommended reinstating the Brigham wiretap to 
develop information on this organization because, in their view, most of the 
Brigham's house guests belonged to subversive organizations, and in particular the 
One Gun Club.21 
On 4 June 1942, a senior FBI official (probably Ladd) reauthorized the 
Brigham wiretap. Significantly, Ladd or Hoover did not seek the attorney general's 
approval to reinstate this wiretap, but authorized it on their own authority (and thus 
violated Roosevelt's 1940 directive that all wiretaps be authorized by the attorney 
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general). This action was based "under the original authority granted by the 
Attorney General." Attorney General Francis Biddle had originally authorized the 
wiretap on the fact that a threat had been made against the president. The 
continuance of the wiretap in 1942 had nothing to do with a threat made against the 
president, suggesting that FBI officials may not have been confident that Biddle 
would have re- authorized the wiretap. Indeed, Biddle later wrote in 1962 that he 
"was not in the habit of approving wiretaps" and that he believed it was a "dirty 
business." This action further reveals that FBI officials had gained a level of 
autonomy enabling them to employ surveillance methods that, while illegal, needed 
authorization from superiors. Furthermore, FBI agents never developed any 
information about a threat to the president or that confirmed the existence of the One 
Gun Club. The wiretap and other sources of information instead uncovered only 
political intelligence about the America First Committee, its members, and 
associates, all under the rubric of a domestic security investigation.22 
The Brigham wiretap was resumed on 24 June. Following FBI procedure the 
wiretap was assigned a "symbol number" (the code -identification for wiretap or 
microphone surveillance targets). The precise symbol assigned to Brigham has been 
deleted in FBI documents released under the FOIA. The symbol then became part 
of the Symbol Number Sensitive Source Index (now called the National Security 
Electronic Surveillance Card File), a centralized finding aid identifying the targets of 
specially sensitive FBI wiretaps and bugs. When citing the symbol number in their 
correspondence and reports, FBI agents would not reveal that their source was a 
wiretap. Regarding Brigham, FBI agents either just cited the symbol number or, 
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more often than not, referred to the wiretap as "Confidential Informant [deleted, but 
symbol number]. "23 
New York SAC Foxworth found the Brigham wiretap profitable. On a 
weekly basis he submitted reports on information obtained from the wiretap and he 
requested continuance of the wiretap from Hoover because "information of value 
was obtained from this source. "24 Interestingly, the wiretap reports are not included 
in Brigham's FBI file along with the wiretap continuance requests -which utilized 
the euphemism "Confidential Informant [deleted]." These sensitive reports were 
more than likely filed in one of the secret office files maintained either by Hoover or 
by other senior FBI officials. A letter of 12 August from Hoover to Foxworth does 
document that weekly reports were submitted with the requests for continuing the 
wiretap, and further that Hoover had ordered the continued submission of weekly 
reports on the Brigham wiretap and "on all such confidential informants. "25 
The extant wiretap reports reveal no new information about a subversive 
organization but continue, in the words of SAC Foxworth, to "reveal additional anti - 
Roosevelt, anti- Semitic, and continued isolationist attitude on part of Ethel and 
Barbara Brigham. "26 In July, moreover, FBI officials reported one piece of 
information obtained through the wiretap to the administration. The information 
involved an intercepted conversation between Ethel Brigham and an unidentified 
individual. Ethel stated that she had learned from an "underground" source that 
Britain and Germany had been meeting secretly in Belgium which would leave the 
United States "holding the bag." These uncorroborated comments were obtained 
from a telephone conversation and were never substantiated. Further, given the fact, 
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admitted to by FBI agents and associates of the Brighams, that Ethel Brigham was 
apt to make exaggerated and wild statements, the comments should have held no 
weight. But given the crisis atmosphere in 1942 and Hoover's practice of reporting 
information to the White House, he concluded that this information was of some 
value to his superiors. On 20 July Hoover forwarded this particular information to 
the attorney general, Harry Hopkins (by this time Roosevelt's close advisor), the 
head of MID, and Assistant Secretary of State Adolf A. Berle. The recipients were 
not informed that the information had been obtained through a wiretapped 
conversation.27 
FBI agents continued until 26 October to monitor the Brighams' telephone 
conversations, with weekly approvals, when the wiretap was discontinued.28 During 
this period nothing was developed about any subversive organization called the One 
Gun Club. Instead, FBI agents continued to collate political intelligence, much of it 
very caustic. On 17 July, for example, FBI agents overheard Ethel state that "the 
President is unable to stand on his own feet, let alone think, and that he is only the 
front man for the Jews who are desirous of getting a ring around the world and want 
to smash the United States." On 5 August she reportedly referred to Roosevelt as 
"that idiot at the helm of this country" (this is the only reported information gleaned 
from 5 August). On 16 August she referred to Roosevelt's refusal to utilize Charles 
Lindbergh's services after the United States had entered the war -in April 1941 
Lindbergh had resigned his Army Air Corps commission as a colonel -as "part of 
the crookedness ... of the President." These examples are representative of the type 
of information FBI agents developed during the course of this wiretap. All of it was 
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vitriolic, emotional, and sometimes anti -Semitic. And despite nothing being 
developed about the One Gun Club, Hoover continually approved the wiretap's use 
because, as Foxworth said in his requests, information "of value" had been 
collected.29 
The final paragraph in the last report on Ethel Brigham, dated 1 July 1943, 
indirectly summarizes the investigation's nature. It reads: 
Since the long investigation conducted with regard to Mrs. Ethel 
Brigham and her family has not indicated that they are engaged in any un- 
American activities, and since their rabid and vicious statements have been 
considered harmless by unprejudiced Americans who have had frequent 
opportunity to judge the background and character of this family, the 
collateral leads set out in the above referenced report are being disregarded 
and this case is being closed in the New York Field Office.3° 
The investigation of Ethel Brigham and her family demonstrates that FBI 
officials had, in fact, gathered political intelligence about anti -interventionists from a 
wiretap and forwarded some of it to the White House. The investigation and wiretap 
may have been initially based on the premise of a threat against the life of President 
Roosevelt -a threat that when examined closely does not seem credible. 
Nonetheless, the wiretap only yielded information of a political and personal nature 
about the Brighams, the America First Committee, and prominent anti - 
interventionists like Charles Lindbergh. Interestingly, in October 1941 Hoover 
denied to Robert E. Wood, chairman of the America First Committee that the FBI 
"directly or indirectly at any place in the United States tapped the wires, interfered 
with the mails, or checked the membership lists of the America First Committee." 
We know, now, that Hoover's statement is untrue.3 
The value of this wiretap as a source of political intelligence is further 
demonstrated by FBI officials' continuing it after Secret Service agents had 
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interviewed Brigham, which dispensed with the issue of a threat against Roosevelt. 
This value is further underscored by the decision of a senior FBI official to re- 
authorize the wiretap in 1942 without the attorney general's sanction, thereby 
violating Roosevelt's 1940 directive requiring such advance approval. Instead, FBI 
officials re- authorized the tap on the basis of the attorney general's original consent, 
but the continuance had nothing to do with a threat made against the president. The 
re- established wiretap again only produced political intelligence. SAC Foxworth 
thereafter requested weekly re- approval of its use from Hoover, claiming valuable 
information was being gathered but as FBI documents show, only political 
intelligence was collected. 
Conceivably other anti -interventionists had been wiretapped or that 
information about them had been gathered from wiretaps that indirectly bore on anti - 
interventionist activity. This conclusion, while speculative, is nonetheless probable. 
Given Hoover's intricate filing procedures and use of euphemisms in FBI reports 
that hid the fact that a wiretap was a source, we may never know the full extent of 
FBI wiretapping and the full amount of political intelligence gathered. Extant FBI 
records prove the use of some wiretaps and allude to others, but a great deal of 
sensitive FBI files routinely were destroyed as FBI policy or were destroyed 
following Hoover's death in 1972. While we might not fully comprehend the scope 
of FBI employment of illegal wiretaps, we do know they were used. 
* * * 
Harry Elmer Barnes was a prominent American revisionist historian, 
sociologist, criminologist, and social critic. He received his Ph.D. in history from 
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Columbia University in 1918, and held academic appointments of many institutions. 
He is well known for his widely -read college text books World Politics in Modern 
Civilization (1930), A History of Western Civilization (1935), and An Intellectual 
and Cultural History of the Western World (1937). But he is best known for his 
revisionist tract Genesis of the World War (1926) which redirected blame for the war 
from Germany to France and Russia. In total, Barnes published over thirty books 
and hundreds of essays. When he joined the chorus of anti -interventionists in the 
late 1930s, Barnes's reputation made him an articulate and prominent critic of 
Roosevelt's foreign policy. 
While Barnes held politically liberal views and initially supported the New 
Deal, and freely spoke out in support of them, his historical revisionism about 
American involvement in the First World War underpinned his criticisms of New 
Deal diplomacy. He considered himself a person holding liberal beliefs yet sided 
with the mostly conservative America First Committee -he served as one of their 
speakers -to oppose the foreign policy of President Roosevelt. He also served as a 
vice -chairman for the Keep America Out of War Congress and was an editor of the 
anti -interventionist newsletter Uncensored. His siding with conservatives, who saw 
a threat in Roosevelt's centralization of power, alienated Barnes from his usual 
publishers. Publisher D. C. Heath, for example, wrote Barnes in 1941 that due to the 
"somewhat hysterical times" they felt "that we ought not to undertake your book, no 
matter how good the book." Instead, he began to publish with conservative presses, 
criticizing American entrance into World War II and the events leading up to Pearl 
Harbor. The conservative Caxton Press published his Second World War revisionist 
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book, Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace (1953). He also published essays later in 
conservative periodicals such as the National Review.32 
FBI officials monitored Barnes's activities dating from 1936 (to 1944), but 
more intensively when he became a spokesperson for the anti- interventionist 
movement. Historian Roy Turnbaugh has explained the FBI's monitoring of Barnes 
as a reaction to his criticism of the Bureau. (Barnes claimed the FBI propagated its 
image during the 1930s and that it was not the efficient, expert organization that 
Hoover claimed.) Turnbaugh concluded that when Barnes became a critic of 
Roosevelt's foreign policy, FBI Director Hoover used this opportunity to enact 
retribution. At one level this conclusion has merit. Nonetheless, the FBI's 
investigative effort regarding Barnes, as with other prominent anti -interventionists, 
extended beyond vengeance. FBI officials (and many Americans) viewed the anti - 
interventionists as un- American, subversive, or unwitting tools of the Nazis. Barnes, 
who seemingly thrived on the controversial, was no exception. His unabashed 
comments -both verbal and written -about Roosevelt's foreign policy, the FBI, and 
the war situation in Europe led FBI officials to regard him as un- American or 
subversive. This, coupled with Hoover's effort to curry favor with the Roosevelt 
White House, best explains the FBI's interest in this prominent anti -interventionist 
foreign policy critic.33 
FBI officials first became interested in Barnes in February 1936 when he 
commented disparagingly about the Justice Department's and FBI's war on 
gangsters. An FBI agent in Scranton, Pennsylvania, had attended a lecture Barnes 
gave on crime and reported that Barnes said neither the attorney general nor Hoover 
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had done anything to stop rackeeteers. He reportedly said the two had "hoodwinked 
the public with a lot of cheap publicity in the tracking down of a few criminals." 
Barnes went on to describe John Dillinger (and others) as, in reality, small -time 
criminals and not the important or dangerous ones. After reporting these comments 
to Hoover, an FBI agent wrote a memorandum on Barnes that summarized his 
professional life. In explaining Barnes's criticism of the FBI, the agent concluded: 
"Because of his Communistic tendencies, it can be readily seen why he has 
antagonisms toward the Bureau, probably dating back to the Bureau's activities 
many years ago [presumably its activity during the Red Scare of 1919 -20]." Barnes, 
however, always denied that he was a communist. In April 1941, for example, he 
wrote the Indianapolis branch of the American Legion to protest their condemnation 
of him as a communist.34 
In November 1936 Barnes again criticized the Justice Department and FBI 
along the same lines as his address in February. In an address at St. Louis Barnes 
claimed that the FBI only sought "small fry" criminals, ignoring the more 
sophisticated organized criminals, and thereby threw "dust into the eyes of the 
public." FBI Assistant Director Louis Nichols recommended in a 9 December 
memorandum: 
While it might be advisable to ignore Barnes, nevertheless I feel that 
such remarks as set forth above should not go unchallenged as they are 
derogatory and convey the impression that Barnes is attempting to discredit 
our Bureau, and I feel that his hand should be called, particularly when he by 
innuendo questions our honesty. Therefore, it is suggested that some 
vigorous representative of the Bureau interview Barnes and ask him for any 
information or evidence that he has as to the "10,000 most dangerous 
criminals who scorn to steal less than $10,000 at a time" whom "the Federal 
Department of Justice does not choose to meddle with." Then if Barnes is 
unable to furnish any accurate information regarding them which come 
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within our investigative jurisdiction, it is suggested that he be summarily 
placed in his proper place. It is believed that it would be inadvisable to write 
him a letter. However, if the above course is not deemed desirable, then I 
would like to suggest that the Director consider the feasibility of quoting 
Barnes in some future address as illustrative of the hoity toity professors who 
are so impractical and who really are undermining good law enforcement 
rather than bolstering it.35 
Senior FBI officials apparently decided not to pursue this course of action against 
Barnes. 
FBI officials lost interest in Barnes until 1940. In December of that year, 
FBI agents found his name in the files of an unnamed communist group as having in 
1933 endorsed the magazine Soviet Russia Today. He was also listed in these files 
as having been a member of the National Commission for Defense of Political 
Prisoners, and in 1935 as a board member of People's Lobby, Inc.. An FBI agent 
noted in a 17 December memorandum, labeled "internal security," that as Barnes 
had been previously "connected with questionable activity in the District of 
Columbia, a preliminary investigation is being made for the purpose of ascertaining 
his present whereabouts." FBI officials were interested in "his present activity and 
whether or not he is engaged in any form of un- American activity." For unspecified 
reasons, Hoover ended this specific inquiry in January 1941, but did not lose interest 
in Barnes altogether.36 
During 1941, FBI officials received unsolicited information concerning 
Barnes's alleged subversive activities. In June an unnamed informant wrote the FBI 
stating that Barnes was a fifth columnist and a Nazi mouthpiece in the United States. 
Then in July another unnamed informant wrote the FBI to accuse Barnes of having 
been "mixed up with radical and semi -radical affairs throughout the world." The 
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writer listed Barnes's various jobs and associations which, to him, suggested he was 
a communist. And in December, a Military Intelligence Division official forwarded 
an Army intelligence report to the FBI that described Barnes as "a dangerous man." 
The cited evidence, however, involved the professor's anti -administration public 
comments. In July 1941 Barnes, coincidentally, had denied to a friend that he had 
ever been a radical. He then stated that, in fact, "the FBI has been consulting me 
frequently this spring about appointments to their force." (Barnes was a noted 
criminologist.) None of these charges, however, were substantiated. Taken as a 
whole they seemingly confirmed for FBI officials (and others) that Barnes was a 
subversive and thereby an internal security threat. These accusations, along with his 
continued criticism of the administration, later led government officials in 1943 to 
develop a sedition case against the professor.37 
Other than notations in the America First Committee FBI file during 1941 
and 1942, the FBI file on Barnes curiously contains little information about his 
activities between 1941 and 1942. Barnes first became a focus of FBI officials in 
1943 when his critical utterances about the administration drew government 
attention. One FBI document dated 23 December 1942, however, precedes the 1943 
sedition case against the professor. During that month an FBI informant in Kansas 
City, Missouri, advised that a social science course offered by a Professor Trimble 
(who was associated with America First) at Kansas City University in 1942 was 
using a textbook written by Barnes entitled Social Institutions. The informant 
believed that as the book was published after 1942, Barnes was attempting in it to 
discredit the Roosevelt administration. A Professor Manheim referred to the book as 
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"obnoxious and ... not the type of literature for college freshmen." The informant 
further claimed that in a chapter entitled "Prejudice: Propaganda and Censorship" 
Barnes "uses a subtle style and cleverly insinuates that Roosevelt is attempting to set 
up a pro -Facist [sic] government in this country." To the chagrin of the informant, 
Barnes also had listed one of George Sylvester Viereck's books in his bibliography. 
The SAC in Kansas City informed FBI headquarters that he would follow up this 
information by interviewing the informant and collecting passages from Barnes's 
book. Hoover, however, ordered the agent not to follow up the lead because in his 
view it was "unnecessary. "38 
Barnes became aware in 1942 of concerns about his textbook Social 
Institutions, published by Prentice Hall. The editor at Prentice Hall, S. E. Carll, who 
was possibly interviewed about the book by FBI agents and listed as an unnamed 
confidential informant in FBI reports or who had caught word of FBI interest in the 
book, wrote Barnes and asked him to carefully review the statements he made in 
this, and other, textbooks. The editor stressed that he did not believed Barnes was 
guilty of sedition, but warned him that some impressionable student could show the 
book to his/her parents who would not understand the context of Barnes's 
statements. Carll stressed that the parents may "take exception to it and consider it 
their patriotic duty to report the book to the FBI. Then your trouble begins." The 
editor wrote that his example was merely "hypothetical" but added that "strange 
things can happen in times of stress. "39 
Following the United States entrance into the Second World War, the 
Roosevelt administration investigated, arrested, and prosecuted a number of 
281 
individuals for making seditious utterances. According to one Justice Department 
document, the government planned to use provisions of the Espionage Act, Smith 
Act, and the seditious conspiracy statute against "disloyal utterance." Francis 
Biddle, Roosevelt's civil -libertarian attorney general, has noted that he ordered the 
release of a number of these individuals and dropped their prosecutions. Biddle 
refused to allow a rehash of the First World War prosecutorial abuses. Among those 
released, for example, was Ellis O. Jones who had said Roosevelt should be 
impeached for asking Congress to declare war. The Roosevelt White House itself 
even sought to silence some members of the press utilizing the Smith Act, but 
Biddle prevented such an abuse. Others who were more pronounced in their 
radicalism were also prosecuted. These individuals included Gerald Winrod, 
William Dudley Pelley, Lawrence Dennis, Joseph McWilliams, George Deatherage, 
and Elizabeth Dilling. FBI Director Hoover, sensing the White House's interest in 
prosecuting some of its critics prior to Pearl Harbor, tried to develop information 
that could be used to warrant indictments against the president's critics for sedition 
(or under some other federal statute). Harry Elmer Barnes was one such 
individual.4o 
FBI agents began in 1943 to develop information on Barnes in hopes that the 
Justice Department could prosecute him "under the Sedition Statutes." An FBI 
report of 23 January 1943 from Albany, New York, records the FBI's view of 
Barnes. The Albany SAC claimed that Barnes was "long associated with 
Communist Front Organizations and isolationist movements. [He was] reported as 
strongly anti- British and noticeably opposed to President Roosevelt and [the] present 
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administration." The SAC also cited a newspaper account of a Barnes speech that 
was critical of President Roosevelt. An FBI agent was immediately dispatched to 
interview the newspaper reporter who had written the piece to confirm its 
accuracy.41 
FBI agents interviewed numerous persons to determine Barnes's political 
views dating from 1942. In September 1942, the Albany SAC reported, Mrs. Regine 
Kurlander offered the Albany office unsolicited information on Barnes. She had met 
him in Cleveland and through conversation determined that Barnes "gave every 
indication of being completely Fascist and no longer a liberal." She noted that 
Barnes claimed Roosevelt had planned Pearl Harbor to deliberately maneuver the 
country into war. Kurlander further reported Barnes's disparaging comments about 
Winston Churchill and Chiang Kai- Shek.42 
FBI agents then followed up with a search of FBI files, which indicated 
Barnes had been a speaker for the America First Committee and editor of the anti - 
interventionist periodical Uncensored. Various interviews of newspaper reporters 
who had covered some of Barnes's speeches were conducted, as well as some 
speech attendees, to determine their content. In each instance the interviewee noted 
that Barnes had made negative comments about the Roosevelt administration and its 
foreign policy.43 
An FBI report of 9 March described Barnes as a subversive and thereby 
liable for prosecution under the sedition statues. An FBI confidential informant 
(likely from Kansas City University), designated "A -1," criticized Barnes as an 
academic who "debunks and criticizes everything called `Americanism. "' 
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Confidential informant A -1 also regarded Barnes as "a short sighted rationalist who 
would go so far as anarchy; he is pedagogically dangerous." But while the 
informant may not have believed Barnes was a Fascist, he nevertheless believed him 
to "be inclined to Socialism and Communism." Lastly, the informant commented on 
one of Barnes's college textbooks, Social Justice as "bad for the students because it 
presents a too one -sided viewpoint and criticizes American ideals and traditions to 
the extreme." To FBI officials, all of these points about Barnes suggested that the 
professor was a seditionist.44 
FBI agents, in addition to monitoring Barnes's speeches following the 
American entry into the Second World War, sought out specific information about 
Barnes himself FBI agents traveled to Barnes's hometown, Cooperstown, New 
York, and interviewed people there. An FBI agent interviewed the Cooperstown 
assistant postmaster, J. Gilchriest, and inquired about where Barnes lived and the 
content of the professor's mail- nothing "unusual" was reported. An agent also 
interviewed the director of the Cooperstown branch of the New York State 
Historical Association who reported that after a speech given to the group, Barnes's 
reputation in the community plunged. Questioning the town clerk, N. E. D. 
Gilmore, about Barnes, FBI agents learned that he "is extremely sincere in his 
opinions." FBI agents also interviewed the village commissioner, mayor, and 
several individuals all of whom commented on Barnes's politics. To them he was 
critical of the Roosevelt administration.45 
On 20 April, Hoover assembled four FBI reports on Barnes -dated 23 
December 1942, 23 January, 9 March, and 30 March 1943 (all outlined above)- 
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which he then forwarded to Assistant Attorney General Wendell Berge of the Justice 
Department's Criminal Division. Hoover asked Berge to review the information 
FBI agents had developed and to report back to him if it qualified as "a violation of 
the Sedition Statutes and if you believe further investigation is warranted." Berge 
responded that the information developed by FBI agents did "not suggest that 
prosecutive action under the Sedition Statutes is warranted." The assistant attorney 
general advised that no further investigation appeared necessary. Hoover then 
advised the Albany SAC to discontinue the probe, adding that should further 
information on Barnes, "of a seditious nature," be received it should be reported to 
him.46 
FBI agents continued to report information about Barnes to Hoover. In May, 
an FBI agent in Kansas City attempted to ascertain "the phraseology of certain 
passages" from Barnes's book Social Institutions because they "strongly indicated 
the subject's anti -American sentiment." The agent was unable to accomplish this 
task, however, as his informant -a student -no longer attended the class using the 
textbook and no longer had a copy of it. Then, in June, the SAC in New York 
reported that Barnes was an officer of the American Council on Public Affairs, a 
member of the National Committee of International Juridical Association, and a 
Communist Party speaker. All of this information, some of it speculative, suggested 
to FBI officials that Barnes was a seditionist on account that he had "expressed [a] 
very pessimistic attitude toward [the] U.S. notwithstanding the outcome of the 
war." 47 
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One last report was filed on Barnes in July 1943 regarding suspicions that he 
was a seditionist and thereby subject to prosecution. The FBI's Albany, New York, 
field office interviewed one of Barnes's colleagues, the president of Union College 
in Schenectady, Dr. Dixon Fox. Fox was asked about Barnes's speech before the 
New York State Historical Association (having been present) inasmuch as FBI 
officials believed it suggested that Barnes was a seditionist. Fox's good character 
and standing as a college president apparently put FBI and Justice Department 
officials at ease. Dr. Fox stated that he had known Barnes for twenty -five years and 
while he thought Barnes was somewhat anti -British he nevertheless believed him "to 
be entirely open." Fox added that Barnes had the "disposition causing him to take 
the side of the minority in most disputes." This statement was enough for FBI 
officials to consider the case against Barnes for sedition closed and they proceeded 
with it no longer.48 
The foreclosure of the FBI's effort to develop evidence that could be used to 
prosecute Harry Elmer Barnes for sedition did not end FBI interest in the anti - 
interventionist historian. In December 1943 Barnes decided to apply for a 
government position as a business consultant with the Office for Emergency 
Management of the War Production Board. Such a job, during wartime, required an 
FBI background check and, again, Barnes's former status as an anti -interventionist 
foreign policy critic of Roosevelt was focused upon. Upon checking the Bureau's 
files for general information about Barnes, an FBI agent resurrected Barnes's 1936 
criticism of the FBI and submitted it to senior FBI officials. Upon reading the 
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memorandum, Hoover scribbled on the document: "See that he is thoroughly 
investigated as he is obviously a foul ball.i49 
Hoover ordered a widespread investigation with field offices across New 
York state, New Jersey, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Michigan, Massachusetts, 
and Washington, D.C. The FBI director wanted the matter "vigorously 
investigated.i50 Each field office reported to FBI headquarters with background 
information from their files or investigations, much of it duplicative. Nothing new 
was reported. Each report covered Barnes's various organizational memberships. 
comments made in speeches or in his writings, or information that had been reported 
under the Bureau's previous investigation for sedition. The New York field office 
offered the most detailed information, unsurprisingly, as it was central to the sedition 
inquiry. Indeed, the New York SAC reported on 9 February that Barnes lA as "a 
dangerous man" due to his "superlative egotism, and lastly on account of his flair for 
the spectacular." The SAC also reported that Barnes hated the United States 
government and "would either have some part in our government or go to jail. "5t 
FBI Director Hoover forwarded selected data to George Gould, assistant 
director for investigations of the Office for Emergency Management, culled from the 
FBI's long investigation of Barnes. On 26 February, Hoover forwarded to Gould 
three copies of the New York SAC's 9 February report on Barnes. This report. 
among all the field office reports submitted to Hoover, contained the most 
derogatory data regarding Barnes. Then, in a confidential 17 March letter to Gould, 
Hoover informed the OEM official that Barnes had made critical comments 
regarding the Justice Department's efforts to curb crime in 1936. He said Barnes 
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claimed big business had a part in protecting large, modern crime syndicates and, 
moreover, that the Justice Department had "hoodwinked the public by tracking down 
second rate criminals like Dillinger, a poor hunted boy, who was denied his 
constitutional right to surrender. "52 
Barnes's FBI file provides no indication of the decision of the Office for 
Emergency Management. But historian Roy Turnbaugh, who has studied Barnes's 
life, writes that despite the FBI's negative investigative reports Barnes had been 
hired by the Prison industry as a consultant before the FBI's reports were finally 
submitted.53 This FBI effort nonetheless demonstrates Hoover's desire to service the 
Roosevelt administration's political interests. FBI agents had investigated Barnes 
regarding him as a seditionist during a period when the government actively sought 
former critics for prosecution. But this effort involved more than an FBI vendetta 
against Barnes for his 1936 derogatory comments about the Bureau. Barnes was a 
prominent foreign policy critic of the Roosevelt administration and was closely 
associated with the America First Committee, working as one of their speakers. He 
was also a man of convictions who spoke out against the wrongs he saw in society, 
whether they were social problems or political ones that he identified in the 
Roosevelt administration. As a man who was often involved in controversy -a man 
who often spoke out for the underdog, as one of his colleagues commented to an FBI 
agent-it is not surprising that Barnes fell under FBI scrutiny for sedition and, later, 
when FBI agents conducted background checks for a government job his anti - 
interventionist and anti -FBI comments were further scrutinized as unfavorable. 
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Given Barnes's various statements, FBI officials viewed him predictably as "un- 
American." 
* * * 
Laura Houghtaling Ingalls was a noted female aviator during the 1930s, 
winning $2,500 in an air race from New York to California and establishing a 
number of female flying records. Moreover, like Charles Lindbergh, she was a 
colorful and controversial speaker on behalf of the America First Committee. But 
unlike Lindbergh and others associated with the America First Committee, Ingalls 
was the only America -First individual to have been successfully prosecuted for 
violating the Foreign Agents Registration Act -the law which FBI officials used 
time and again to develop information against Roosevelt's foreign policy critics. 
Her indictment in December 1941 and subsequent prosecution became a black mark 
on the legitimacy of the anti -interventionist movement. Yet among sincere anti - 
interventionist foreign policy critics those identified with the America First 
Committee and not radical fringe groups -Ingalls's prosecution was an exception.54 
Some America First members may have held controversial views regarding Nazi 
Germany and American entrance into the European war, but they never acted on 
them. Ingalls's naiveté regarding Nazi Germany -she admired German "efficiency" 
and rebuilding in the 1930s -led her to accept money from a German embassy 
representative to supplement expenses she had incurred while making anti- 
interventionist speeches for the America First Committee. While she had violated 
the law, as stipulated in the Registration Act, her motives do not appear to have been 
insidious, nor was Nazi influence among members of the America First Committee 
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significant. Ingalls was, indeed, a lawbreaker but her story is significant in two 
ways. First, it reflects the goal of FBI officials in regard to anti -interventionists -to 
develop information that might be used to prosecute foreign policy critics under the 
Registration Act or Smith Act. Two, her case stood out in FBI officials' minds (and 
others) as representative of the average anti -interventionist. Indeed, her case became 
a model for possible later prosecutions of those associated with Ingalls, particularly 
individuals associated with the America First Committee. 
Ingalls first came to the attention of FBI officials but not for her 
controversial statements about the administration's foreign policy. The catalyst then 
was her inquiry to work for the FBI. In August 1939, shortly after the outbreak of 
war in Europe, Ingalls was unable to find work as a female pilot in the military or 
airline industry. She decided to write Hoover asking to "work for you though the 
medium of my airplanes and perhaps serve my country as well- something I long to 
do; even though I am a woman-even in times of peace." When FBI Assistant 
Director Harold Nathan rejected Ingalls's offer, the aviator renewed her offer, 
commenting that there must be some position for a woman of her talents.55 
Hoover frowned on employing Ingalls, however. FBI officials had noted a 
29 September 1939 article (just thirteen days after her renewed offer) in the New 
York Times that Ingalls and Catherine Curtis,56 whom the FBI viewed as "allegedly 
Fascist in her leanings and affiliations," had unsuccessfully petitioned the U.S. 
Senate to conduct a hearing on the war. Having failed to convince the Senate to hear 
their ideas, Ingalls flew low between the Capitol and White House to drop anti -war 
pamphlets. By doing this Ingalls had violated restricted airspace and had 
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temporarily lost her pilot's license. Because of her associations and violation of 
restricted airspace (and undoubtedly from a degree of male chauvinism), Hoover 
declined Ingalls's second offer to work for the FBI.57 
By 1941, after Ingalls had become a popular speaker for the America First 
Committee -some considered her the "heroine" of the Committee, whereas Charles 
Lindbergh was the "hero" -FBI officials began to take a new interest in Ingalls.'$ 
FBI officials' interest then centered on her role as a controversial opponent of 
Roosevelt's foreign policy. In April and July 1941, an FBI informant notified the 
Bureau that in order to obtain a visa for a planned trip to London and Berlin, Ingalls 
had made an appointment to meet the German minister plenipotentiary and chargé 
d'affaires at the German embassy, Hans Thomsen. Ingalls had reportedly, and 
naively, hope to initiate peace between the countries.59 
Again, in August, an informant reported that Ingalls had discussed the 
possibility of flying to Germany "on a good will tour to tell the German people that 
the Americans are not obtaining the truth." To arrange this tour, Ingalls contacted 
Dr. Hans Borchers and Captain Fritz Wiedemann, German consular officials in New 
York and San Francisco, respectively. When reporting this information about her 
German contacts, the FBI's informant also noted that Ingalls had stated: 
Germany is a building country. America is in chaos. The Germans 
have the best brains in the world and are the finest organizers. You will be 
surprised to see what they intend to do in Africa. They have scientific minds 
and there isn't a lazy bone in the body of a German. 
Up to this point, FBI officials had only developed information that revealed Ingalls's 
admiration for alleged German efficiency and her naïve belief that she could be a 
mediator of peace and understanding between the Axis and Allies.6o 
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Also in August, according to an FBI informant, Ingalls traveled to 
Washington, D.C., where she became more closely involved with German officials. 
Through a third party, Julia Kraus, who worked for the District of Columbia, Ingalls 
had arranged to meet Baron Ulrich von Gienanth, second secretary of the German 
Embassy, to further her plans for a goodwill tour. She had met with von Gienanth 
twice in September, once receiving a package of German propaganda pamphlets. 
The content of the meetings is unknown, but Ingalls had made arrangements that 
would later lead to her prosecution under the Foreign Agents Registration Act.61 
Ingalls worked for the America First Committee as a speaker at its various 
rallies nationwide, but the Committee agreed only to pay her traveling expenses. 
Apparently Ingalls had decided to use her new contacts in the German embassy to 
secure further funds to supplement that paid by the America First Committee 
because, Ingalls had said, she could not continue to speak with America First 
without increased funding. In October, therefore, Ingalls made arrangements 
whereby von Gienanth agreed to pay her $250 per month as a means to supplement 
the travel expenses the America First Committee offered. She came to the figure of 
$250 because, according to Ingalls, she would make approximately $300 a month as 
a flight instructor.62 
Before FBI officials learned the details of this arrangement, they believed 
Ingalls might have passed information about American national defense to the 
German embassy. In September Hoover notified his SAC in New York to continue 
the investigation and he notified Assistant Secretary of State Adolf Berle of the 
connection with the German embassy.63 Meantime, FBI agents kept Ingalls under 
292 
surveillance. They followed her movements by day to keep track of her 
whereabouts. A 10 October memorandum from J. K. Mumford to FBI Assistant 
Director Ladd -head of the FBI's Domestic Intelligence Division -states that 
Ingalls had been "limiting her activities to her apartment and to calling at the 
America First Committee offices only." A second FBI memorandum suggests the 
possibility of a wiretap. But if FBI agents had wiretapped Ingalls, an admittedly 
speculative conclusion, they would not have been able to use any information 
gathered from the wiretap against the aviator in trial. Wiretapping was an illegal 
surveillance tool that Roosevelt authorized only for national defense cases 
(intelligence purposes) not for use in court.64 
The second memorandum, dated 16 December, reports that the FBI's 
primary problem regarding Ingalls "is that most of the information in the possession 
of the Bureau has been obtained from highly confidential sources which are not 
competent evidence in the event of a trial." FBI officials had maintained the 
practice of referring to wiretaps as "confidential sources," as was demonstrated in 
the case of Ethel Brigham. The same memorandum also states that "information 
developed today indicates that Laura Ingalls has made numerous efforts to contact 
von Gienanth by telephone and has threatened to come to his home. On one 
occasion he hung up the telephone during the conversation...." It is conceivable that 
Ingalls had been wiretapped or that information about her had been obtained 
indirectly via a different wiretap (possibly on the German embassy). This 
information would not have been admissible in a court of law.65 
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When war broke out between the United States and Germany, von Gienanth 
broke off contact with Ingalls. FBI officials knew of the contact between Ingalls and 
the German embassy and on 15 December inquired of the Justice Department 
whether she "should be taken into custodial detention at this time." Hoover was told 
not to arrest Ingalls. Instead, he submitted FBI reports concerning her to the Justice 
Department's Criminal Division who advised that sufficient evidence did not exist to 
link Ingalls with von Gienanth. But a breakthrough was made in the case when 
Ingalls's intermediary, Julia Kraus, confided to FBI agents that von Gienanth paid 
Ingalls to supplement her speech -making efforts for the America First Committee. 
FBI agents also obtained some telegrams sent by Kraus to Ingalls that indicated the 
receipt of money. They then interviewed Ingalls who did not hide the fact that she 
received the money, and was subsequently arrested.66 
Meantime, Hoover dispatched a memorandum on Ingalls to the White House. 
In the blind memorandum, he outlined the Bureau's case up to that date.67 
The Justice Department had sought to charge Ingalls with violating the 
Foreign Agents Registration Act as she had accepted money from an official of the 
German embassy to fund her speechmaking efforts with the America First 
Committee. According to the law, this made her a paid agent of the German 
government and had not registered herself with the State Department as such an 
agent. United States attorneys had planned to charge her in two ways: one, for 
failing to register as a foreign agent; two, for conspiring to violate the Registration 
Act with von Gienanth. Wendell Berge, head of the department's Criminal 
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Division, decided to proceed only with the first charge since it was the safest route to 
conviction.68 
On 23 December a federal grand jury indicted Ingalls for failing to register as 
a paid agent of the German government inasmuch as the money she received had 
been used by her to influence public opinion -via her speeches -in a matter of 
public policy.69 Defending herself during the resultant trial, Ingalls cited the offer of 
her services to the FBI in 1939, an offer Hoover rejected. But given Hoover's public 
statements asking citizens to assist the Bureau in its work, according to Ingalls's 
lawyer, she set about on this premise "to engage in counterespionage work." In 
short, Ingalls's defense was that she had been working all along to gather 
intelligence from the German embassy. The defense impressed neither the 
prosecutors nor Hoover, who commented: "Of all the silly clap trap this takes the 
prize." FBI officials became concerned on 3 February, however, when they learned 
that FBI agents had used a third party, Mrs. Ralph Revilo who was looking after 
Ingalls's apartment, to enter her Los Angeles residence and remove documents. The 
field office was censured by FBI headquarters, although it was determined that the 
documents were not central to the prosecution's case. In any event, the trial was 
held from 9 February to 13 February 1942, and a verdict of guilty was returned. 
Ingalls was thereby sentenced to serve eight months to two years in prison.70 
Following her conviction, FBI officials decided to look more closely at 
Ingalls's connection with the America First Committee to ascertain whether others 
associated with her and the group could be prosecuted. The FBI's special agent in 
charge at the Washington, D.C., field office noted that in the course of gathering 
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evidence from Ingalls's apartment, with a search warrant, a list of committee 
chairpersons, speakers, and speaking dates was found. The agent noted that the 
Washington, D.C., field office was holding this information since the listed 
individuals "are believed to be proper subjects for investigation." Moreover, the 
agent continued, "In the event of an investigation of the America First 
Committee['s] activities, the above information would be of considerable value." 
Hoover responded to the SAC ordering him to included the Ingalls material in the 
field office's summary report on the America First Committee, which at the time 
FBI officials had believed was attempting to reemerge in politics (see chapter 
four).71 
Ingalls's viewpoints about Nazi Germany and about her ability to prevent a 
destructive war might have been naïve. She had broken the law and suffered the 
consequences. Despite being a member and popular speaker for the America First 
Committee -she made over fifty speeches from the summer of 1941 until American 
entrance in the war- Ingalls' s case was atypical. Most America First members and 
speakers did not associate with German officials nor accept money from them. 
Ingalls's acceptance of money to supplement her America First travel expenses 
further confirmed her naivete, but to FBI officials (and others) her action typified the 
inherent disloyalty of the America First Committee. Indeed, Hoover's tactic to 
develop evidence that anti -interventionists violated the Espionage Act, Foreign 
Agents Registration Act, Sedition Statutes, or some other law succeeded in Ingalls's 
case. Her prosecution might have bolstered FBI officials views that Roosevelt's 
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anti -interventionist foreign policy critics were subversive and thus subject to 
investigation. 
* * * 
The FBI's investigations and monitoring of the Brighams, Harry Elmer 
Barnes, and Laura Ingalls demonstrates Hoover's interest in promoting the political 
interests of the Roosevelt administration. From the Brigham wiretap and 
investigation FBI officials had gathered valuable political intelligence about 
Roosevelt's foreign policy critics that was then incorporated in three political 
intelligence reports to the White House. The FBI's investigation of Barnes 
illustrates the Bureau's interest in developing information about anti -interventionist 
critics subsequent to Pearl Harbor that could be used to prosecute them under the 
sedition statutes. Barnes was a prominent anti -interventionist, respected historian, 
but not a seditionist. As a controversial figure he, as many prominent anti - 
interventionists, was viewed as a subversive. The Laura Ingalls investigation and 
prosecution demonstrates the Bureau's (and administration's) view of anti - 
interventionists as subversive, confirming the validity of their perceptions even 
though her case was atypical of America Firsters. Thus FBI officials desired to use 
the Ingalls case as a template for further prosecutions of anti -interventionists 
associated both with the America First Committee and Ingalls. To them, the success 
of the Ingalls prosecution under the Foreign Agents Registration Act validated FBI 
perceptions of anti -interventionists as a whole and FBI tactics -which might have 
included wiretaps. 
297 
FBI officials might have believed the Brighams, Barnes, and Ingalls were 
dangerous subversives, and given the crisis atmosphere this is not surprising. The 
FBI's monitoring of them nevertheless demonstrates Hoover's political agenda. 
Hoover had a long interest in satisfying the political and policy desires of President 
Roosevelt. He succeeded in this whether in providing valuable political intelligence 
on his foreign policy critics, or working to develop evidence that could be used to 
prosecute some former critics. Despite no documented response from administration 
officials regarding Brigham, Barnes, or Ingalls, Hoover's continued efforts to 
monitor and investigate Roosevelt's foreign policy critics (and to report on their 
activities) suggests a course of action the White House had no intention of impeding. 
In his efforts Hoover employed illegal surveillance methods, whether wiretaps or 
mail covers. All of these efforts had at their basis an interest in catering to White 
House interests that placed Hoover and his FBI in good stead with the 
administration. The use of these intrusive tactics suggests that the FBI's origins as a 
national security agency (part of the national security state) had its origins with the 
Great Debate. A pattern is evident in the extent and tactics FBI officials employed 
against the anti -interventionists (such as illegal wiretaps) that mirrors those 
employed against communists and leftists during the Cold War. By utilizing such 
means, the end result was increased authority for the FBI, a basis upon which 
Hoover built the FBI into an even more powerful and autonomous agency. 
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CHAPTER 8 
The FBI, British Intelligence, and the Anti- interventionists, 1940 -1942. 
Dating from 1940, British intelligence established a relationship with the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation and thereafter played a covert role in the anti - 
interventionist /interventionist foreign policy debate. Because of a dearth in 
documentation we cannot definitively ascertain the scope and nature of British 
intelligence operations in America. But available evidence shows that the agency 
dubbed British Security Coordination (BSC) sought to discredit and disrupt the 
political activities of Charles Lindbergh, the America First Committee, Burton 
Wheeler, Hamilton Fish, and others. The lack of firm documentation has also lent 
itself to the rise of a popular and sensational mythology surrounding the BSC's 
activity, and particularly the role of its leader, Sir William Stephenson. Extant 
evidence, however, demonstrates less heroic aspects of BSC's history, including its 
interest, parallel with the FBI's, in the activities of Roosevelt's foreign policy critics 
(indeed many of the same targets). New evidence furthermore suggests that the 
relationship between the FBI and British intelligence played a part, heretofore 
ignored in favor of other theories, in convincing President Roosevelt that the United 
States needed centralized intelligence. 
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The records of the British Security Coordination -the umbrella organization 
that represented the British Security Service (MI5), Secret Intelligence Service 
(SIS), Special Operations Executive (SOE), and Political Warfare Executive in 
America - reportedly were destroyed at the end of the Second World War after the 
organization's official history had been written.' Destroying the documentary 
record gave BSC partisans a golden opportunity to write history their way, and to 
minimize the role of the FBI. Stephenson had recruited various authors including an 
academic, two journalists, and a short-story essayist to write an uncritical history.2 
This official BSC history remained classified until it was published in 1998.3 Before 
then, unofficial apologists dominated the literature about BSC and Stephenson. H. 
Montgomery Hyde -a former BSC official- published a version of the official BSC 
history at Stephenson's urging entitled The Quiet Canadian (1962). Hyde borrowed 
freely from the BSC history when writing his account, which followed the original 
text more or less faithfully, but exaggerated Stephenson's importance. Hyde also 
published a memoir of his role with BSC entitled Secret Intelligence Agent (1982). 
In 1976, with the assistance of Stephenson, Canadian journalist William Stevenson 
published a sensational account of Stephenson and the BSC, A Man Called Intrepid, 
which perpetuated a dewy -eyed mythology about BSC. All of these works dealt in 
some manner with the FBI's relationship with BSC, but none was verifiable.`' 
While the official BSC history is not referenced - needless if BSC records 
were destroyed -it nevertheless presents a generally accurate account, if written in a 
flattering and triumphal manner, of the BSC's work in America. To be sure, the 
BSC history must be used carefully. But there is no reason to doubt, beneath the 
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uncritical prose, the official history's general veracity. Some of the facts examined 
and conclusions drawn in 1945, when the history was written, can be verified or 
reflect perceptions about anti- interventionists that are contemporaneous to 1945. 
The official history, therefore, is a useful original source in understanding one aspect 
of the FBI's relationship with the BSC. Utilizing available archival sources, FBI 
files, and other varied sources, we can ascertain at least a limited understanding of 
the relationship between the FBI and BSC in the context of their interest in the 
president's foreign policy critics. 
* * * 
The relationship between the FBI and British intelligence dates at least to the 
First World War when it liaised with Sir William Wiseman, the British intelligence 
representative in America.5 During the Second World War, the FBI maintained 
limited and unofficial contact with Captain Sir James Paget, the British Passport 
Control Officer, who from 1937 was the representative for British intelligence in 
America. (British intelligence officials previously preferred that Paget coordinate 
with the State Department.)6 The FBI also maintained limited contact with the 
British Purchasing Commission. By 1940, the more influential William Stephenson 
replaced Paget as passport control officer. Stephenson established an intimate and 
official relationship with FBI Director Hoover and built his British Security 
Coordination organization in New York. 
William Stephenson was born and raised in western Canada. When the First 
World War commenced in August 1914, he was a student in Winnipeg but joined 
the military and eventually became an officer and pilot. Stephenson distinguished 
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himself as a fighter pilot and won various British and French commendations. 
Stephenson also won at this time the world amateur -lightweight boxing 
championship. After the war, Stephenson became a successful businessman with a 
variety of high -level contacts. His contacts in the steel industry, particularly in 
Germany, made him invaluable to the British government. He was able to provide 
Winston Churchill and Lieutenant Colonel Claude Dansey of SIS (who regularly 
sought out businessmen for intelligence purposes) information on German war 
preparations and munitions. After Churchill became prime minister in 1940, 
Stephenson was recruited by SIS and, given his high -level contacts in America - 
such as with the wealthy Astor family of New York who were also friends of the 
Roosevelts -he was selected as Britain's intelligence representative there. 
Stephenson made two trips to the United States in 1940. It was during the 
second trip that he established himself as the British passport control officer. This 
first voyage to America, however, occurred in April 1940 after efforts by Hamish 
Mitchell, of the British Purchasing Commission, failed to establish liaison with the 
FBI. Mitchell sought FBI assistance to protect British war materials from saboteurs 
through FBI plant- protection surveys and employee name checks. The FBI and the 
State Department-the latter represented by Assistant Secretary of State Adolf 
Berle, head of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference- reacted coolly to 
Mitchell's proposal and no liaison was effected. (Berle later reacted unfavorably to 
Stephenson's intelligence operations in the United States.)9 
Sir Stewart Menzies, head of SIS, had recruited Stephenson to travel to the 
United States to establish "a high -level liaison with the Federal Bureau of 
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Investigation. "10 Stephenson established contact with Hoover through a mutual 
friend, the boxer Gene Tunney.11 Yet before Hoover would establish formal ties to a 
foreign intelligence organization that was to operate on American soil, he demanded 
authorization from President Roosevelt. Berle opposed liaison with British 
intelligence while Hoover sought to monopolize this liaison, and so wanted to 
bypass State Department channels. Stephenson, given this situation, obtained 
Roosevelt's imprimatur through Vincent Astor. An intimate friend of both 
Roosevelt and Stephenson, Astor later served as an intelligence coordinator in New 
York for the White House. Roosevelt, it appears, happily endorsed Stephenson's 
desire for FBI liaison directing that "There should be the closest possible marriage 
between the FBI and British Intelligence." Roosevelt's approval of liaison between 
the FBI and BSC is confirmed by Robert E. Sherwood, former Roosevelt 
speechwriter and chief of the Office of War Information, who wrote in 1948: "There 
was, by Roosevelt's order and despite State Department qualms, effectively close 
co- operation between J. Edgar Hoover and the FBI and British security services 
under the direction of a quiet Canadian, William Stephenson. "12 
Stephenson, Tom Troy has ascertained, had at least one fourteen -hour 
meeting with Hoover to work out the details.13 He then returned to Great Britain and 
reported on his mission to establish close cooperation with the FBI. On 21 June 
1940, Stephenson returned to New York City aboard the SS Britannic to formally 
build the BSC.14 As no meaningful British intelligence organization existed in New 
York, Stephenson had to build one. He had already made contact with Hoover, 
which was imperative for him to operate on American soil, but Stephenson also 
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maintained a number of high -level contacts in America and Canada. These 
individuals included William Donovan, who headed the American Office of 
Coordinator of Information and later the Office of Strategic Services, and British 
Ambassador Lord Lothian. Locating his organization in Rockefeller Center on Fifth 
Avenue, Stephenson was assisted by fifteen security officers and forty-five support 
personnel. Stephenson sought three goals for BSC: to monitor enemy activity, to 
prevent enemy sabotage of British property, and to promote the interventionist 
political position in America.15 
Most important to Stephenson at this early juncture was his liaison with 
Hoover. The BSC history's characterization of Hoover is accurate and confirmed by 
recent studies of the FBI director. The BSC history describes Hoover as "in no way 
anti- British, but in every way pro -FBI. His job is at once his pride and his vanity. 
These facts are emphasized because they are fundamental to an understanding of the 
course of BSC's relationship with the FBI, which did not run smoothly 
throughout. "16 
Hoover, according to the BSC history, was indispensable in establishing 
British intelligence in America and not until just before Pearl Harbor did the FBI - 
BSC relationship deteriorate. The BSC history states that "Hoover could hardly 
have been more cooperative" in assisting Stephenson's organization from 1940. 
Indeed, Hoover is credited for giving British Security Coordination its name. 
Hoover also had invited one of Stephenson's lieutenants, H. Montgomery Hyde, to 
tour FBI headquarters to learn about FBI methods. The BSC history further states 
that Hoover permitted the BSC to use an FBI radio channel to communicate with 
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SIS headquarters in Great Britain. Not until early 1941 did BSC approach the FBI 
about establishing an independent radio transmitter. Hoover, reportedly, also 
ordered his agents to cooperate with BSC in every way. 17 
Undoubtedly, there were many interactions between the FBI and BSC. But 
the precise nature and scope of this relationship cannot be determined until records 
are released in both America and Britain. The British government has released 
nothing relating to BSC operations in America or its cooperation with the FBI. Only 
fragmentary evidence proves that liaison was effected. The FBI also has not 
released any unredacted FBI files on the two organizations' relationship, and will 
not release files without British approval. Historian Francis MacDonnell, author of 
Insidious Foes: The Axis Fifth Column and the American Home Front (1995), for 
example, submitted a Freedom of Information Act request to the FBI requesting 
access to correspondence between FBI officials and senior Roosevelt administration 
officials regarding BSC and Stephenson. He also requested access to 
correspondence between FBI officials and Stephenson. MacDonnell received 
hundreds of pages of documents, all of which were heavily redacted, leaving only 
one or two words undeleted. But the FBI also withheld hundreds of pages of 
documents in their entirety. Irrespective of the redactions, the FOIA request 
confirms that a large base of documentation exists -in this case merely reflecting 
inter -government correspondence -in FBI files about Stephenson and the BSC.18 
Some interaction between the FBI and British intelligence can be 
documented. In a personal and confidential letter of 28 May 1941 to the White 
House, Hoover reported that "the British Intelligence Service has advised that . . . 
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nationwide attempts at sabotage may be expected during the Decoration Day week 
end. "19 The FBI's interaction with British intelligence, moreover, suggests that 
Hoover may have played a part in convincing President Roosevelt of the necessity 
for establishing a centralized American foreign intelligence organization, a function 
that Hoover had hoped to secure for the FBI. Previously, credit has been given 
solely to William Donovan, who had made two trips to Great Britain and had 
submitted a report to Roosevelt on the value of centralized intelligence.20 But in late 
1940 and extending into 1941, representatives of the FBI visited Great Britain, 
surveyed its intelligence apparatus, and Hoover submitted a report (in March) to 
Roosevelt that pre -dated Donovan's (in April). 
The official BSC history states that Stephenson "afforded him [Hoover] 
opportunity for studying the organizational prerequisites of secret intelligence 
work." Stephenson supposedly "made arrangements in the autumn of 1940 for two 
of Hoover's senior officers to visit SIS headquarters. "21 Two representatives of the 
FBI indeed traveled to Great Britain in the autumn of 1940, but only one was a 
senior FBI official, Hugh H. Clegg- assistant director of the Training and 
Inspection Division. The other, Lawrence Hince, was an FBI agent who had 
volunteered to serve as Clegg's assistant. Whether Stephenson alone had arranged 
for the trip, as the BSC history suggests, cannot be confirmed, but it is conceivable 
that he had some hand in the arrangements. FBI records indicate that the FBI's 
mission was "to make a survey not only of intelligence matters but all matters 
dealing with functions of police in times of national emergency. "22 
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On 30 October Assistant Secretary of State Berle, Roosevelt's 
interdepartmental intelligence coordinator, approved the FBI mission to Great 
Britain.23 Early in November the State Department issued passports to the two FBI 
men and at 1:00 AM on 23 November they departed Washington for Jersey City. In 
New Jersey, as no space was available on the clipper ships to London, they boarded 
the American Export Line ship Excalibur for Lisbon, Portugal, whence they traveled 
to London. Arriving in London on 1 December, Clegg and Hince proceeded, in the 
words of Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles, "to study methods of handling 
intelligence and internal security. "24 
Clegg and Hince studied British intelligence for two months, departing 
London at the end of January 1941. The two FBI representatives had access to high - 
level British intelligence officials, permitting them to study the organization and 
methods of the Secret Intelligence Service, Security Service, and Government Code 
and Cypher School. In making periodic reports to Hoover, Clegg used the State 
Department's confidential code. One decoded cable to Hoover outlined the broad 
survey of Clegg's and Hince's inquiry. They had examined in detail British 
intelligence and counterintelligence, censorship, evacuation, air -raid defense, 
policing methods, handling of foreign nationals, industrial and plant protection, the 
communication of intelligence, conscription investigations, emergency custodial 
detention, Fifth Column investigations, and various civilian defense and emergency 
procedures.25 
The official history of British intelligence during the Second World War 
indicates that Clegg and Hince, who are unnamed in the history, In February 1941 
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[sic] ... were received as pupils at SIS's London office." There, they were able to 
scrutinize the British effort in deciphering Axis codes.26 Historian Bradley F. Smith 
concluded that the FBI mission to Great Britain led to a closer relationship between 
the FBI and SIS, resulting in FBI agents being permanently attached to SIS. This 
relationship, however, according to Smith, resulted not in an increased 
understanding between American and British cryptanalytic officials but to further 
misunderstandings that had plagued the early cryptanalytic intelligence relationship 
between the two allies. But whatever the effects the mission had on cryptography, it 
nevertheless confirms the increasingly intimate relationship established between the 
FBI and various elements of British intelligence.27 
In addition to having contact with high -level British intelligence officials, 
Clegg and Hince were present when in January 1941 President Roosevelt despatched 
Harry Hopkins, an intimate advisor, to Great Britain in an effort to cement British 
and American relations. The president and Churchill had been at odds inasmuch as 
the prime minister did not know, in the days just prior to the formulation of the lend - 
lease policy, what Roosevelt's precise intentions were. Hopkins spent five weeks in 
Great Britain helping to foster intimate relations between Roosevelt and Churchill, a 
task he succeeded in accomplishing. In London, Hopkins met with a variety of 
government officials, many times dining with them. It was at one such occasion, a 
dinner Lord Beaverbrook, minister of aircraft production, hosted for Hopkins at the 
Claridge Hotel, that Hopkins came into contact with Clegg and Hince. The two FBI 
representatives observed the success with which Hopkins presented himself and 
charmed his hosts and reported this information to Hoover. The FBI director, in 
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turn, forwarded a report to the White House regarding Hopkins's success at this 
particular dinner party.28 
Before their return to Washington, Clegg and Hince cabled a preliminary 
report to Hoover on the results of their inquiry. In their opinion, the FBI 
representatives reported: 
Examination and observation in detail here demonstrate that your [Hoover's] 
investigation for national defense covering sabotage, plant survey, espionage, 
and methods of dealing with suspects, are far superior [than British efforts], 
and follow effective programs and policies, as successful results show here. 
Nevertheless, the authorities here would consider it absolutely necessary that 
the Bureau should have control of the border and port examination stations 
which control the arrival of suspects and aliens.29 
Clegg and Hince might have regarded the FBI's work in domestic national 
security cases as superior to that in Great Britain, but their mission had led to greater 
liaison and understanding between American and British intelligence organizations. 
Moreover, Clegg and Hince had learned much about the organization and operations 
of MI5, SIS, and British cryptography. Upon their return to the United States, 
Hoover collected this information in two memoranda and forwarded them to the 
White House. 
Hoover forwarded the first report on 5 March and the second the following 
day. In the first document, Hoover outlined information "obtained from high 
ranking officials of the British intelligence services" regarding economic warfare 
and readjustment. The memorandum described British plans to disrupt Axis lines of 
supply, steel production, foodstuffs, fuel supplies, and other vital war materials. The 
British had hoped, Hoover continued, to effect economic disruption through 
legislative, diplomatic, and military means. Their ultimate goal, however, according 
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to Hoover, was "to be in a position at the end of the war to organize the world, 
particularly Europe, on an economic basis for the purposes of rehabilitation, profit, 
and the prevention of the spread of Communism." 30 
Hoover's second memorandum to the White House outlined for the president 
"the intelligence organizations and methods of the British." Hoover's report 
critically examined, in particular, the British Security Service. He noted the size of 
the service and its primary weakness: MI5 had no supervision over the police 
organizations that conducted their investigations. Hoover praised the service's 
duplication of its files which, he noted, had already ensured their survival when the 
London office had been bombed. But, he reported, Clegg and Hince had discovered 
"while reviewing the files of the Security Service" that the organization's lack of 
control over the police had led to many delayed and inadequate investigations. Plant 
security surveys also proved inadequate to Hoover who cited the British devotion of 
three hours to a survey whereas FBI agents conducted them over days or weeks. 
Hoover also described the Security Service's use of agents, both undercover and 
official, to monitor suspicious groups and individuals as well as its maintenance of 
watch lists. Lastly, Hoover surveyed the organization's use of wiretaps, mail covers, 
hidden cameras, and other means to monitor foreign diplomatic agents.31 
The second half of this memorandum outlined the organization and general 
activity of the British foreign intelligence organization, the Secret Intelligence 
Service. Hoover noted that British officials believed that if the Security Service and 
SIS were combined, a more effective organization would be had. As a separate 
organization, however, Hoover outlined for Roosevelt the SIS's nature. The British 
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government did not officially acknowledge the existence of the SIS, Hoover wrote, 
yet its appropriation was $14,000,000. Hoover then described the intelligence role 
of station chiefs, contacts with foreign police forces, military observers, the role of 
wireless stations, and the cover of passport control officers (the cover Stephenson 
employed). Then, Hoover outlined the general counterespionage tactics SIS used in 
foreign countries from surveillance to microphones. Lastly, Hoover noted the ease, 
as compared to the US, with which the SIS employed sensitive investigative 
techniques such as mail covers, the interception of wireless transmissions, wiretaps, 
and the interception of telegrams or cables.32 
Clegg's and Hince's survey mission to Great Britain and Hoover's report to 
the White House on British intelligence predated the better -known William Donovan 
mission to London and subsequent report to Roosevelt that is generally credited with 
convincing him to create a central foreign intelligence organization. Donovan had 
made two trips to London, the first in July 1940 at the behest of the White House to 
survey the Fifth Column situation and the state of British defenses. He again 
traveled to London as part of a wider tour of Europe and the Middle East from 
December 1940 to March 1941. Donovan's mission was to ascertain the economic, 
military, and political situation in the Mediterranean region. In London, at the 
conclusion of his tour, and before returning to the United States, Donovan made a 
survey of British intelligence -in particular the SIS and SOE -and consulted with 
the British -intelligence chiefs.33 
Back in Washington, Donovan wrote a four -page memorandum in April 
describing "the instrumentality through which the British Government gathers its 
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intelligence. "34 He wrote that the United States should create a foreign intelligence 
organization using the British system as a guide. He suggested it should be 
controlled by the president, be secretly funded, and be the only organization to 
collect foreign intelligence. Later, Donovan visited the White House and personally 
advocated the creation of such an agency which Roosevelt eventually acceded to in 
July 1941 creating the Office of Coordinator of Information (COI) and placing 
Donovan at its charge. The COI was directly responsible to the president and served 
to coordinate foreign intelligence. But in June 1942 COI was reconfigured to 
become the Office of Strategic Services whose mission was widened to the 
collection of foreign intelligence and special operations.35 
Hoover's report to the White House, dated 6 March 1941, had outlined the 
organization and methods of both the Security Service and Secret Intelligence 
Service. Donovan's memorandum arrived a month later and, in essence, reflected 
the same information as Hoover's memorandum. It is conceivable that the Clegg 
and Hince mission to Great Britain in 1940 -41- predating Donovan's second and 
most recognized trip to London to survey British intelligence -and Hoover's report 
to the White House on their activities may have contributed to convincing Roosevelt 
to establish an American foreign -intelligence apparatus, the COI. Hoover, it should 
be noted, in addition to establishing the FBI as the sole American domestic - 
intelligence organization, had an interest in expanding the FBI's role to include 
foreign intelligence and operations. At the president's request, Hoover had already 
created in the FBI a Special Intelligence Service that operated in Central and South 
America to fight German espionage and to collect economic and political 
317 
intelligence that was "encyclopedic in scope, "36 and he had hoped to enlarge this 
role. Hoover failed in this bid, but not for want of trying.37 The important point to 
be made, however, is that convincing Roosevelt to establish a central foreign 
intelligence apparatus resulted not from one man's mission to London and 
subsequent report, but from multiple sources. The issue, which involved much inter- 
agency competition, is encapsulated in an FBI memorandum dated 29 November 
1941. According to the document, Donovan had a meeting with Clegg in 1941 
where he mentioned his last encounter with him over Christmas -day breakfast in 
London in 1940. Donovan told Clegg that he was proud for having helped "to pave 
the way in England for FBI representatives to obtain valuable information 
concerning most confidential matters." On the bottom of the memorandum Hoover 
penned: "If I recall correctly I think we were there before the Colonel arrived. "38 
* * * 
In its official history, the BSC claimed that the America First Committee had 
legitimate origins but then degenerated into "a pro -German association. "39 In 1941 
this viewpoint was a common perception. FBI officials also believed America First 
had evolved into a pro -Nazi group.40 The BSC's assessment of America First 
further claimed that the group "appealed to pacifists, haters of Roosevelt, haters of 
Great Britain, anti -Communists, anti -Semites, admirers of Germany, American 
imperialists, devotees of big business, and those who hated Europe. "41 While the 
America First Committee had some members who variously fit these criteria, it was 
not a pacifist organization and the Committee worked to exclude extreme elements 
from its ranks. Yet the BSC opinion of the Committee's makeup corresponds with 
318 
the contemporary interventionist opinion of America First. This confirms that the 
information contained in the official BSC history, while self -aggrandizing, is 
accurate inasmuch as it reflects how contemporary interventionists regarded anti - 
interventionist political activity.42 
Other aspects about the America First Committee are inaccurate in the 
official BSC history, but reflect contemporary assumptions regarding the 
organization. According to the BSC, the America First Committee had in early 1941 
seven hundred chapters and nearly one million members. Historian Justus 
Doenecke, a leading scholar of the anti -interventionist movement, has calculated 
America First numbers at 450 chapters and 800,000 members. The BSC history also 
claims that in 1941 Charles Lindbergh had emerged as the Committee's leader. 
While Lindbergh may have been the Committee's most popular and controversial 
speaker and member, he was not its leader. Other views of America First contained 
in the BSC history include a belief that it had been infiltrated by German agents who 
then turned the group "more openly anti -British and pro -German." As evidence, the 
history cites a speech Lindbergh had given just prior to Pearl Harbor where he 
pointed out three war- agitating groups: the British, the Jews, and the White House. 
These examples illustrate contemporary interventionist viewpoints, many of which 
were also held by FBI officials, that are reflected in the official BSC history. 
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Given that the America First Committee was considered a dangerous 
organization, BSC head Stephenson is said to have "perceived the potential menace 
of the America First Committee." To deal with the threat, Stephenson had 
"despatched [agents] to each part of the country to attend its meetings, to keep track 
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of its new members and to ponder upon new and effective ways of instigating 
counter- propaganda.i44 There is no documentation to confirm the claim that BSC 
agents, like FBI agents, were used to monitor the America First Committee, but 
there is no reason to doubt it. One British goal was to bring the United States into 
the war as quickly as possible and a powerful anti -interventionist group, such as 
America First, opposed that end. What must carefully be analyzed, however, are the 
claims made in the BSC history (and elsewhere) regarding BSC tactics to disrupt the 
America First Committee. 
The BSC, according to its history, took three avenues of attack against the 
America First Committee. BSC tactics involved using the press to charge America 
First of having ties with Germany, cooperating with interventionist groups, and 
developing information about the alleged illegal activities of the Committee. It is 
conceivable that the BSC may have had access to sympathetic newspapers or liaised 
with them via a third party, but no direct evidence confirms this. It has been 
established that at least one interventionist group had access to British officials, as 
will be seen below, but the extent of BSC efforts to develop incriminating 
information to use against the America First Committee is unknown. 
One interventionist organization, the Fight For Freedom Committee, sought 
out and maintained a relationship with British officials. When Fight For Freedom 
was formed in 1940, one of its principal members -Dr. Henry Pitt Van Dusen, a 
theology professor at the Union Theological Seminary and graduate of Edinburgh 
University- sought liaison with the British embassy. With the assistance of Aubrey 
Morgan, a British official from the British Information Service in New York, Van 
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Dusen contacted Ambassador Lord Lothian. Van Dusen and Lothian agreed that 
Fight For Freedom would work with the assistance of the British embassy.45 
Historian Mark Lincoln Chadwin has found that the Fight For Freedom 
Committee acted as a liaison between the British embassy and British Information 
Service and the interventionist press. Van Dusen's close cooperation with the 
British embassy, in helping them to distribute British propaganda to the press, was a 
violation of the Foreign Agents Registration Act. Fight For Freedom, by the letter 
of the law, had acted as an agent of foreign power. Indeed, Laura Ingalls had 
successfully been prosecuted under this law for accepting money and propaganda 
from the German embassy. It was unlikely, however, that Fight For Freedom would 
have been prosecuted as its interests were in line with the administration's foreign 
policy goals.46 
As Fight For Freedom served as a liaison between, particularly, the British 
Information Service and the interventionist press, it is possible that BSC was 
involved (perhaps secretly). The British Information Service was headquartered, 
like the BSC, in Rockefeller Center suggesting that the two organizations had ties. It 
is conceivable that the BSC cooperated with the information service to forward pro - 
Allied information to the interventionist press. 
The BSC history described one example of press cooperation involving 
Congressman Hamilton Fish. The BSC history claims that British agents were 
involved in obtaining and publicizing the checks Fish had allegedly received from 
the German businessman G. Hansen -Sturm. The FBI had looked into the matter in 
1942 (see chapter 5), interviewing Henry Hoke who was involved in revealing the 
321 
story. Hoke, the BSC history claims, had cooperated with BSC in another matter "as 
an American friend." It is possible that Hoke had received the information about the 
checks from BSC and offered it to the committee formed to oppose the re- election of 
Fish; this committee brought the matter to the attention of the White House who then 
involved the FBI. Yet there is no supporting documentary evidence to confirm this 
supposition.47 
The BSC history further claims that BSC persuaded Fight For Freedom to 
attend a speech Senator Gerald Nye delivered in Boston on September 1941 where 
the group distributed leaflets accusing him of being a Nazi appeaser. BSC also 
credited itself for having Fight For Freedom buy advertising space in a Boston 
newspaper stating the same, as well as persuading local radio stations to deny Nye 
air time. The BSC prompted Fight For Freedom, according to the BSC history, to 
target Congressman Fish. Fish had delivered a speech in Milwaukee and during his 
concluding remarks somebody handed him a note stating: "Der Fuehrer thanks you 
for your loyalty." Newspaper photographers captured the scene and published ít. 
These examples, according to the BSC history, were representative of the BSC's 
"more direct action" against the America First Committee and its speakers." 
The BSC history recounts one failed attempt at "direct action," however. At 
a 30 October 1941 America First rally at Madison Square Garden, BSC agents 
targeted speaker Charles Lindbergh. BSC agents created duplicate tickets to fill the 
America First crowd with interventionists, particularly Fight For Freedom memhers. 
Some interventionists were to arrive early and others later to disrupt the seating of 
legitimate America -First ticket holders. Unfortunately for the BSC, attendance at 
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the rally was low and the illegitimate attendees were seated in vacant seats thereby 
increasing the rally's already low attendance. Historian Michele Flynn Stenehjem 
has discovered that John T. Flynn of the New York America First Chapter directed 
that the tickets for the rally be specially stamped. By stamping the tickets prior to 
their distribution, according to Stenehjem, illegitimate ticket holders were ushered to 
an out -of -way section of Madison Square Garden.49 
There is no verifiable evidence to prove that the BSC had persuaded or 
directed Fight For Freedom (or other interventionist groups) to disrupt America First 
Committee rallies. It is possible that BSC sought to influence this type of behavior, 
but it is equally possible that these groups employed disruptive tactics without 
prompting. In his book Desperate Deception: British Covert Operations in the 
United States, 1939 -44, Thomas Mahl claims that the Fight For Freedom Committee 
was, in fact, a front for BSC. He further argues that Henry Hoke (among many 
others) was a BSC agent. Mahl provides no evidence beyond speculation to support 
his contentions, reflecting the persistence of the mythology surrounding the 
activities of British intelligence in America. Fight For Freedom indeed had contacts 
with British representatives, but it does not follow that they were a front 
organization. Until verifiable documentation is available, all that can be concluded 
is that BSC played a role -the scope as yet undefined -in attempting to disrupt the 
America First Committee.5° 
In another matter that also had interested FBI officials, the BSC history 
claims that an "American friend" and BSC agents had revealed the abuse of the 
congressional frank involving Senators Wheeler, Nye. and Congressman Fish. 
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While the BSC history does not name the "American friend," the relevant paragraph 
in the history leaves no doubt the person alluded to is Henry Hoke (see chapter 5): 
For this campaign [revealing the congressional franking abuse], the 
cooperation of an American friend was enlisted. He worked on his own, in 
his own time and with his own money, while BSC provided him with 
information, guidance and extra funds. By profession he was a `direct mail 
advertising specialist'. His clients consisted of those commercial companies 
who wished to be told about new and better methods of advertising by mail.5 
The official BSC history suggests that after Hoke developed the franking 
information BSC agents more thoroughly probed the issue. The agents allegedly 
discovered that mailing lists from the German Library of Information and a 
particular type of addressing machine had been used. The BSC history then claims 
that agents investigated and discovered that George Hill and George Sylvester 
Viereck headed the propaganda campaign. Whether BSC agents had actually played 
a leading role in this episode is unknown, but it appears that their alleged efforts may 
not have been predominant. Hoke investigated and pushed the issue, particularly 
with Senator Wheeler, and even the BSC history admits that he had worked on his 
own with, perhaps, limited assistance from the BSC. After Hoke had publicized the 
issue, in September 1941 a federal grand jury was convened to investigate the issue. 
Concurrently, Washington Post reporter Dillard Stokes investigated on his own and 
wrote a series of sensational stories about the franking operation. The Fight For 
Freedom Committee also pressed the issue. 
All that the BSC history lays claim to regarding the frank is found in the 
above sources, leading one to the conclusion that the BSC history exaggerates its 
role. It is probable, however, that BSC had an interest in the franking issue and may 
have lent some type of support to Hoke, but others clearly had the issue in hand and 
324 
successfully pushed the case. The most sensational claim in the BSC history, 
however, is that in its effort the BSC had unraveled Fish's political career. The 
history claims that because the franking story had made its way into a book 
published during Fish's 1944 re- election campaign, and as his political opponents 
had used it, Fish's political career had been destroyed. As the BSC history states, 
Fish "attributed his defeat to Reds and Communists. He might -with more 
accuracy -have blamed BSC." This claim seems unreasonable given the variety of 
groups and individuals who pressed the franking issue and attacked Fish.52 
One claim concerning BSC activity and the anti -interventionists that is bogus 
involved the leak of the Victory Program (see chapter 6) to the Chicago Tribune and 
Washington Times -Herald. Not mentioned in the official BSC history, the account 
of the BSC's role in the Victory Program leak appeared in William Stevenson's A 
Man Called Intrepid, the sensational account of BSC head William Stephenson and 
his organization. Stevenson claims in A Man Called Intrepid that Senator Wheeler 
was, indeed, the person who had leaked the Victory Program to the anti- 
interventionist press, believing it to be the smoking -gun evidence with which 
Roosevelt had intended to lead America into war. Further, Stevenson claims that to 
the Germans, revelation of the Victory Program was a "fantastic intelligence coup." 
Yet, Stevenson writes, in reality the Victory Program was a "plant," a creation of the 
BSC's Political -Warfare Division. The Victory Program, according to this account, 
was pieced together "out of material already known to have reached the enemy in 
dribs and drabs, and ... some misleading information. "53 
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With the United States on the verge of war with Japan in late November 
1941, BSC allegedly slipped the phony Victory Program to Senator Wheeler via a 
young military officer. The BSC's goal was to have Wheeler publicize the plan and 
thereby goad Hitler into declaring war on the United States. The faked Victory 
Program was to stand as evidence, once publicized in the press, of Roosevelt's 
intention to wage war on Nazi Germany. According to Stevenson, the leak 
successfully led Hitler to declare war on the United States on 11 December 1941 and 
was the vehicle to that end.54 
This account of the BSC's alleged role in creating and slipping the Victory 
Program to the unwitting Wheeler who, in turn, had it published and brought the 
United States to war with Germany is erroneous. The Victory Program was a 
genuine War Department contingency plan drawn up under the direction of Albert 
Wedemeyer. When it was leaked to Wheeler and subsequently published in the 
Chicago Tribune and Washington Times -Herald on 4 December 1941, an intensive 
FBI investigation ensued to discover who had leaked the sensitive document (see 
chapter 6). Any notion that the Victory Program was a bogus document concocted 
by BSC is fiction. 
But some continue to press the notion that the Victory Program was intended 
to incite Hitler into declaring war on the United States. Thomas Fleming, in his 
recent book The New Dealers' War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and the War Within 
World War II, accepts that the Victory Program was genuine. Yet he believes that 
Roosevelt intentionally leaked the Victory Program to Wheeler, sensing imminent 
war with Japan, to goad Hitler into declaring war and thereby achieving for 
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Roosevelt the realization of his Europe -first policy. Conceding that "there is no 
absolute proof' to support his claim, Fleming nevertheless believes the charge "fits 
the devious side of Franklin Roosevelt's complex personality." Fleming offers no 
verifiable evidence that supports his case.55 
Irrespective of the FBI's and BSC's interest in the Victory Program leak of 4 
December 1941, the two organizations' relationship began to falter at this time. FBI 
and BSC relations began to deteriorate just prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl 
Harbor, and the origin of this deterioration was bureaucratic. Hoover had 
successfully established FBI primacy in domestic intelligence matters and he sought 
the same in the field of foreign intelligence. Obstructing this goal, however, was 
William Donovan. Donovan had previous experience in intelligence and, more 
importantly, maintained contacts with influential persons such as Secretary of the 
Navy Frank Knox, President Roosevelt, and William Stephenson. With these 
contacts, Donovan was in a strong position to establish for himself a leading role in 
American foreign intelligence. A 31 July 1941 FBI memorandum notes Hoover's 
concern following the colonel's appointment to head the COI. Hoover acquired 
information from informant Henry Grunewald about congressional opposition to 
Donovan's appointment. According to Grunewald, Hoover had congressional 
support to head COI but the other intelligence agencies, who were "jealous of 
Hoover and the Bureau," opposed him.56 
While liaison with Hoover was vital for Stephenson in 1940, his mission also 
required him to establish relations with other high -level administration officials. 
This resulted in a new and perhaps more intimate relationship between Stephenson 
327 
and Donovan than on which Hoover would have approved. It was this relationship, 
in light of Hoover's quest for a foreign intelligence role for the FBI, that led to a 
deterioration of FBI -BSC relations inasmuch as Hoover no longer maintained 
exclusive liaison with BSC. The COI -BSC relationship threatened Hoover's foreign 
intelligence goal because Donovan was Hoover's primary competitor in running 
foreign intelligence. 
The official BSC history suggests that Hoover "resented Donovan's 
organization [COI] when it was first established because he feared that its interests 
would clash with the authority of the FBI, particularly in Latin America." Hoover, 
thereby, "attacked" BSC because it was Donovan's "mainstay" in keeping COI 
operational. Hoover's resentment of BSC at this juncture appears to extend beyond 
the FBI's already established authority and its operations in Latin America. The 
deterioration was bureaucratic inasmuch as the FBI no longer monopolized the BSC 
relationship and it was this that threatened Hoover's desire to extend the FBI further 
in foreign intelligence. The BSC history also suggests this, stating: "Basic to them 
all [Hoover's attempts to embarrass BSC] was his resentment that the FBI no longer 
had a monopoly of collaboration with British Intelligence." If Hoover were to 
involve the FBI in foreign intelligence beyond Latin America, he would have needed 
the support (he had the liaison) with British intelligence. Hoover's hope that the FBI 
would assume a greater foreign intelligence role- beyond that which it had already 
established in Latin America -over a limited concern with COI and Latin America, 
is the most likely explanation for the worsening FBI -BSC relations.57 
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According to the BSC history, Hoover's rift with BSC lasted a year and a 
half The history further states that the FBI director's displeasure with BSC was not 
openly stated but expressed behind the scenes, yet another accurate Hoover 
characteristic. Just how Hoover sought "to embarrass BSC" is not explained in the 
official history because the story "would be merely tedious and probably 
misleading." But the official history does suggest that one example of 
misunderstanding between Hoover and BSC was over a time -lag in providing the 
FBI with up -to -date intelligence on Latin America, where Hoover's SIS was 
operating. Apparently considerable time passed when transferring intelligence from 
Latin America to London to the FBI, and Hoover believed that BSC had 
purposefully withheld information from the FBI. Commenting on Hoover's 
character, the official history observes correctly that he "is the kind of man who does 
not bow easily to the inevitable -that is at once his strength and his weakness -and 
it took a long while to convince him that he could not succeed in his determination 
to exclude BSC from contact with other US Intelligence agencies." While we may 
not know the exact details of this rift, the BSC history states that Hoover eventually 
accepted the BSC's liaison with other agencies and held no "bitterness" toward 
BSC.'8 
* * * 
Our understanding of the precise nature and scope of the FBI's liaison with 
British Security Coordination (and more broadly with British intelligence) remains 
limited. Until the British and American governments release more substantial 
documentation we will have only an incomplete understanding of the agencies' 
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relationship. Yet a paucity of evidence does not preclude an analysis of the FBI's 
and BSC's interest in the anti -interventionists. Evidence exists, particularly in the 
form of the BSC's official history, which hints at the BSC's role in disrupting the 
activities of the America First Committee, Charles Lindbergh, Hamilton Fish, 
Gerald Nye, and others. The official history offers neither a complete nor a detailed 
analysis, and despite its sometimes misleading nature and triumphal tone, it should 
not be dismissed out of hand. Many of the events discussed in the official history, 
which was written in 1945 and only published in 1998, had in fact occurred. The 
history also reflects popular assumptions and perceptions about the anti - 
interventionists dating from 1940 by those who advocated intervention. It therefore 
has some value to the analysis of BSC's interest in Roosevelt's critics because one 
can ascertain the BSC's, and thereby British intelligence's, view of anti - 
interventionists and gain a limited insight into how they dealt with them. 
Independent sources establish the veracity of some information contained in 
the official BSC history. Robert Sherwood's 1948 memoir corroborates the official 
history's claim that Roosevelt had directed the FBI to maintain close cooperation 
with the BSC. Further, state department documents and FBI files confirm that two 
FBI representatives traveled to Great Britain to study its intelligence methods, a 
claim (if vague in detail) made in the official BSC history. Independent sources - 
Adolf Berle's diary and H. Montgomery Hyde's memoir -also establish that the FBI 
permitted the BSC to use its wireless transmitter to contact superiors in London. 
The history's description of Hoover's personality and priorities, too, is accurate and 
confirmed by recent academic biographies of the FBI director. 
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Some contemporary perceptions and biases about anti -interventionists in the 
official BSC history are also borne out. While these perceptions are factually 
inaccurate, they reflect assumptions BSC officials made about anti -interventionists. 
The history suggests, for example, that the America First Committee was originally 
organized as a legitimate pressure group but degenerated through time into a pro - 
German outfit. FBI officials (as well as some prominent interventionists) also held 
this view. Further, the BSC history's view of the America First Committee's 
composition reflects popular perceptions of the organization. Interventionists 
believed that the Committee fostered pacifists, fascists, and anti- Semites despite 
America First's concerted effort to exclude these elements from its ranks. Other 
perceptions of America First reflected in the BSC history involve its leadership. 
Many Americans in 1941 mistakenly believed that Charles Lindbergh singularly led 
the Committee during its existence, yet the famous aviator was only a member and 
popular (if controversial) speaker for America First. 
BSC efforts to disrupt the anti -interventionists and its involvement in the 
congressional franking scandal, as elucidated in the BSC history, must be critically 
examined. The official history claims that BSC maintained links with the 
interventionist press and interventionist pressure groups to discredit and disrupt anti - 
interventionists, but the nature and scope of these links are not clear. One historian 
has already established that the Fight For Freedom Committee maintained a 
relationship with British officials and acted for them as a conduit to the 
interventionist press. The BSC history, moreover, claims that BSC maintained a 
relationship with Fight For Freedom, but the nature of the relationship is not 
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elaborated upon. It seems likely that the BSC may have used its contact with Fight 
For Freedom as a conduit to the interventionist press. Yet it is not clear how BSC 
maintained a link with Fight For Freedom. It seems possible that the relationship 
may have been covert. Historian Mark Lincoln Chadwin has documented that Fight 
For Freedom had links with British officials but nowhere does he mention British 
intelligence. It is possible that BSC used a third party, such as the British 
Information Service or the British embassy, as its link to Fight For Freedom. (This 
covert link may have been pragmatic, as a means of passing information, rather than 
manipulative.) And thus the BSC history, in its triumphal tone, claims that Fight For 
Freedom's tactics were, in fact, the BSC's. 
The BSC's involvement in the congressional franking case also appears to be 
exaggerated. Henry Hoke, the "friend" of BSC, may have had contacts with BSC in 
his efforts to publicize the abuse of the frank. Thomas Mahl assumes that Hoke was 
a BSC "agent," but there is no evidence to substantiate this claim. Furthermore, the 
BSC history's claim that its agents had developed the case, assisted the U.S. federal 
prosecutor, and publicized it seems overstated. The Fight For Freedom Committee, 
journalists, a federal grand jury, and others developed and publicized information 
about the franking abuse and Congressman Fish. While the BSC probably worked 
to develop information which could have been used to discredit anti -interventionists, 
their efforts as outlined in the history seem to have only replicated or complemented 
the efforts of others. 
What conclusions can be drawn regarding the FBI's and BSC's relationship 
during the interventionist /anti -interventionist foreign policy debate? Clearly there 
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was close liaison between the two organizations and they both sought to develop 
information on President Roosevelt's foreign policy critics. Indeed, Edwin Webster 
of the America First Committee's New York Chapter wrote Senator Nye in October 
1941 with concerns that "a British agency [sought] to frame the America First 
Committee and discredit them." He feared the British goal was to call America First 
"to account for subversive activities. "59 But a dearth in documentation prevents a 
complete understanding of the scope and nature of this relationship. Further, their 
relationship broke down over bureaucratic infighting regarding American foreign 
intelligence and intelligence liaison. Hoover sought to create a foreign intelligence 
role for the FBI but had competition with Donovan who, with high -ranking and 
influential contacts and being a member of Roosevelt's social circle (Hoover was a 
social introvert), was in a better position to secure the job for himself Stephenson 
and BSC suffered Hoover's resentment thereafter when Donovan established liaison 
with British intelligence. This was a roadblock that hindered Hoover's desire to 
enter into foreign intelligence and thereby led to a breakdown in FBI -BSC relations. 
The FBI's development of a close working relationship with British 
intelligence further reflects its role in the growing national security apparatus. 
Dating from 1940 and extending into the Cold War era, the FBI's relationship with 
British intelligence increased to become part of what has been termed the "special 
intelligence relationship" between the British and American governments. This 
early liaison, therefore, reflects one aspect of the FBI's origins as part of the later 
national security state. It was from this foundation, laid during the pre -war period 
and in the context of the interventionist /anti -interventionist foreign policy debate, 
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CONCLUSION 
A close examination of the FBI's surveillance of Charles Lindbergh, the 
America First Committee, Senators Burton Wheeler and Gerald Nye, Congressman 
Hamilton Fish, those associated with the Victory Program investigation, the 
Brigham family, Harry Elmer Barnes, and Laura Ingalls confirms the underlying 
political nature of the FBI's effort. J. Edgar Hoover sought in each instance to cater 
to the Roosevelt administration's political and policy interests -that being to 
monitor the political activity of its anti -interventionist foreign policy critics and, if 
possible, discredit them. In the Ingalls case, even though the FBI had a 
responsibility to investigate a true violation of the Foreign Agents Registration Act, 
underscoring its effort was a desire to develop a successful prosecution of not an 
espionage agent but one the president's foreign policy critics. Further highlighting 
the political nature of this investigation is the fact that FBI officials did not seek a 
similar case against the interventionist Fight For Freedom Committee who, as Mark 
Lincoln Chadwin has shown, similarly violated the Foreign Agents Registration Act. 
The Bureau's concern with the administration's political interests is further 
underscored in the Victory Program leak investigation where FBI officials focused, 
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almost exclusively, on anti- interventionist critics to satisfy the desires of some high - 
level administration officials to hold them responsible. 
FBI surveillance efforts against the anti- interventionists were widespread, 
thorough, and responsive to Roosevelt's political desires. FBI agents employed the 
use of informers, illegal wiretaps, mail covers, official investigations, perused 
organizations' private files, collected derogatory intelligence, provided public 
opinion leaders with FBI -obtained political intelligence (using blind memoranda), 
and sought to develop cases against anti -interventionists that would have discredited 
them in the courts. Hoover also recommended to his superiors the use of the grand 
jury that, while nominally secret, invariably drew public attention and pressure that 
could serve to cast doubt on the legitimacy of Roosevelt's critics. The FBI's 
surveillance was not limited nor were Roosevelt's purposes "essentially 
benevolent."' Instead, they reflected an intensive FBI investigative effort and a 
disregard by Roosevelt for his political opponents' civil liberties. Taken as a whole, 
FBI surveillance during this period reveals similar patterns of FBI behavior that 
occurred during the Cold War (i.e., use of illegal wiretaps, widely disseminating 
political intelligence to public opinion leaders, and extensively monitoring White 
House critics). This pattern suggests that the Bureau's origins as a national security 
apparatus date to the period of the Great Debate. 
In return for satisfying administration political interests, Hoover obtained 
increased authority for the FBI from the White House. When Attorney General 
Cummings sought to publicize the crime issue during the early New Deal, to pass his 
crime bill, with enthusiastic FBI assistance he was successful. Then, beginning in 
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1934, Hoover responded to White House requests for information about the 
activities of fascist groups in America. By 1936, pleased with Hoover's reports, 
Roosevelt stepped up FBI efforts when he verbally authorized the Bureau to 
investigate domestic fascist and communist movements. In 1939 Hoover sought and 
won an executive order making the FBI the primary domestic investigative agency. 
With war raging in 1940, Roosevelt increased FBI investigative authority by 
authorizing the use of illegal wiretaps in national defense cases. Hoover exploited 
this executive directive and created for his FBI autonomy in using this investigative 
tool. Meantime, Hoover developed or revised special filing procedures that ensured 
the confidentiality of sensitive FBI operations and information. Yet it is an 
important factor that this all occurred during a period of international crisis that 
resulted in a charged political debate that permitted Hoover to cater to the 
President's domestic political concerns. 
An examination of the increasing number of FBI agents and the agency's 
annual appropriations from 1934 further alludes to Hoover's success in developing 
his FBI during this period. In 1934 the FBI employed 391 agents and a support staff 
of 451 and was appropriated $2,589,500. By 1936, the year Roosevelt increased 
FBI investigative authority, the agency had nearly doubled its agents to 609 with a 
support staff of 971. Its 1936 appropriation was $5,000,000. When the anti - 
interventionist /interventionist debate dominated American national politics by 1941, 
the FBI employed 1,596 agents and 2,677 support staff with a budget of 
$14,743,300. To round off the increase, by the final year of the war (1945) the FBI 
had 4,370 agents, 7,422 support staff, and an appropriation of $44,197,146.2 
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The FBI's relationship with British intelligence also illustrates the origins of 
the Bureau's role in the later national security state. A hallmark of the Second 
World War and Cold War (and beyond), the close intelligence relationship between 
the United States and Great Britain had its origins during the Great Debate. The 
FBI's "special relationship" with British intelligence began in 1940 and increasingly 
became more intimate. And while we may not be able to definitively ascertain the 
scope and nature of the FBI's relationship with the British Security Coordination, 
both sought similar goals in regards President Roosevelt's anti -interventionist 
foreign policy critics. Together with other FBI tactics alluded to previously, the 
Bureau's close liaison with a foreign intelligence agency suggests that its origins 
within the national security state began during the pre- Second World War period.. 
Anti -interventionists suspected that the FBI was monitoring their political 
activities, and while the Bureau's efforts ultimately failed to discredit them, it 
nevertheless had a certain chilling effect. Lindbergh believed that the FBI had 
wiretapped his telephone and, indeed, FBI agents collected information about the 
aviator indirectly from an illegal wiretap and included it in a report to the White 
House and to the federal prosecutor who was to question Lindbergh in a grand jury 
investigation. Other anti -interventionists suspected or knew they were under 
investigation by the FBI, and they expressed their concern. The America First 
Committee went so far as to obtain confirmation from Hoover that the FBI had in no 
manner collected intelligence on them through a wiretap. Yet FBI agents had, 
indeed, gathered "valuable" political intelligence about the group via the Brigham 
wiretap. Even in the Ingalls investigation it appears that the FBI had used an illegal 
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wiretap that caused some concern among FBI officials about certain evidence 
thereby being inadmissible in court. 
Roosevelt and senior administration officials found Hoover's reports 
valuable. After receiving the first of Hoover's political intelligence reports in 1940 
Roosevelt thanked the FBI director in a personal letter. And by late 1941 when the 
Great Debate settled into a temporary stalemate, Roosevelt directed the attorney 
general to have the FBI investigate the money sources behind the America First 
Committee in the hopes that a grand jury probe would end the impasse. Senior 
administration officials also pressed for an FBI investigation of anti -interventionists 
in order to hold them responsible for the leak of the Victory Program. But most 
unsubtle was Interior Secretary Ickes's use of FBI information -which had been 
acquired, unknown to Ickes, partly through a wiretap -in his critical book 
manuscript on Lindbergh. Clearly, senior administration officials found Hoover's 
reports tantalizing and, in some instances, used this information. 
This study, therefore, compliments the work of historians of the FBI, anti - 
interventionists, and the national security state. The FBI's extensive political 
surveillance during the Great Debate can now be understood as part of the better - 
known history of the FBI's political surveillance during both the Red Scare and Cold 
War periods. This study also compliments the work of historians of anti - 
interventionism who have neglected the topic due to a lack of documentation or 
historical focus. While we might not be able to definitively understand how the 
administration used the information provided by the FBI, the administration's 
interest in it is apparent. This study further broadens our understanding of the 
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national security state which has been analyzed in numerous ways. In terms of the 
FBI, at least, during the period of the Great Debate was when, for the first time, the 
agency extensively monitored the activity of administration critics and sought to 
undermine them. The FBI's methods here are strikingly similar to those employed, 
though on a much greater scale, during the Cold War. This suggests that the FBI's 
contribution to the national security state may be dated earlier than the Cold War and 
involved groups beyond leftists and communists. 
In sum, the FBI's surveillance of Roosevelt's anti -interventionist foreign 
policy critics denotes the origins of the Cold -War FBI's national security apparatus. 
For the first time the Bureau extensively monitored administration opposition, 
basing their efforts on a "domestic security" rationale, and thereby became an 
intelligence arm for the White House. FBI agents used a variety of intrusive and 
illegal investigative tactics and regarded legitimate foreign policy dissenters as 
"subversives" or "un- American." FBI officials sought to develop the intelligence 
gathered from these investigations to recommend the indictment of Roosevelt's 
critics under the Smith Act, Foreign Agents Registration Act, Espionage Act, or 
conspiracy statutes, a tactic they would employ against domestic Communists during 
the Cold War. These actions violated the civil liberties of law- abiding political 
opponents and contributed a chilling effect in important public debate over national 
policy. From these origins FBI Director Hoover was able to create in the FBI a 
more intrusive, powerful, and autonomous internal security agency during the Cold 
War. But while this evolution had its basis during the Great Debate, it was not a 
predetermined fact that the FBI would become the Cold War agency it did. Unique 
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circumstances (such as Truman's ascendancy to the presidency and Hoover's later 
misrepresentation of executive orders) during the Cold War era permitted Hoover to 
develop the FBI into a more intrusive and autonomous agency.3 Nevertheless, 
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